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Abstract: It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same
methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-
held view, suggesting that people’s moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in
causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to
say that the relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance
error, etc.) then interferes and allows people’s moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that
moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. I argue that the data available now favor the
second of these approaches over the first.
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1. Introduction
Consider the way research is conducted in a typical
modern university. There are departments for theology,
drama, philosophy . . . and then there are departments
specifically devoted to the practice of science. Faculty
members in these science departments generally have
quite specific responsibilities. They are not supposed to
make use of all the various methods and approaches one
finds in other parts of the university. They are supposed
to focus on observation, experimentation, the construction
of explanatory theories.
Now consider the way the human mind ordinarily makes
sense of the world. One plausible view would be that the
human mind works something like a modern university.
There are psychological processes devoted to religion
(the mind’s theology department), to aesthetics (the
mind’s art department), to morality (the mind’s philosophy
department) . . . and then there are processes specifically
devoted to questions that have a roughly “scientific” char-
acter. These processes work quite differently from the
ones we use in thinking about, say, moral or aesthetic ques-
tions. They proceed using more or less the same sorts of
methods we find in university science departments.
This metaphor is a powerful one, and it has shaped
research programs in many different areas of cognitive
science. Take the study of folk psychology. Ordinary
people have a capacity to ascribe mental states (beliefs,
desires, etc.), and researchers have sometimes suggested
that people acquire this capacity in much the same way
that scientists develop theoretical frameworks (e.g.,
Gopnik & Wellman 1992). Or take causal cognition.
Ordinary people have an ability to determine whether
one event caused another, and it has been suggested that
they do so by looking at the same sorts of statistical infor-
mation scientists normally consult (e.g., Kelley 1967).
Numerous other fields have taken a similar path. In each
case, the basic strategy is to look at the methods used by
professional research scientists and then to hypothesize
that people actually use similar methods in their ordinary
understanding. This strategy has clearly led to many
important advances.
Yet, in recent years, a series of experimental results have
begun pointing in a rather different direction. These
results indicate that people’s ordinary understanding
does not proceed using the same methods one finds in
the sciences. Instead, it appears that people’s intuitions
in both folk psychology and causal cognition can be
affected by moral judgments. That is, people’s judgments
about whether a given action truly is morally good or
bad can actually affect their intuitions about what that
action caused and what mental states the agent had.
These results come as something of a surprise. They do
not appear to fit comfortably with the view that certain
aspects of people’s ordinary understanding work much
like a scientific investigation, and a question therefore
arises about how best to understand them.
One approach would be to suggest that people truly are
engaged in an effort to pursue something like a scientific
investigation, but that they simply aren’t doing a very
good job of it. Perhaps the competencies underlying
people’s judgments actually are purely scientific in
nature, but there are then various additional factors that
get in the way of people’s ability to apply these com-
petencies correctly. Such a view might allow us to
explain the patterns observed in people’s intuitions
while still holding onto the basic idea that people’s
capacities for thinking about psychology, causation, and
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the like, can be understood on the model of a scientific
investigation.
This approach has a strong intuitive appeal, and recent
theoretical work has led to the development of specific
hypotheses that spell it out with impressive clarity and pre-
cision. There is just one problem. The actual experimental
results never seem to support these hypotheses. Indeed,
the results point toward a far more radical view. They
suggest that moral considerations actually figure in the
competencies people use to make sense of human beings
and their actions.
2. Introducing the person-as-scientist theory
In the existing literature on causal cognition and theory-of-
mind, it has often been suggested that people’s ordinary
way of making sense of the world is in certain respects ana-
logous to a scientific theory (Churchland 1981; Gopnik &
Meltzoff 1997; Sloman 2005). This is an important and
provocative suggestion, but if we are to grapple with it
properly, we need to get a better understanding of pre-
cisely what it means and how experimental evidence
might bear on it.
2.1. Ordinary understanding and scientific theory
To begin with, we will need to distinguish two different
aspects of the claim that people’s ordinary understanding
is analogous to a scientific theory. First, there is the claim
that human thought might sometimes take the form of a
theory. To assess this first claim, one would have to pick
out the characteristics that distinguish theories from
other sorts of knowledge structures and then ask whether
these characteristics can be found in ordinary cognition.
This is certainly a worthwhile endeavor, but it has already
been pursued in a considerable body of recent research
(e.g., Carey & Spelke 1996; Goldman 2006; Murphy &
Medin 1985), and I will have nothing further to say about
it here. Instead, the focus of this target article will be on
a second claim, namely, the claim that certain facets of
human cognition are properly understood as scientific.
To begin with, it should be emphasized that this second
claim is distinct from the first. If one looks to the usual
sorts of criteria for characterizing a particular knowledge
structure as a “theory” (e.g., Premack & Woodruff 1978),
one sees immediately that these criteria could easily be sat-
isfied by, for example, a religious doctrine. A religious doc-
trine could offer systematic principles; it could posit
unobservable entities and processes; it could yield definite
predictions. For all these reasons, it seems perfectly
reasonable to say that a religious doctrine could give us a
certain kind of “theory” about how the world works. Yet,
although the doctrine might offer us a theory, it does not
appear to offer us a specifically scientific theory. In par-
ticular, it seems that religious thinking often involves
attending to different sorts of considerations from the
ones we would expect to find in a properly scientific inves-
tigation. Our task here, then, is to figure out whether
certain aspects of human cognition qualify as “scientific”
in this distinctive sense.
One common view is that certain aspects of human
cognition do indeed make use of the very same sorts of con-
siderations we find in the systematic sciences. So, for
example, in work on causal cognition, researchers some-
times proceed by looking to the statistical methods that
appear in systematic scientific research and then suggesting
that those same methods are at work in people’s ordinary
causal judgments (Gopnik et al. 2004; Kelley 1967; Wood-
ward 2004). Different theories of this type appeal to quite
different statistical methods, but these differences will not
be relevant here. The thing to focus on is just the general
idea that people’s ordinary causal cognition is in some way
analogous to a scientific inquiry.
And it is not only the study of causal cognition that pro-
ceeds in this way. A similar viewpoint can be found in the
theory-of-mind literature (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997),
where it sometimes goes under the slogan “Child as Scien-
tist.” There, a central claim is that children refine their
understanding of the mind in much the same way that
scientists refine their theories. Hence, it is suggested
that we can look at the way Kepler developed his theory
of the orbits of the planets and then suggest that children
use the same basic approach as they are acquiring the
concept of belief (Gopnik & Wellman 1992). Once
again, the idea is that the cognitive processes people use
in ordinary life show a deep similarity to the ones at
work in systematic science.
It is this idea that we will be taking up here. Genuinely
scientific inquiry seems to be sensitive to a quite specific
range of considerations and seems to take those consider-
ations into account in a highly distinctive manner. What
we want to know is whether certain aspects of ordinary
cognition work in more or less this same way.
2.2. Refining the question
But now it might seem that the answer is obvious. For it
has been known for decades that people’s ordinary intui-
tions show certain patterns that one would never expect
to find in a systematic scientific investigation. People
make wildly inappropriate inferences from contingency
tables, show shocking failures to properly detect corre-
lations, display a tendency to attribute causation to which-
ever factor is most perceptually salient (Chapman &
Chapman 1967; McArthur & Post 1977; Smedslund
1963). How could one possibly reconcile these facts
about people’s ordinary intuitions with a theory according
to which people’s ordinary cognition is based on some-
thing like a scientific methodology?
The answer, I think, is that we need to interpret that
theory in a somewhat more nuanced fashion. The theory
is not plausibly understood as an attempt to describe all
of the factors that can influence people’s intuitions.
Instead, it is best understood as an attempt to capture
the “fundamental” or “underlying” nature of certain cogni-
tive capacities. There might then be various factors that
interfere with our ability to apply those capacities cor-
rectly, but the existence of these additional factors would
in no way impugn the theory itself.
To get a rough sense for the strategy here, it might be
helpful to return to the comparison with religion. Faced
with a discussion over religious doctrine, we might say:
“This discussion isn’t best understood as a kind of scientific
inquiry; it is something else entirely. So if we find that the
participants in this discussion are diverging from proper
scientific methods, the best interpretation is that they
simply weren’t trying to use those methods in the first
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place.” This would certainly be a reasonable approach
to the study of religious discourse, but the key claim of
the person-as-scientist theory is that it would not be the
right approach to understanding certain aspects of our
ordinary cognition. Looking at these aspects of ordinary
cognition, a defender of the person-as-scientist view
would adopt a very different stance. For example, she
might say: “Yes, it’s true that people sometimes diverge
from proper scientific methods, but that is not because
they are engaging in some fundamentally different sort of
activity. Rather, their underlying capacities for causal cogni-
tion and theory-of-mind really are governed by scientific
methods; it’s just that there are also various additional
factors that get in the way and sometimes lead people into
errors.”
Of course, it can be difficult to make sense of this talk of
certain capacities being “underlying” or “fundamental,”
and different researchers might unpack these notions in
different ways:
1. One view would be that people have a domain-
specific capacity for making certain kinds of judgments
but then various other factors intrude and allow these
judgments to be affected by irrelevant considerations.
2. Another would be that people have a representation
of the criteria governing certain concepts but that they are
not always able to apply these representations correctly.
3. A third would be that the claim is best understood
counterfactually, as a hypothesis about how people
would respond if they only had sufficient cognitive
resources and freedom from certain kinds of biases.
I will not be concerned here with the particular differ-
ences between these different views. Instead, let us intro-
duce a vocabulary that allows us to abstract away from
these details and talk about this approach more generally.
Regardless of the specifics, I will say that the approach is to
posit an underlying competence and then to posit various
additional factors that get in the way of people’s ability
to apply that competence correctly.
With this framework in place, we can now return to our
investigation of the impact of moral considerations on
people’s intuitions. How is this impact to be explained?
One strategy would be to start out by finding some way
to distinguish people’s underlying competencies from
the various interfering factors. Then one could say that
the competencies themselves are entirely scientific in
nature, but that the interfering factors then prevent
people from applying these competencies correctly and
allow moral considerations to affect their intuitions. This
strategy is certainly a promising one, and I shall discuss
it in further detail later. But it is important to keep in
mind that we also have open another, very different
option. It could always turn out that there simply is no
underlying level at which the relevant cognitive capacities
are purely scientific, that the whole process is suffused
through and through with moral considerations.
3. Intuitions and moral judgments
Before we think any further about these two types of
explanations, we will need to get a better grasp of the
phenomena to be explained. Let us begin, then, just by
considering a few cases in which moral considerations
appear to be impacting people’s intuitions.
3.1. Intentional action
Perhaps the most highly studied of these effects is the
impact of people’s moral judgments on their use of the
concept of intentional action. This is the concept people
use to distinguish between behaviors that are performed
intentionally (e.g., hammering in a nail) and those that
are performed unintentionally (e.g., accidentally bringing
the hammer down on one’s own thumb). It might at first
appear that people’s use of this distinction depends
entirely on certain facts about the role of the agent’s
mental states in his or her behavior, but experimental
studies consistently indicate that something more
complex is actually at work here. It seems that people’s
moral judgments can somehow influence their intuitions
about whether a behavior is intentional or unintentional.
To demonstrate the existence of this effect, we can con-
struct pairs of cases that are exactly the same in almost
every respect but differ in their moral status.1 For a
simple example, consider the following vignette:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the
board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It
will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environ-
ment.”
The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all
about harming the environment. I just want to make as
much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.”
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environ-
ment was harmed.
Faced with this vignette, most subjects say that the chair-
man intentionally harmed the environment. One might
initially suppose that this intuition relies only on certain
facts about the chairman’s own mental states (e.g., that
he specifically knew his behavior would result in environ-
mental harm). But the data suggest that something more is
going on here. For people’s intuitions change radically
when one alters the moral status of the chairman’s behav-
ior by simply replacing the word “harm” with “help”:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the
board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It
will help us increase profits, and it will also help the environ-
ment.”
The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all
about helping the environment. I just want to make as much
profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.”
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environ-
ment was helped.
Faced with this second version of the story, most subjects
actually say that the chairman unintentionally helped the
environment. Yet it seems that the only major difference
between the two vignettes lies in the moral status of the
chairman’s behavior. So it appears that people’s moral
judgments are somehow impacting their intuitions about
intentional action.
Of course, it would be unwise to draw any strong con-
clusions from the results of just one experiment, but this
basic effect has been replicated and extended in numerous
further studies. To begin with, subsequent experiments
have further explored the harm and help cases to see
what exactly about them leads to the difference in
people’s intuitions. These experiments suggest that
moral judgments truly are playing a key role, since partici-
pants who start out with different moral judgments about
the act of harming the environment end up arriving at
different intuitions about whether the chairman acted
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intentionally (Tannenbaum et al. 2009). But the effect is
not limited to vignettes involving environmental harm; it
emerges when researchers use different cases (Cushman
& Mele 2008; Knobe 2003a) and even when they turn to
cases with quite different structures that do not involve
side-effects in any way (Knobe 2003b; Nadelhoffer
2005). Nor does the effect appear to be limited to any
one particular population: It emerges when the whole
study is translated into Hindi and conducted on Hindi-
speakers (Knobe & Burra 2006) and even when it is sim-
plified and given to 4-year-old children (Leslie et al.
2006a). At this point, there is really a great deal of evidence
for the claim that people’s moral judgments are somehow
impacting their intuitions about intentional action.
Still, as long as all of the studies are concerned only with
intuitions about intentional action specifically, it seems
that our argument will suffer from a fatal weakness. For
someone might say: “Surely, we have very strong reason
to suppose that the concept of intentional action works
in more or less the same way as the other concepts
people normally use to understand human action. But
we have good theories of many of these other concepts –
the concepts of deciding, wanting, causing, and so forth –
and these other theories do not assign any role to moral
considerations. So the best bet is that moral considerations
do not play any role in the concept of intentional action
either.”
In my view, this is actually quite a powerful argument.
Even if we have strong evidence for a certain view about
the concept of intentional action specifically, it might
well make sense to abandon this view in light of theories
we hold about various other, seemingly similar concepts.
3.2. Further mental states
As it happens, though, the impact of moral considerations
does not appear to be limited to people’s use of the word
“intentionally.” The very same effect also arises for numer-
ous other expressions: “intention,” “deciding,” “desire,” “in
favor of,” “advocating,” and so forth.
To get a grip on this phenomenon, it may be helpful to
look in more detail at the actual procedure involved in
conducting these studies. In one common experimental
design, subjects are randomly assigned to receive either
the story about harming the environment or the story
about helping the environment and then, depending on
the case, are asked about the degree to which they agree
or disagree with one of the following sentences:
(1)
a. The chairman of the board harmed the environment
intentionally.
W W W W W W W
definitely unsure definitely
disagree agree
b. The chairman of the board helped the environment
intentionally.
W W W W W W W
definitely unsure definitely
disagree agree
When the study is conducted in this way, one finds that
subjects show moderate agreement with the claim that
the chairman harmed intentionally and moderate dis-
agreement with the claim that he helped intentionally
(Knobe 2004a). The difference between the ratings in
these two conditions provides evidence that people’s
moral intuitions are affecting their intuitions about inten-
tional action.
It appears, however, that this effect is not limited to the
concept of intentional action specifically. For example,
suppose we eliminate the word “intentionally” and
instead use the word “decided.” The two sentences then
become:
(2) a. The chairman decided to harm the environment.
b. The chairman decided to help the environment.
Faced with these revised sentences, subjects show more or
less the same pattern of intuitions. They tend to agree with
the claim that the agent decided to harm, and they tend to
disagree with the claim that the agent decided to help
(Pettit & Knobe 2009).
Now suppose we make the case a little bit more
complex. Suppose we do not use the adverb “intentionally”
but instead use the verb “intend.” So the sentences come
out as:
(3) a. The chairman intended to harm the environment.
b. The chairman intended to help the environment.
One then finds a rather surprising result. People’s
responses in both conditions are shifted over quite far
toward the “disagree” side. In fact, people’s intuitions
end up being shifted over so far that they do not, on the
whole, agree in either of the two conditions (Shepard
2009; cf. Cushman 2010; Knobe 2004b; McCann 2005).
Nonetheless, the basic pattern of the responses remains
the same. Even though people’s responses don’t go all
the way over to the “agree” side of the scale in either con-
dition, they are still more inclined to agree in the harm
case than they are in the help case.
Once one conceptualizes the issue in this way, it
becomes possible to find an impact of moral consider-
ations in numerous other domains. Take people’s appli-
cation of the concept in favor. Now consider a case in
which an agent says:
I know that this new procedure will [bring about some
outcome]. But that is not what we should be concerned
about. The new procedure will increase profits, and that
should be our goal.
Will people say in such a case that the agent is “in favor” of
bringing about the outcome?
Here again, it seems that moral judgments play a role.
People disagree with the claim that the agent is “in
favor” when the outcome is morally good, whereas they
stand at just about the midpoint between agreement and
disagreement when the outcome is morally bad (Pettit &
Knobe 2009). And similar effects have been observed for
people’s use of many other concepts: desiring, intending,
choosing, and so forth (Pettit & Knobe 2009; Tannenbaum
et al. 2009).
Overall, these results suggest that the effect obtained for
intuitions about intentional action is just one example of a
far broader phenomenon. The effect does not appear to be
limited to the concept intentionally, nor even to closely
related concepts such as intention and intending. Rather,
it seems that we are tapping into a much more general ten-
dency, whereby moral judgments impact the application of
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a whole range of different concepts used to pick out
mental states and processes.
3.3. Action trees
But the scope of the effect does not stop there. It seems
also to apply to intuitions about the relations that obtain
among the various actions an agent performs. Philoso-
phers and cognitive scientists have often suggested that
such relations could be represented in terms of an action
tree (Goldman 1970; Mikhail 2007). Hence, the various
actions performed by our chairman in the help case
might be represented with the tree in Figure 1.
Needless to say, ordinary folks do not actually commu-
nicate with each other by writing out little diagrams like
this one. Still, it seems that we can get a sense of how
people are representing the action tree by looking at
their use of various ordinary English expressions, for
example, by looking at the way they use the expressions
“in order to” and “by.”
A number of complex issues arise here, but simplifying
slightly, the key thing to keep in mind is that people only
use “in order to” for relations that go upward in the tree,
and they only use “by” for relations that go downward.
Thus, people are willing to say that the chairman
“implemented the program in order to increase profits”
but not that he “increased profits in order to implement
the program.” And, conversely, they are willing to say
that he “increased profits by implementing the program”
but not that he “implemented the program by increasing
profits.” Looking at people’s intuitions about simple
expressions like these, we can get a good sense of how
they are representing the geometry of the action tree itself.
But now comes the tricky part. Experimental results
indicate that people’s intuitions about the proper use of
these expressions can actually be influenced by their
moral judgments (Knobe 2004b; forthcoming). Hence,
people are willing to say:
The chairman harmed the environment in order to increase
profits.
but not:
The chairman helped the environment in order to increase
profits.
And, similarly, they are willing to say:
The chairman increased profits by harming the environment.
but not:
The chairman increased profits by helping the environment.
One natural way of explaining these asymmetries would
be to suggest that people’s moral judgments are having an
effect on their representations of the action tree itself. For
example, suppose that when people make a judgment that
harming the environment is morally wrong, they thereby
come to represent the corresponding node on the action
tree as “collapsing” into a lower node (see Fig. 2).
The asymmetries we find for “in order to” and “by”
would then follow immediately, without the need for any
controversial assumptions about the semantics of these
specific expressions. Although the issue here is a
complex one, recent research does seem to be supporting
the claim that moral judgments are affecting action tree
representations in this way (Knobe, forthcoming;
Ulatowski 2009).
3.4. Causation
All of the phenomena we have been discussing thus far
may appear to be quite tightly related, and one might
therefore suspect that the effect of morality would disap-
pear as soon as one turns to other, rather different cases.
That, however, seems not to be the case. Indeed, the very
same effect arises in people’s intuitions about causation
(Alicke 2000; Cushman 2010; Hitchcock & Knobe 2009;
Knobe, forthcoming; Knobe & Fraser 2008; Solan &
Darley 2001).
For a simple example here, consider the following
vignette:
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk
stocked with pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to
take pens, but faculty members are supposed to buy their own.
The administrative assistants typically do take the pens.
Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist
repeatedly e-mailed them reminders that only administrators
are allowed to take the pens.
On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants
encounters Professor Smith walking past the receptionist’s
desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs
to take an important message . . . but she has a problem.
There are no pens left on her desk.
Faced with this vignette, most subjects say that the pro-
fessor did cause the problem but that the administrative
assistant did not cause the problem (Knobe & Fraser
2008). Yet, when we examine the case from a purely scien-
tific standpoint, it seems that the professor’s action and the
administrative assistant’s action bear precisely the same
relation to the problem that eventually arose. The main
difference between these two causal factors is just that
the professor is doing something wrong (violating the
departmental rule) while the administrative assistant is
doing exactly what she is supposed to (acting in accordance
with the rules of the department). So it appears that
people’s judgment that the professor is doing something
wrong is somehow affecting their intuitions about
Figure 1. Action tree for the help case. Figure 2. Action tree for the harm case.
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whether or not the professor caused the events that
followed.
Now, looking just at this one case, one might be tempted
to suppose that the effect is not at all a matter of moral
judgment but simply reflects people’s intuitive sense that
the professor’s action is more “unusual” or “strange”
than the administrative assistant’s. But subsequent
studies strongly suggest that there is something more
afoot here. People continue to show the same basic
effect even when they are informed that the administrative
assistants never take pens whereas the professors always
do (Roxborough & Cumby 2009), and there is a statisti-
cally significant effect whereby pro-life subjects are more
inclined than pro-choice subjects to regard the act of
seeking an abortion as a cause of subsequent outcomes
(Cushman et al. 2008). All in all, the evidence seems
strongly to suggest that people’s moral judgments are actu-
ally impacting their causal intuitions.
3.5. Doing and allowing
People ordinarily distinguish between actually breaking
something and merely allowing it to break, between actu-
ally raising something and merely allowing it to rise,
between actually killing someone and merely allowing
someone to die. This distinction has come to be known
as the distinction between doing and allowing.
To explore the relationship between people’s intuitions
about doing and allowing and their moral judgments, we
used more or less the same methodology employed in
these earlier studies (Cushman et al. 2008). Subjects
were randomly assigned to receive different vignettes.
Subjects in one condition received a vignette in which
the agent performs an action that appears to be morally
permissible:
Dr. Bennett is an emergency-room physician. An uncon-
scious homeless man is brought in, and his identity is
unknown. His organ systems have shut down and a nurse
has hooked him up to a respirator. Without the respirator
he would die. With the respirator and some attention from
Dr. Bennett he would live for a week or two, but he
would never regain consciousness and could not live
longer than two weeks.
Dr. Bennett thinks to himself, “This poor man deserves to
die with dignity. He shouldn’t spend his last days hooked up
to such a horrible machine. The best thing to do would be to
disconnect him from the machine.”
For just that reason, Dr. Bennett disconnects the home-
less man from the respirator, and the man quickly dies.
These subjects were then asked whether it would be more
appropriate to say that the doctor ended the homeless
man’s life or that he allowed the homeless man’s life to
end.
Meanwhile, subjects in the other condition were given a
vignette that was almost exactly the same, except that the
doctor’s internal monologue takes a somewhat different
turn:
. . . Dr. Bennett thinks to himself, “This bum deserves to die.
He shouldn’t sit here soaking up my valuable time and
resources. The best thing to do would be to disconnect
him from the machine.”
These subjects were asked the same question: whether it
would be more appropriate to say that the doctor ended
the man’s life or allowed it to end.
Notice that the doctor performs exactly the same behav-
ior in these two vignettes, and in both vignettes, he per-
forms this behavior in the hopes that it will bring about
the man’s death. The only difference between the cases
lies in the moral character of the doctor’s reasons for
hoping that the man will die. Yet this moral difference
led to a striking difference in people’s intuitions about
doing versus allowing. Subjects who received the first
vignette tended to say that the doctor “allowed” the
man’s life to end, whereas subjects who received the
second vignette tended to say that the doctor “ended”
the man’s life. (Moreover, even within the first vignette,
there was a correlation whereby subjects who thought
that euthanasia was generally morally wrong were less
inclined to classify the act as an “allowing.”) Overall,
then, the results of the study suggest that people’s moral
judgments are influencing their intuitions here as well.
It would, of course, be foolhardy to draw any very
general conclusions from this one study, but the very
same effect has also been observed in other studies using
quite different methodologies (Cushman et al. 2008),
and there is now at least some good provisional evidence
in support of the view that people’s intuitions about
doing and allowing can actually be influenced by their
moral judgments.
3.6. Additional effects
Here we have discussed just a smattering of different ways
in which people’s moral judgments can impact their intui-
tions about apparently non-moral questions. But our
review has been far from exhaustive: there are also
studies showing that moral judgments can affect intuitions
about knowledge (Beebe & Buckwalter, forthcoming),
happiness (Nyholm 2009), valuing (Knobe & Roedder
2009), act individuation (Ulatowski 2009), freedom (Phil-
lips & Knobe 2009), and naturalness (Martin 2009).
Given that all of these studies were conducted just in the
past few years, it seems highly probable that a number
of additional effects along the same basic lines will
emerge in the years to come.
4. Alternative explanations
Thus far, we have seen that people’s ordinary application
of a variety of different concepts can be influenced by
moral considerations. The key question now is how to
explain this effect. Here we face a choice between two
basic approaches. One approach would be to suggest
that moral considerations actually figure in the competen-
cies people use to understand the world. The other would
be to adopt what I will call an alternative explanation. That
is, one could suggest that moral considerations play no role
at all in the relevant competencies, but that certain
additional factors are somehow “biasing” or “distorting”
people’s cognitive processes and thereby allowing their
intuitions to be affected by moral judgments.
The first thing to notice about the debate between these
two approaches is that we are unlikely to make much pro-
gress on it as long as the two positions are described only in
these abstract, programmatic terms. Thus, suppose that
we are discussing a new experimental result and
someone says: “Well, it could always turn out that this
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effect is due to some kind of interfering factor.” How
would we even begin to test such a conjecture? As long
as the claim is just about the possibility of “some kind of
interfering factor,” it is hard to know where one could go
to look for confirming or disconfirming evidence.
Fortunately, however, the defenders of alternative
hypotheses have not simply put forward these sorts of
abstract, programmatic conjectures. Instead, they have
developed sophisticated models that make it possible to
offer detailed explanations of the available experimental
data. Such models start out with the idea that people’s
actual competence includes no role for moral consider-
ations, but they then posit various additional psychological
factors that explain how people’s moral judgments might
nonetheless influence their intuitions in specific cases.
Each such alternative explanation then generates further
predictions, which can in turn be subjected to experimen-
tal test. There has been a great deal of research in recent
years devoted to testing these models, including some
ingenious new experiments that enable one to get a
better handle on the complex cognitive processes under-
lying people’s intuitions. At this point, then, the best
approach is probably just to look in detail at some of the
most prominent explanations that have actually been pro-
posed and the various experiments that have been devised
to test them.
4.1. The motivational bias hypothesis
Think of the way a District Attorney’s office might conduct
its business. The DA decides to prosecute a suspect and
hands the task over to a team of lawyers. These lawyers
then begin looking at the case. Presumably, though, they
do not examine the evidence with perfectly unbiased
eyes. They have been hired to secure a conviction, and
they are looking at the evidence with a view to achieving
this goal (cf. Tetlock 2002). One might say that they are
under the influence of a motivational bias.
A number of researchers have suggested that a similar
mechanism might be at the root of the effects we have
been discussing here (Alicke 2008; Nadelhoffer 2006a).
Perhaps people just read through the story and rapidly
and automatically conclude that the agent is to blame.
Then, after they have already reached this conclusion,
they begin casting about for ways to justify it. They try to
attribute anything they can – intention, causation, et
cetera – that will help to justify the blame they have
already assigned. In essence, the suggestion is that the
phenomena under discussion here can be understood as
the results of a motivational bias.
This suggestion would involve a reversal of the usual
view about the relationship between people’s blame judg-
ments and their intuitions about intention, causation, and
so forth. The usual view of this relationship looks some-
thing like what’s shown in Figure 3
Here, the idea is that people first determine that the
agent fulfilled the usual criteria for moral responsibility
(intention, cause, etc.) and then, on the basis of this
initial judgment, go on to determine that the agent
deserves blame. This sort of model has a strong intuitive
appeal, but it does not seem capable of explaining the
experimental data reviewed above. After all, if people
determine whether or not the agent caused the outcome
before they make any sort of moral judgment, how could
it be that their moral judgments affect their intuitions
about causation?
To resolve this question, one might develop a model
that goes more like the one shown in Figure 4
In this revised model, there is a reciprocal relationship
between people’s blame judgments and their intuitions
about intention, causation, et cetera. As soon as people
observe behavior of a certain type, they become motivated
to find some way of blaming the agent. They then look to
the evidence and try to find a plausible argument in favor
of the view that the agent fulfills all of the usual criteria
for responsibility. If they can construct a plausible argument
there, they immediately blame the agent. Otherwise, they
reluctantly determine that the agent was not actually blame-
worthy after all. In short, the hypothesis says that people’s
intuitions about intention and causation affect their blame
judgments but that the causal arrow can also go in the
other direction, with people’s drive to blame the agent dis-
torting their intuitions about intention and causation.
One of the main sources of support for such a hypoth-
esis is the well-established body of theoretical and exper-
imental work within social psychology exploring similar
effects in other domains. There is now overwhelming evi-
dence that motivational biases can indeed lead people to
interpret evidence in a biased manner (for a review, see
Kunda 1990), and, within moral psychology specifically,
there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that
people often adopt certain views as part of a post hoc
attempt to justify prior moral intuitions (Ditto et al.
2009; Haidt 2001). So the motivational bias hypothesis is
perhaps best understood as the application to a new
domain of a theoretical perspective that is already quite
well supported elsewhere.
More importantly, the hypothesis makes it possible to
explain all of the existing results without supposing that
moral considerations actually play any role at all in any
of the relevant competencies. The thought is that
people’s competencies are entirely non-moral but that a
motivational bias then interferes with our ability to apply
these concepts correctly. (An analogous case: If John
sleeps with Bill’s girlfriend, Bill may end up concluding
that John’s poetry was never really any good – but that
does not mean that Bill’s criteria for poetry actually
involve any reference to sexual behavior.)
All in all, then, what we have here is an excellent
hypothesis. It draws on well-established psychological
theory, provides a clear explanation of existing results,
Figure 3. Traditional account of the process underlying blame
ascription.
Figure 4. Motivational bias account of blame ascription.
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and offers a wealth of new empirically testable predictions.
The one problem is that when researchers actually went
out and tested those new predictions, none of them were
empirically confirmed. Instead, the experimental results
again and again seemed to go against what would have
been predicted on the motivational bias view. At this
point, the vast majority of researchers working on these
questions have therefore concluded that the motivational
bias hypothesis cannot explain the full range of experimen-
tal findings and that some other sort of psychological
process must be at work here (Hindriks 2008; Machery
2008; McCann 2005; Nichols & Ulatowski 2007; Turner
2004; Wright & Bengson 2009; Young et al. 2006).
4.1.1. Neuropsychological studies. The usual way of
understanding the motivational bias hypothesis is that
reading through certain kinds of vignettes triggers an
immediate affective reaction, which then distorts
people’s subsequent reasoning (Nadelhoffer 2006a). An
obvious methodology for testing the hypothesis is there-
fore to find people who don’t have these immediate affec-
tive reactions and then check to see whether these people
still show the usual effect.
Young et al. (2006) did just that. They took the cases of
the corporate executive who harms or helps the environ-
ment and gave these cases to subjects who had lesions in
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). Previous
experiments had shown that such subjects have massive
deficits in the ordinary capacity for affective response.
They show little or no affective response in situations
where normal subjects would respond strongly (Damasio
et al. 1990), and when they are presented with moral
dilemmas in which most people’s answers seem to be
shaped by affective responses, they end up giving
answers that are radically different from those given by
normal subjects (e.g., Koenigs et al. 2007). The big ques-
tion was whether they would also give unusual answers
on the types of questions we have been examining here.
The results showed that they did not (Young et al. 2006).
Just like normal subjects, the VMPFC patients said that
the chairman harmed the environment intentionally but
helped the environment unintentionally. In fact, one
hundred percent of patients in this study said that the
environmental harm was intentional. On the basis of this
experimental result, Young and colleagues concluded
that the asymmetry observed in normal subjects was not,
in fact, due to an affective reaction.
But, of course, even if it turns out that affective reac-
tions play no role in these effects, the motivational bias
hypothesis would not necessarily be refuted (Alicke
2008). After all, it is important to distinguish carefully
between affect and motivation, and we need to acknowl-
edge the possibility that people are experiencing a motiva-
tional bias that does not involve any kind of affect at all.
Perhaps people just calmly observe certain behaviors,
rapidly arrive at certain moral appraisals, and then find
themselves trying to justify a judgment of blame.
This proposal is, I believe, an interesting and suggestive
one. To address it properly, we will need to develop a more
complex theoretical framework.
4.1.2. Types of moral judgment. To begin with, we need
to distinguish between a variety of different types of
moral judgment. One type of moral judgment is a
judgment of blame. This is the type of judgment we have
been discussing thus far, and it certainly does play an
important role in people’s psychology. But it is not the
only type of moral judgment people make. They also
make judgments about whether an agent did something
morally wrong, about whether a behavior violated
people’s moral rights, about whether its consequences
were bad. A complete theory of moral cognition would
have to distinguish carefully between these various types
of moral judgments and explain how each relates to
people’s intuitions about intention, causation, and the like.
In any case, as soon as we distinguish these various types
of moral judgment, we see that it would be possible for
people’s intuitions to be influenced by their moral judg-
ments even if these intuitions are not influenced by
blame in particular. In fact, a growing body of experimen-
tal evidence suggests that the process actually proceeds in
a quite different way (see Fig. 5).
This model involves a quite radical rejection of the view
that people’s intuitions about intention, causation, et
cetera, are distorted by judgments of blame. Not only
are these intuitions not distorted by blame, they are not
even influenced by blame at all. Rather, people start out
by making some other type of moral judgment, which
then influences their intuitions about intention and causa-
tion, which in turn serves as input to the process of asses-
sing blame.
Though this model may at first seem counterintuitive, it
has received support from experimental studies using a
wide variety of methodologies. To take one example,
Guglielmo and Malle (in press) gave subjects the vignette
about the chairman and the environment and then used
structural equation modeling to test various hypotheses
about the relations among the observed variables. The
results did not support a model in which blame judgments
affected intuitions about intentional action. In fact, the
analysis supported a causal model that went in precisely
the opposite direction: it seems that people are first arriv-
ing at an intuition about intentional action, and that this
intuition is then impacting their blame judgments. In
short, whatever judgment it is that affects people’s inten-
tional action intuitions, the statistical results suggest that
it is not a judgment of blame per se.
In a separate experiment, Guglielmo and Malle (2009)
used reaction time measures to determine how long it
took subjects to make a variety of different types of judg-
ments. The results showed that people generally made
judgments of intentional action before they made judg-
ments of blame. (There was even a significant effect in
this direction for some, though not all, of the specific
cases we have been considering here.) But if the blame
judgment does not even take place until after the inten-
tional action judgment has been completed, it seems that
people’s intentional action judgments cannot be distorted
by feedback from blame.
Finally, Keys and Pizarro (unpublished data) developed
a method that allowed them to manipulate blame and then
Figure 5. Distinct processes of moral judgment.
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look for an effect on intuitions about intentional action.
Subjects were given the vignettes about the agent who
either helps or harms the environment, but they were
also randomly assigned to receive different kinds of infor-
mation about the character of this agent. Some were given
information that made agent look like a generally nice
person; others were given information that made the
agent look like a generally nasty person. The researchers
could then examine the impact of this manipulation on
intuitions about blame and about intentional action.
Unsurprisingly, people’s intuitions about blame were
affected by the information they received about the
agent’s character, but – and this is the key result of the
experiment – this information had no significant impact
on people’s intuitions about intentional action. Instead,
intuitions about intentional action were affected only by
information about the actual behavior (helping vs.
harming) the agent was said to have performed.2
In the face of these new results, friends of the motiva-
tional bias view might simply retreat to a weaker position.
They might say: “Okay, so we initially suggested that
people’s intuitions were distorted by an affective reaction
associated with an impulse to blame, but we now see
that the effect is not driven by affect and is not caused
specifically by blame. Still, the basic idea behind the
theory could nonetheless be on track. That is to say, it
could still be that people’s intuitions are being distorted
by an effort to justify some kind of moral judgment.”
4.1.3. Cause and blame. This approach certainly sounds
good in the abstract, but as one proceeds to look carefully
at the patterns of intuition observed in specific cases, it
starts to seem less and less plausible. The difficulty is
that the actual patterns observed in these cases just don’t
make any sense as an attempt to justify prior moral
judgments.
For a simple example, consider the case in which the
receptionist runs out of pens and people conclude that
the professor is the sole cause of the problem that
results. In this case, it seems that some kind of moral judg-
ment is influencing people’s intuitions about causation,
but which moral judgment is doing the work here? One
obvious hypothesis would be that people’s intuitions
about causations are being influenced by a judgment
that the agent deserves blame for the outcome. If this
hypothesis were correct, it would make a lot of sense to
suggest that people’s intuitions were being distorted by a
motivational bias. The idea would be that people want to
conclude that the professor is to blame for a particular
outcome and, to justify this conclusion, they say that he
is the sole cause of this outcome.
The one problem is that the data don’t actually suggest
that people’s causal intuitions are being influenced by a
judgment that the agent is to blame for the outcome.
Instead, the data appear to suggest that these intuitions
are being influenced by a judgment that the agent’s
action itself is bad. So, for example, in the case at hand,
we can distinguish two different moral judgments that
people might make:
(a) The professor is to blame for the outcome (the reception-
ist’s lack of pens).
(b) There is something bad about the professor’s action (taking
a pen from the desk).
The key claim now is that it is the second of these judg-
ments, rather than the first, that is influencing people’s
intuition that the professor caused the outcome.
To test this claim empirically, we need to come up with a
case in which the agent is judged to have performed a bad
action but in which the agent is nonetheless not judged to
be blameworthy for the outcome that results. One way to
construct such a case would be to modify our original
story by switching the outcome over to something good.
(For example: the receptionist was planning to stab the
department chair’s eye out with a pen, but now that all of
the pens have been taken, her plan is thwarted, and the
department chair’s eyes are saved.) In such a case, the pro-
fessor would still be performing a bad action, but there
would not even be a question as to whether he was “to
blame” for the outcome that resulted, since there would
be no bad outcome for which anyone could deserve blame.
Experiments using this basic structure have arrived at a
surprising pattern of results (Hitchcock & Knobe 2009).
Even when the outcome has been switched to something
good, people continue to have the same causal intuitions.
They still conclude that the agent who performed the
bad action is more of a cause than the agent who per-
formed the good action. Yet when the outcome is some-
thing good, it seems impossible to explain this pattern in
terms of a motivational bias. After all, friends of the moti-
vational bias hypothesis would then have to say that people
are displeased with the agent who performs the bad action,
that their intuitions thereby become distorted by moral
judgment, and that they end up being motivated to con-
clude: “This bad guy must have been the sole cause of
the wonderful outcome that resulted.” It seems quite dif-
ficult, however, to see how such a conclusion could poss-
ibly serve as a post hoc justification for some kind of
negative moral judgment.
4.1.4. Conclusion. Of course, it might ultimately prove
possible to wriggle out of all of these difficulties and
show that the data reviewed here do not refute the motiva-
tional bias hypothesis. But even then, a larger problem
would still remain. This problem is that no one ever
seems to be able to produce any positive evidence in
favor of the hypothesis. That is, no one seems to be able
to provide evidence that motivational biases are at the
root of the particular effects under discussion here.
There is, of course, plenty of evidence that motivational
biases do in general exist (e.g., Kunda 1990), and there are
beautiful experimental results showing the influence of
motivational biases in other aspects of moral cognition
(Alicke 2000; Ditto et al. 2009; Haidt 2001), but when it
comes to the specific effects under discussion here, there
are no such experiments. Instead, the argument always
proceeds by drawing on experimental studies in one
domain to provide evidence about the psychological pro-
cesses at work in another (see, e.g., Nadelhoffer 2006a).
That is, the argument has roughly the form: “This expla-
nation turned out to be true for so many other effects, so
it is probably true for these ones, as well.”
It now appears that this strategy may have been leading
us astray. The basic concepts at work in the motivational
bias explanation – affective reactions, post hoc rationaliz-
ation, motivated reasoning – have proved extraordinarily
helpful in understanding other aspects of moral cognition.
But moral cognition is a heterogeneous phenomenon.
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What proves helpful in thinking about certain aspects of it
may prove utterly irrelevant in thinking about others.
4.2. The conversational pragmatics hypothesis
Let us turn, then, to a second possible alternative hypoth-
esis. When people are engaged in ordinary discussions,
their use of words does not simply serve as a straightfor-
ward reflection of the way they apply the corresponding
concepts. Instead, people strive to act as helpful conversa-
tion partners, following certain complex principles that
enable them to provide useful information to their audi-
ence. The study of these principles falls under the
heading of “conversational pragmatics,” and researchers
engaged in this study have illuminated many puzzling
aspects of the way people ordinarily use language in com-
munication. A number of researchers have suggested that
this approach might also serve to explain the phenomena
we are trying to understand here (Adams & Steadman
2004a; 2004b; Driver 2008a; 2008b).
To get a sense for this hypothesis, it might be helpful to
start out by looking at a potentially analogous case in
another domain. Imagine that you have a bathroom in
your building but that this bathroom is completely non-
functional and has been boarded up for the past three
years. And now imagine that someone hands you a ques-
tionnaire that asks:
Do you have a bathroom in your building?
__Yes __No
It does seem that your actual concept bathroom might cor-
rectly apply to the room in your building, but when you
receive this question, you immediately have an under-
standing of what the questioner really wants to know –
namely, whether or not you have a bathroom that actually
works – and you might therefore choose to check the box
marked “No.”
With these thoughts in mind, consider what might
happen when subjects receive a questionnaire that asks
whether they agree or disagree with the sentence:
The chairman of the board harmed the environment
intentionally.
W W W W W W W
definitely unsure definitely
disagree agree
It might be thought that people’s concept of intentional
action does not, in fact, apply to cases like this one; but
that, as soon as they receive the questionnaire, they form
an understanding of what the questioner really wants to
know. The real question here, they might think, is
whether the chairman deserves to be blamed for his be-
havior, and they might therefore check the circle marked
“definitely agree.”
Similar remarks might be applied to many of the other
effects described above. Thus, suppose that subjects are
asked whether they agree or disagree with the sentence:
The administrative assistant caused the problem.
W W W W W W W
definitely unsure definitely
disagree agree
It might be thought that people’s concept of causation
does apply in cases like this one, but it also seems that sub-
jects might quite reasonably infer that the real point of the
question is to figure out whether the administrative assist-
ant deserves blame for this outcome and that they might
therefore check the circle marked “definitely disagree.”
Before going on any further, it might be helpful to take a
moment to emphasize just how different this pragmatic
hypothesis is from the motivational bias hypothesis we dis-
cussed above. The motivational bias hypothesis posits an
error that affects people’s understanding of certain
morally relevant events. By contrast, the pragmatic
hypothesis does not involve any error or even any effect
on people’s understanding of events. It simply suggests
that people are applying certain kinds of conversational
rules. The basic idea is that moral considerations aren’t
actually affecting people’s understanding of the situation;
it’s just that moral considerations do sometimes affect
people’s view about which particular words would be
best used to describe it.
In any case, although the two hypotheses are very differ-
ent in their theoretical approaches, they have proved
remarkably similar in their ultimate fate. Like the motiva-
tional bias hypothesis, the pragmatic hypothesis initially
looked very promising – a clear and plausible explanation,
backed by a well-supported theoretical framework – but,
as it happened, the actual empirical data just never came
out the way the pragmatic hypothesis would predict.
Indeed, the pragmatic hypothesis suffers from many of
the same problems that plagued the motivational bias
hypothesis, along with a few additional ones that are all
its own.
4.2.1. Patient studies. One way to test the hypothesis
would be to identify subjects who show an inability to
use conversational pragmatics in the normal way, and
then to check to see whether these subjects still show
the usual effect. Zalla, Machery, and Leboyer did exactly
that in a recent study (Zalla et al. 2010). They took the
story about the chairman who harms or helps the environ-
ment and presented it to subjects with Asperger’s syn-
drome, a developmental disorder characterized by
difficulties in certain forms of communication and a strik-
ing inability to interact normally with others. Previous
studies had shown that subjects with Asperger’s display
remarkable deficits in the capacity to understand conver-
sational pragmatics, tending instead to answer questions
in the most literal possible way (e.g., De Villiers et al.
2006; Surian et al. 1996). If the original effect had been
due entirely to pragmatic processes, one might therefore
have expected subjects with Asperger’s to respond quite
differently from neurotypical subjects.
But that is not what Zalla and colleagues found. Instead,
they found that subjects with Asperger’s showed exactly
the same pattern of responses observed in previous
studies. Just like neurotypical subjects, people with Asper-
ger’s tended to say that the chairman harmed the environ-
ment intentionally but helped it unintentionally. This
result suggests that the pattern displayed by subjects in
earlier studies is not, in fact, a product of their mastery
of complex pragmatic principles.
4.2.2. Cancelation. Of course, the study of linguistic def-
icits in people with Asperger’s brings up a host of complex
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issues, and this one experiment certainly should not be
regarded as decisive. The thing to notice, though, is that
results from a variety of other tests point toward the
same basic conclusion, offering converging evidence for
the claim that the effect here is not a purely pragmatic
one (Adams & Steadman 2007; Knobe 2004b; Nichols &
Ulatowski 2007; for a review, see Nadelhoffer 2006c).
Indeed, one can obtain evidence for this claim using one
of the oldest and most widely known tests in the prag-
matics literature. Recall that we began our discussion of
conversational pragmatics with a simple example. If a
person says “There is a bathroom in the building,” it
would be natural to infer that this bathroom is actually
in working order. But now suppose that we make our
example just a little bit more complex. Suppose that the
person utters two sentences: “There is a bathroom in the
building. However, it is not in working order.” Here it
seems that the first sentence carries with it a certain sort
of pragmatic significance but that the second sentence
then eliminates the significance that this first sentence
might otherwise have had. The usual way of describing
this phenomenon is to say that the pragmatic “implica-
tures” of the first sentence have been cancelled by the
second (Grice 1989).
Using this device of cancellation, we could then con-
struct a questionnaire that truly would accurately get at
people’s actual concept of bathrooms. For example, sub-
jects could be asked to select from among the options:
– There is no bathroom in the building.
– There is a bathroom in the building, and it is in
working order.
– There is a bathroom in the building, but it is not in
working order.
Subjects could then feel free to signify the presence of the
bathroom by selecting the third option, secure in the
knowledge that they would not thereby be misleadingly
conveying an impression that the bathroom actually did
work.
In a recent experimental study, Nichols and Ulatowski
(2007) used this same approach to get at the impact of
pragmatic factors in intuitions about intentional action.
Subjects were asked to select from among these options:
– The chairman intentionally harmed the environ-
ment, and he is responsible for it.
– The chairman didn’t intentionally harm the environ-
ment, but he is responsible for it.
As it happened, Nichols and Ulatowski themselves
believed that the original effect was entirely pragmatic,
and they therefore predicted that subjects would indicate
that the behavior was unintentional when they had the
opportunity to do so without conveying the impression
that the chairman was not to blame. But that is not at all
how the data actually came out. Instead, subjects were
just as inclined to say that the chairman acted intentionally
in this new experiment as they were in the original version.
In light of these results, Nichols and Ulatowski concluded
that the effect was not due to pragmatics after all.
4.2.3. Other effects. Finally, there is the worry that, even
if conversational pragmatics might provide a somewhat
plausible explanation of some of the effects described
above, there are other effects that it cannot explain at all.
Hence, the theory of conversational pragmatics would
fail to explain the fact that moral considerations exert
such a pervasive effect on a wide range of different kinds
of judgments.
The pragmatic hypothesis was originally proposed as an
explanation for people’s tendency to agree with sentences
like:
The chairman of the board harmed the environment
intentionally.
And when the hypothesis is applied to cases like this one, it
does look at least initially plausible. After all, it certainly
does seem that a sentence like “He did not harm the
environment intentionally” could be used to indicate that
the agent was not, in fact, to blame for his behavior.
But now suppose we take that very same hypothesis and
apply it to sentences like:
The chairman harmed the environment in order to increase
profits.
Here the hypothesis does not even begin to get a grip.
There simply isn’t any conversational rule according to
which one can indicate that the chairman is not to blame
by saying something like: “He didn’t do that in order to
increase profits.” No one who heard a subject uttering
such a sentence would ever leave with the impression
that it was intended as a way of exculpating or excusing
the chairman.
Of course, one could simply say that the pragmatics
hypothesis does explain the effect on “intentionally” but
does not explain the corresponding effect on “in order
to.” But such a response would take away much of the
motivation for adopting the pragmatics hypothesis in the
first place. The hypothesis was supposed to give us a way
of explaining how moral considerations could impact
people’s use of certain words without giving up on the
idea that people’s actual concepts were entirely morally
neutral. If we now accept a non-pragmatic explanation of
the effect for “in order to, ” there is little reason not to
accept a similar account for “intentionally” as well.
4.3. Summary
Looking through these various experiments, one gradually
gets a general sense of what has been going wrong with the
alternative explanations. At the core of these explanations
is the idea that people start out with an entirely non-moral
competence but that some additional factor then inter-
feres and allows people’s actual intuitions to be influenced
by moral considerations. Each alternative explanation
posits a different interfering factor, and each explanation
thereby predicts that the whole effect will go away if this
factor is eliminated. So one alternative explanation might
predict that the effect will go away when we eliminate a
certain emotional response, another that it will go away
when we eliminate certain pragmatic pressures, and so
forth.
The big problem is that these predictions never actually
seem to be borne out. No one has yet found a way of elim-
inating the purported interfering factors and thereby
making the effect go away. Instead, the effect seems
always to stubbornly reemerge, coming back again and
again despite all our best efforts to eliminate it.
Now, one possible response to these difficulties would
be to suggest that we just need to try harder. Perhaps
the relevant interfering factor is an especially tricky or
well-hidden one, or maybe there are a whole constellation
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of different factors in place here, all working together to
generate the effects observed in the experiments. When
we finally succeed in identifying all of the relevant
factors, we might be able to find a way of eliminating
them all and thereby allowing people’s purely non-moral
competence to shine through unhindered.
Of course, it is at least possible that such a research
program would eventually succeed, but I think the most
promising approach at this point would be to try looking
elsewhere. In my view, the best guess about why no one
has been able to eliminate the interfering factors is that
there just aren’t any such factors. It is simply a mistake
to try to understand these experimental results in terms
of a purely non-moral competence which then gets
somehow derailed by various additional factors. Rather,
the influence of moral considerations that comes out in
the experimental results truly is showing us something
about the nature of the basic competencies people use
to understand their world.
5. Competence theories
Let us now try to approach the problem from a different
angle. Instead of focusing on the interfering factors, we
will try looking at the competence itself. The aim will be
to show that something about the very nature of this com-
petence is allowing people’s moral judgments to influence
their intuitions.
5.1. General approach
At the core of the approach is a simple and straightforward
assumption that has already played an enormously impor-
tant role in numerous fields of cognitive science. Specifi-
cally, I will be relying heavily on the claim that we make
sense of the things that actually happen by considering
other ways things might have been (Byrne 2005; Kahne-
man & Miller 1986; Roese 1997).
A quick example will help to bring out the basic idea
here. Suppose that we come upon a car that has a dent
in it. We might immediately think about how the car
would have looked if it did not have this dent. Thus, we
come to understand the way the car actually is by consid-
ering another way that it could have been and comparing
its actual status to this imagined alternative.
An essential aspect of this process, of course, lies in our
ability to select from among all the possible alternatives
just the few that prove especially relevant. Hence, in the
case at hand, we would immediately consider the possi-
bility that the car could have been undented, and think:
“Notice that this car is dented rather than undented.”
But then there are all sorts of other alternatives that we
would immediately reject as irrelevant or not worth think-
ing about. We would not take the time, for example, to
consider the possibility that the car could have been levi-
tating in the air, and then think: “Notice that this car is
standing on the ground rather than levitating in the air.”
Our ability to pick out just certain specific alternatives
and ignore others is widely regarded as a deeply important
aspect of human cognition, which shapes our whole way of
understanding the objects we observe. It is, for example, a
deeply important fact about our way of understanding the
dented car that we compare it to an undented car. If we
had instead compared it to a levitating car, we would
end up thinking about it in a radically different way.
A question now arises as to why people focus on particu-
lar alternative possibilities and ignore others. The answer,
of course, is that all sorts of different factors can play a role
here. People’s selection of specific alternative possibilities
can be influenced by their judgments about controllability,
about recency, about statistical frequency, about non-
moral forms of goodness and badness (for reviews, see
Byrne 2005; Kahneman & Miller 1986; Roese 1997). But
there is also another factor at work here that has not
received quite as much discussion in the existing litera-
ture. A number of studies have shown that people’s selec-
tion of alternative possibilities can be influenced by their
moral judgments (McCloy & Byrne 2000; N’gbala & Bran-
scombe 1995). In other words, people’s intuition about
which possibilities are relevant can be influenced by
their judgments about which actions are morally right.
For a simple illustration, take the case of the chairman
who hears that he will be helping the environment, but
reacts with complete indifference. As soon as one hears
this case, one’s attention is drawn to a particular alterna-
tive possibility:
(1) Notice that the chairman reacted in this way, rather than
specifically preferring that the environment be helped.
This alternative possibility seems somehow to be especially
relevant, more relevant at least than many other possibili-
ties we could easily imagine. In particular, one would not
think:
(2) Notice that the chairman reacted in this way rather than
specifically trying to avoid anything that would help the
environment.
Of course, one could imagine the chairman having this
latter sort of attitude. One could imagine him saying: “I
don’t care at all whether we make profits. What I really
want is just to make sure that the environment is
harmed, and since this program will help the environment,
I’m going to do everything I can to avoid implementing it.”
Yet this possibility has a kind of peculiar status. It seems
somehow preposterous, not even worth considering. But
why? The suggestion now is that moral considerations
are playing a role in people’s way of thinking about alterna-
tive possibilities. Very roughly, people regard certain pos-
sibilities as relevant because they take those possibilities to
be especially good or right.
With these thoughts in mind, we can now offer a new
explanation for the impact of moral judgments on
people’s intuitions. The basic idea is just that people’s
intuitions in all of the domains we have been discussing –
causation, doing/allowing, intentional action, and so on –
rely on a comparison between the actual world and certain
alternative possibilities. Because people’s moral judg-
ments influence the selection of alternative possibilities,
these moral judgments end up having a pervasive impact
on the way people make sense of human beings and
their actions.3
5.2. A case study
To truly spell out this explanation in detail, one would have
to go through each of the different effects described above
and show how each of these effects can be explained on a
model in which moral considerations are impacting
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people’s way of thinking about alternative possibilities.
This would be a very complex task, and I will not
attempt it here. Let us proceed instead by picking just
one concept whose use appears to be affected by moral
considerations. We can then offer a model of the compe-
tence underlying that one concept and thereby illustrate
the basic approach. For these illustrative purposes, let us
focus on the concept in favor.
We begin by introducing a fundamental assumption that
will guide the discussion that follows. The assumption is
that people’s representation of the agent’s attitude is
best understood, not in terms of a simple dichotomy
between “in favor” and “not in favor,” but rather, in
terms of a whole continuum of different attitudes an
agent might hold. So we will be assuming that people
can represent the agent as strongly opposed, as strongly
in favor, or as occupying any of the various positions in
between. For simplicity, we can depict this continuum in
terms of a scale running from con to pro. 4 (See Fig. 6.)
Looking at this scale, it seems that an agent whose atti-
tude falls way over on the con side will immediately be
classified as “not in favor,” and that an agent whose atti-
tude falls way over on the pro side will immediately be
classified as “in favor.” But now, of course, we face a
further question. How do people determine the threshold
at which an agent’s attitude passes over from the category
“not in favor” to the category “in favor”?
To address this question, we will need to add an
additional element to our conceptual framework. Let us
say that people assess the various positions along the con-
tinuum by comparing each of these positions to a particu-
lar sort of alternative possibility. We can refer to this
alternative possibility as the default. Then we can
suggest that an agent will be counted as “in favor” when
his or her attitude falls sufficiently far beyond this
default point. (See Fig. 7.)
The key thing to notice about this picture is that
there needn’t be any single absolute position on the conti-
nuum that always serves as the threshold for counting an
agent as “in favor.” Instead, the threshold might vary
freely, depending on which point gets picked out as the
default.
To get a sense for the idea at work here, it may be
helpful to consider a closely analogous problem. Think
of the process a teacher might use in assigning grades to
students. She starts out with a whole continuum of differ-
ent percentage scores on a test, and now she needs to find
a way to pick out a threshold beyond which a given score
will count as an A. One way to do this would be to intro-
duce a general rule, such as “a score always counts as an
A when it is at least 20 points above the default.” Then
she can pick out different scores as the default on different
tests – treating 75% as default on easy tests, 65% as
default on more difficult ones – and the threshold for
counting as an A will vary accordingly.
The suggestion now is that people’s way of thinking
about attitudes uses this same sort of process. People
always count an agent as “in favor” when the agent’s
attitude falls sufficiently far beyond the default, but
there is no single point along the continuum that is
treated as default in all cases. Different attitudes can be
treated as default in different cases, and the threshold
for counting as “in favor” then shifts around from one
case to the next.
Now we arrive at the crux of the explanation. The
central claim will be that people’s moral judgments
affect their intuitions by shifting the position of the
default. For morally good actions, the default is to have
some sort of pro-attitude, whereas for morally bad
actions, the default is to have some sort of con-attitude.
The criteria for “in favor” then vary accordingly.
Suppose we now apply this general framework to the
specific vignettes used in the experimental studies.
When it comes to helping the environment, it seems
that the default attitude is a little bit toward the pro
side. That is to say, the default in this case is to have at
least a slightly positive attitude – not necessarily a deep
or passionate attachment, but at least some minimal
sense that helping the environment would be a nice
thing to do. An attitude will then count as “in favor” to
the extent that it goes sufficiently far beyond this
default point. (See Fig. 8.)
But look at the position of the agent’s actual attitude
along this continuum. The agent is not even close to reach-
ing up to the critical threshold here – he is only interested
in helping the environment as a side-effect of some other
policy, and people should therefore conclude that he does
not count as “in favor” of helping.
Now suppose we switch over to the harm case. There,
we find that the agent’s actual attitude has remained con-
stant, but the default has changed radically. When it comes
to harming the environment, the default is to be at least
slightly toward the con side – not necessarily showing
any kind of vehement opposition, but at least having
some recognition that harming the environment is a bad
thing to do. An agent will then count as “in favor” to the
extent that his or her attitude goes sufficiently far
beyond this default (Fig. 9).
In this new representation, the agent’s actual attitude
remains at exactly the same point it was above (in
Fig. 8), but its position relative to the default is now
quite different. This time, the attitude falls just about at
the critical threshold for counting as “in favor,” and
people should therefore be just about at the midpoint in
their intuitions as to whether the agent was in favor of
harming – which, in fact, is exactly what the experimental
results show.
Figure 8. Representation of the continuum for the help case.
Figure 7. Criteria for ascription of “in favor.”
Figure 6. Continuum of attitude ascription.
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Notice how sharply this account differs from the alterna-
tive hypotheses discussed above. On those alternative
hypotheses, people see that the agent harmed the environ-
ment, want to blame him for his behavior, and this interest
in blame then shapes the way they conceptualize or describe
various aspects of the case. The present account says nothing
of the kind. Indeed, the account makes no mention at all of
blame. Instead, it posits a role for an entirely different kind
of moral judgment – a judgment that could be made even in
the absence of any information about this specific agent or
his behaviors. The claim is that before people even begin
considering what actually happened in the case at hand,
they can look at the act of harming the environment and
make a judgment about what sort of attitude an agent
could be expected to hold toward it. This judgment then
serves as a standard they can use to make sense of the behav-
ior they actually observe.
5.3. Extending the model
What we have here is a model of the competence under-
lying people’s use of one particular concept. The key
question now is whether this same basic approach can
be applied to the various other concepts discussed
above. In a series of recent papers, I have argued that it
can be used to explain the impact of moral judgment on
people’s intuitions about freedom, knowledge, and causa-
tion5 (Hitchcock & Knobe 2009; Pettit & Knobe, 2009;
Phillips & Knobe 2009). But new studies are coming
out all the time, and we may soon be faced with exper-
imental results that the model cannot explain. At any
rate, one certainly should not expect that this model
will turn out to be correct in every detail. Presumably,
further work will show that it needs to be revised or
expanded in various ways, and perhaps it will even have
to be scrapped altogether.
In the present context, however, our concern is not so
much to explore the details of this one model as to use it
as a way of illustrating a more general approach and the
contrast between this approach and the one we saw in
the alternative explanations described above. The alterna-
tive explanations start out with the idea that the relevant
competencies are entirely non-moral, but that some
additional factor then interferes and allows people’s intui-
tions to be influenced by moral considerations. These
explanations therefore predict that it should be possible,
at least in principle, to eliminate the interfering factors
and examine the judgments people make in the absence
of this influence.
By contrast, in the approach under discussion here,
moral considerations are not understood as some kind
of extra factor that gets added in on top of everything
else. Instead, the whole process is suffused with moral
considerations from the very beginning. Hence, in this
approach, no real sense can be attached to the idea of
eliminating the role of morality and just watching the
basic process unfold in its pure, non-moral form.
6. Conclusion
This target article began with a metaphor. The suggestion
was that people’s ordinary way of making sense of the
world might be similar, at least in certain respects, to the
way research is conducted in a typical modern university.
Just as a university would have specific departments
devoted especially to the sciences, our minds might
include certain specific psychological processes devoted
especially to constructing a roughly “scientific” kind of
understanding.
If one thinks of the matter in this way, one immediately
arrives at a certain picture of the role of moral judgments
in people’s understanding as a whole. In a university, there
might be faculty members in the philosophy department
who were hired specifically to work on moral questions,
but researchers in the sciences typically leave such ques-
tions to one side. So maybe the mind works in much the
same way. We might have certain psychological processes
devoted to making moral judgments, but there would be
other processes that focus on developing a purely “scienti-
fic” understanding of what is going on in a situation and
remain neutral on all questions of morality.
I have argued that this picture is deeply mistaken. The
evidence simply does not suggest that there is a clear div-
ision whereby certain psychological processes are devoted
to moral questions and others are devoted to purely scien-
tific questions. Instead, it appears that everything is
jumbled together. Even the processes that look most
“scientific” actually take moral considerations into
account. It seems that we are moralizing creatures
through and through.
ACKNOWL EDGMEN TS
For comments on earlier drafts, I am deeply grateful to John Doris,
Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, and five anonymous reviewers.
NOTES
1. In each of the studies that follow, we found a statistically
significant difference between intuitions about a morally good
act and intuitions about a morally bad act, but one might well
wonder how large each of those differences was. The answers
are as follows. Intentional action: 33% vs. 82%. (All subsequent
results are on a scale from 1 to 7.) Deciding: 2.7 vs. 4.6. In
favor: 2.6 vs. 3.8. In order to: 3.0 vs. 4.6. By: 3.0 vs. 4.4. Causa-
tion: 2.8 vs. 6.2. Doing/allowing: 3.0 vs. 4.6.
2. Surprisingly, there was also a significant gender x character
interaction, whereby women tended to regard the act as more
intentional when the agent had a bad character, while men
tended to regard the act as more intentional when the agent
had a good character. I have no idea why this might be occurring,
but it should be noted that this is just one of the many individual
differences observed in these studies. Feltz and Cokely (2007)
have shown that men show a greater moral asymmetry in inten-
tional action intuitions when the vignettes are presented within-
subject, and Buckwalter (2010) has shown that women show a
greater moral asymmetry when they are asked about the
agent’s knowledge. Though not well-understood at the
moment, these individual differences might hold the key to
future insights into the moral asymmetries discussed here. (For
further discussion, see Nichols & Ulatowski 2007.)
3. Strikingly, recent research has shown that people’s intuitions
about intentional action can be affected by non-moral factors, such
as judgments about the agent’s own interests (Machery 2008;
Nanay 2010), knowledge of conventional rules (Knobe 2007),
and implicit attitudes (Inbar et al. 2009). This recent discovery
offers us an interesting opportunity to test the present account.
Figure 9. Representation of the continuum for the harm case.
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If we can come up with a general theory about how people’s evalu-
ations impact their thinking about alternative possibilities – a
theory that explains not only the impact of moral judgments but
also the impact of other factors – we should be able to generate
predictions about the precise ways in which each of these other
factors will impact people’s intentional action intuitions. Such pre-
dictions can then be put to the test in subsequent experiments.
4. There may be certain general theoretical reasons for
adopting the view that people’s representations of the agent’s
attitude have this continuous character, but the principal evi-
dence in favor of it comes from the actual pattern of the exper-
imental data. For example, suppose that instead of saying that
the agent does not care at all about the bad side-effect, we say
that the agent deeply regrets the side-effect but decides to go
ahead anyway so as to achieve the goal. Studies show that
people then tend to say that the side-effect was brought about
unintentionally (Phelan & Sarkissian 2008; Sverdlik 2004). It
is hard to see how one could explain this result on a model in
which people have a unified way of thinking about all attitudes
that involve the two features (1) foreseeing that an outcome will
arise but (2) not specifically wanting it to arise. However, the
result becomes easy to explain if we assume that people rep-
resent the agent’s attitude, not in terms of sets of features (as
I earlier believed; Knobe 2006), but in terms of a continuous
dimension. We can then simply say that people take the regret-
ful agent to be slightly more toward the con side of the conti-
nuum and are therefore less inclined to regard his or her
behavior as intentional.
5. Very briefly, the suggestion is that intuitions in all three
of these domains involve a capacity to compare reality to
alternative possibilities. Thus, (a) intuitions about whether an
agent acted freely depend on judgments about whether it
was possible for her to choose otherwise, (b) intuitions about
whether a person knows something depend on judgments
about whether she has enough evidence to rule out relevant
alternatives, and (c) intuitions about whether one event
caused another depend on judgments about whether the
second event would still have occurred if the first had not.
Because moral judgments impact the way people decide
which possibilities are relevant or irrelevant, moral judgments
end up having an impact on people’s intuitions in all three of
these domains.
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Abstract: Knobe’s argument rests on a way of distinguishing
performance errors from the competencies that delimit our cognitive
architecture. We argue that other sorts of evidence than those that he
appeals to are needed to illuminate the boundaries of our folk
capacities in ways that would support his conclusions.
Joshua Knobe argues that the various moral inflections of our folk
psychology are part of “the competencies people use to under-
stand the world” (target article, sect. 4, para. 1), a hypothesis
that he contrasts with the claim that “certain additional factors
are somehow ‘biasing’ or ‘distorting’ people’s cognitive processes
and thereby allowing their intuitions to be affected by moral
judgments” (sect. 4, para. 1). However, Knobe really never
makes clear exactly what makes something “inside” or “outside”
a competence. Clearly, both he and his past interlocutors have
taken motivated cognition and pragmatic factors to count as
“interfering,” rather than as part of the competence. But what
can ground such judgments? We worry that any non-stipulative
way of answering this question that plausibly excludes motivation
and pragmatic considerations, can also be used to insist that
moral considerations are “outside of” or “external to” the compe-
tence under consideration. We are not disputing the empirical
facts that he does muster; rather, our concern is with a further
theoretical interpretation he wants to place on those facts,
which we argue is unwarranted.
One natural way to circumscribe the boundaries of a compe-
tence is bottom-up, by appealing to a fairly literal, physical
notion of containment provided by neuroanatomy. But neither
Knobe nor his interlocutors muster any such neuroanatomical
evidence, so this sort of approach is not a good contender.
A more promising way of approaching questions of compe-
tence is to begin with a high-level characterization of the function
that a cognitive process is supposed to compute, and on this basis
attempt to specify an algorithm for computing that function and
to address questions of actual physical implementation (see
Mallon 2007). Once we are clear about what task a cognitive
process is supposed to execute, constraints or problems in the
execution of the task can be identified. According to this top-
down approach to competence, then, what allows us to describe
something as interfering with a cognitive process is a substantive
account of the work the process is supposed to be doing.
The problem with taking this kind of approach here is that
there isn’t a settled account of what sort of job our folk psycho-
logical judgments are supposed to do. What we have are two
different models, each of which stipulates what function is suppo-
sedly being calculated by our folk psychological judgments, and
thus, what is and is not part of our competence with such judg-
ments. On Knobe’s model, pragmatics and motivation may
indeed properly lie outside the competence. But on his
opponent’s model, the exact same line of reasoning would
apply to the source of the morality effects that Knobe is appealing
to. There is no “supposed to” to be found within those sorts of
findings, and so where to draw an inside/outside line is, thus
far, an empirical free move – stipulated, not discovered.
One can contrast the situation regarding our folk-psychological
capacities with the comparatively much better established taxon-
omy of competences in both language and vision. For example,
linguists are used to separating out the semantic, syntactic, pho-
nological, and pragmatic components of our overall linguistic
capacities. This division has proved empirically fruitful, and it
is grounded in bottom-up considerations as well (such as deficit
patterns due to various lesions). In debates about language,
then, it makes sense that showing a phenomenon to be a
proper part of one member of that partition is thereby a good
reason to reject it as part of some other member. Interestingly,
we see exactly this dynamic in earlier stages of the debate
about the side-effect effect, which for several years was explicitly
framed in terms of whether there was a moral dimension to the
semantic component of our “intentionally” discourse. And so it
made sense, in the context of the debate so construed, to take
a pragmatic explanation of the side-effect effect to preempt an
explanation of it in semantic terms. The existing framework legiti-
mated ruling pragmatics to be “outside” of semantics. But in this
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target article, Knobe switches from a debate about semantic com-
petence to a debate about competence in some abstract sense. And
we think Knobe has made the right decision to move away from the
semantic debate, in part because of some Quinean pessimism
about certain forms of conceptual analysis (see Alexander et al.
2010). But more importantly, Knobe’s own favored account
(sect. 5) locates the source of this moral inflection in a mechanism
for the allocation of cognitive resources, selecting different alterna-
tives for cognitive attention. He writes, “The basic idea is just that
people’s intuitions . . . rely on a comparison between the actual
world and certain alternative possibilities. Because people’s
moral judgments influence the selection of alternative possibilities,
these moral judgments end up having a pervasive impact” (sect.
5.1, para. 8). But this influence on cognitive attention would
count as part of general cognition, but not part of semantics, in
the traditional linguistic taxonomy, and thus would have counted
as an “external” causal factor in the old debate.
Given his current choice of hypothesis, this shift away from a
specifically semantic framing of the issues to a more generic
one makes sense. Unfortunately, in doing so, he has abandoned
one set of resources for underwriting an inside/outside distinction
without replacing them with something else. The challenge he
faces is how to substantiate such a distinction in a way that both
(1) isn’t merely stipulative and (2) puts pragmatics and motivation
on the “outside” and cognitive attention on the “inside.”
We think that, in order to do so, other sorts of evidence will be
needed than those that Knobe appeals to in his article. Perhaps
an evolutionary or teleological argument could ground a top-
down approach here; or perhaps neuroanatomical evidence
could ground a bottom-up approach; or perhaps – and where
we would place our bets – further re-refinement of the basic
question is still in order.
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Abstract: Knobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in
intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts
such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe
that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe’s
side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.
Virtually everyone, including both professional and lay evaluators
of human behavior, agrees that to praise or blame an agent, the
agent must have acted intentionally, with foresight of the conse-
quences, and must have caused the outcome. In a perfect evalua-
tive world, assessments of intentionality, foresight, and causation
would be made independently of the judge’s expectations, affec-
tive and attitudinal reactions, and moral beliefs and predilections.
By now, however, there is abundant evidence that such factors
have a powerful and pervasive influence on intentionality, fore-
sight, and causation judgments. In his target article, Knobe
offers an alternative to the view that such influences are motiv-
ated by the desire to justify praising or blaming an agent who
evokes positive or negative evaluative reactions.
Knobe has argued that the reason that concepts such as inten-
tionality, causation, and foresight are influenced by moral con-
siderations is because these concepts are suffused with moral
considerations (i.e., moral considerations figure into the under-
lying competencies). To illustrate his position, he uses his well-
traveled example of an executive who knows that, as a side
effect of initiating a certain program, the environment will be
helped or harmed, but whose only concern is to increase
profits. Knobe assumes that in the “help” scenario, the normative
(or “default”) expectation would be to have at least a moderately
pro-attitude toward helping the environment. The default expec-
tation in the “harm” scenario would be for a moderately anti-atti-
tude (or in Knobe’s term, con-attitude) toward harming
environment. In the “help” case, the executive doesn’t meet the
threshold required for having a pro-attitude; whereas in the
“harm” case, the executive’s failure to endorse a con-attitude
places him in the range of plausibly having a pro-attitude.
Thus, in the latter case but not the former, the executive is
thought to have acted intentionally because he apparently has a
pro-attitude toward the harmful outcome. Ascriptions of inten-
tionality are thus dependent on the sort of attitude an evaluator
thinks an agent should have about a particular outcome. Inten-
tionality (and presumably other concepts such as causation and
foresight) is applied when the agent’s presumed attitude
crosses the evaluator’s normative threshold.
Our alternative to Knobe’s position – the culpable control
model of blame (Alicke 1992; 2000; Alicke & Zell 2009; Alicke
et al. 2010) – can explain the environmental harming/helping
findings without positing that concepts such as intentionality are
inherently moral. Further, it can explain cases other than the
specialized side-effect scenarios that are the focus of Knobe’s
theory. The culpable control model assumes that positive and
negative evaluative reactions – which are judgments of right or
wrong, good or bad, or approval or disapproval – to the people
involved in an event, their actions, and the outcomes that ensue
can induce social perceivers to process information in a “blame
validation” mode. Blame validation involves interpreting the evi-
dence regarding intentionality, causation, and foresight in a way
that justifies praising an agent who elicits positive evaluations or
blaming one who arouses negative evaluations.
The culpable control model explains Knobe’s findings by
assuming that social perceivers view the environment-harming
executive as a major jerk (i.e., one who arouses strong negative
evaluations), but view the environment-helping executive as
only a minor one. Imputing intentionality to the environment-
harming executive, therefore, validates social perceivers’ negative
evaluative reactions, and in turn, supports a blame attribution.
The culpable control model, therefore, does not require the
assumption that concepts such as intentionality, causation, and
foresight are suffused with moral considerations. Rather, the
influences of these evaluations can be explained in terms of the
desire to blame an agent whose actions arouse strong disapproval.
It is important to note that most of Knobe’s examples apply to
cases where foreseen but unintended side-effects occur, which
narrows the application of the theory. Furthermore, Knobe’s
example is not an optimal one for considering the relative
merits of his position and the culpable control model because
his default assumption regarding an agent’s attitude is con-
founded with positive and negative evaluations of the agent’s
goals and actions and the outcomes that occur. For example, in
the “harm” scenario, the agent’s indifference toward harming
the environment diverges from the attitude we would expect
most agents to have in this situation; but this indifference, as
well as both the agent’s decision to let the environment be
harmed and the fact that the environment ultimately is
harmed, also provides a basis for negative evaluative reactions.
So, we need some other case to differentiate these two views.
In an early set of studies (Alicke 1992, Study 1), participants
learned that a young man was speeding home to hide either an
anniversary present or a vial of cocaine from his parents before
they arrived home. A car accident occurred under somewhat
ambiguous circumstances: It could have been due in part to his
speeding, but also to environmental impediments such as a
partly obscured stop sign. The study’s results were clear: When
the driver’s motive was undesirable (i.e., to hide cocaine), his
driving was cited as far more causal than the environmental
obstacles. However, precisely the opposite was true when his
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motive was to hide an anniversary present. This case would be
very difficult for Knobe’s theory to explain: Why would anyone
assume that the driver who was speeding home to hide cocaine
had a pro-attitude towards causing car accidents, and that the
driver who was speeding to hide an anniversary present did
not? The more plausible alternative, based on the culpable
control model, is that negative evaluations of the driver whose
motive was to hide cocaine induced participants to skew the evi-
dential criteria for causation to support their desire to blame him.
In sum: Knobe’s position is plausible in cases involving fore-
seen but unintended side-effects, but it has some trouble explain-
ing cases outside of this narrow scope. The culpable control
model can explain many cases involving side-effects, as well as
most cases that do not involve side-effects, and can do so
without claiming that concepts such as intentionality, causation,
and foresight are suffused with moral considerations.
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Abstract: Scientific inquiry possibly shares with people’s ordinary
understanding the same evolutionary determinants, and affect-laden
intuitions that shape moral judgments also play a decisive role in
decision-making, planning, and scientific reasoning. Therefore, if
ordinary understanding does differ from scientific inquiry, the reason
does not reside in the fact that the former (but not the latter) is
endowed with moral considerations.
According to Knobe’s central thesis, we are “moralizing crea-
tures,” with moral judgments lying at the core of the competen-
cies we use to make sense of our actions and ourselves. By
“ordinary understanding,” Knobe means the way people make
sense of the world without having any scientific education. He
argues that human cognition, in general, is intrinsically and ines-
capably moral, in the sense that people just do not make sense of
certain situations without performing proto-moral judgments at
the very time they perceive them. However, the target article’s
argument is not as generally applicable as Knobe claims: the
article does not address people’s cognition in general, but only
how we, as human beings, perceive and interpret human inter-
actions, as is made clear in the reported experiments. While
this topic in fact belongs to the study of causal cognition, it is
far from exhausting it.
Also, the way Knobe contrasts his main thesis with other claims
that have been made before seems to be misleading, promoting an
erroneous interpretation of his own thesis. He opposes his view
about cognition to the idea that the functioning of the human
mind mirrors the functioning of scientists (Gopnik 1996;
Gopnik & Schulz 2004; Gopnik & Tenenbaum 2007). Despite
Knobe’s insistence on criticizing this view, it is the wrong
opponent to his own thesis. What he is actually attacking is a
view according to which humans’ perception of humans’ inter-
actions is objective, in the sense of being devoid of any moral com-
mitment. Gopnik’s view, for instance, is about the development of
cognition as much as about cognition in adults, independently of
their being impregnated or not with moral considerations.
Actually, if we adopt the thesis according to which scientific
inquiry is only a very refined manifestation of our effort to make
sense of the world, sharing with people’s ordinary understanding
the same evolutionary roots, then Knobe’s claim that ordinary
understanding does not build itself in the same manner as scienti-
fic understanding does, loses much of its strength. The justification
of this thesis will follow in two steps.
An increasing body of evidence, from fields such as psychol-
ogy, anthropology, and neuroscience, lends support to the idea
that quick and automatic affect-laden intuitions indeed shape
higher levels of human reasoning, which belong to a slower
and phylogenetically newer set of cognitive resources (Eslinger
& Damasio 1985; Fiske 1992; Greene & Haidt 2002; Haidt
2001; 2007; Moll et al. 2005; Prinz 2006). Thus, the first step is
to consider emotional and affective factors as the driving forces
behind moral judgments. This view is by no means new; it goes
back at least to David Hume’s proposal that moral reasoning is
driven by moral emotions and intuitions: “Reason is, and ought
only to be the slave of the passions” (Hume 1739/2000).
The second step is to dissolve the concept of “moral judgment”
by no longer envisaging it as a single entity, but rather as a com-
pound cognitive act. Based on neuroscientific evidence, it is
becoming increasingly clear that there are no specific regions of
the brain responsible for moral judgments, which would be the
combined result of basic processes involving abstract reasoning,
its emotional content, and possibly other cognitive factors
(Greene & Haidt 2002). Lending support to this view, the
“affect as information” hypothesis, from social psychology, empha-
sizes the importance of people’s mood and feelings when making
decisions and judgments (Haidt 2001). In the same vein, Dama-
sio’s “somatic marker” hypothesis points to the role of emotional
experiences in guiding decision-making by ascribing affective
valence to behavioral options, and this has been substantiated by
empirical data originating from several clinical and neuroimaging
studies (Eslinger & Damasio 1985; Bechara et al. 2000).
In conclusion, Knobe’s article has the merit of reinforcing, with
both experimental facts and theoretical considerations, the not
often recognized importance of moral values in assembling appar-
ently neutral and objective evaluations. However, we believe that
such an idea must be brought to a wider scenario, in which we
could integrate basic neurophysiological mechanisms underlying
emotional states and decisional processes into a framework able
to account for more elaborate cognitive tasks, such as planning,
moral judgments, and scientific reasoning. Finally, granting to
Knobe that we inescapably moralize our perception of human
interactions, it would be interesting to say a word about the relation-
ships between this intuitive grasping and the scientific grasping that
psychologists and sociologists try to achieve. What does happen in a
psychologist’s mind when she studies someone looking at two
people interacting? Such a question is likely to allow one to go
deeper into the implications of Knobe’s proposition.
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Abstract: In this commentary we suggest that asymmetries in reasoning
associated with moral judgment do not necessarily invalidate a theory-
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theory account of naı¨ve psychological reasoning. The asymmetries may
reflect a core knowledge assumption that human nature is prosocial, an
assumption that heightens vigilance for antisocial dispositions, which in
turn leads to differing assumptions about what is the presumed topic of
conversation.
We question Knobe’s thesis that in acknowledging the asymme-
tries observed in reasoning associated with moral judgment we
must perforce abandon a “theory-theory” characterization of
naı¨ve psychological reasoning. Certainly there are pervasive
asymmetries, at least when the situation affords opportunity for
moral evaluation, but such asymmetries may not, in themselves,
invalidate a theory-theory perspective.
We suspect that underlying the asymmetries is a tendency to
view prosocial dispositions as the norm, a tendency that makes
us especially vigilant about antisocial dispositions. In other
words, we firmly expect others to have prosocial intentions and
behavior. When asked about actions that involve harm-infliction
or rule breaking, we assume these anomalies are the events that
require explanation and attention. This vigilance, which recog-
nizes moral culpability as a conspicuous and interesting phenom-
enon, can account for the empirical findings in question without
compelling rejection of a theory-theory characterization of naı¨ve
psychological reasoning. That is, just because we bring to our
reasoning something like a base-rate assumption, or perhaps
even a “core knowledge” assumption (a` la Spelke & Kinzler
2007) concerning prosocial intentions and behavior, it does not
follow that we are essentially unscientific or irrational in the
reasoning that ensues.
Even if we begin with a default assumption about its nature,
we may nevertheless view human behavior through a theory-
like framework that can be rationally revised through experience
(e.g., Gopnik & Wellman 1992). In essence, we suggest that,
despite the arguments raised by Knobe against motivational
and conversational pragmatics hypotheses, there is some such
alternative view that can account for the empirical findings
without invalidating a theory-theory characterization of naı¨ve
psychological reasoning.
Knobe’s point regarding the pervasive nature of observed
asymmetries in psychological reasoning, at least in reasoning
that invites moral judgment, is well supported. But the asymme-
tries may simply reveal that people are poised to seize on moral
failings and treat them as focal. They are less inclined to view pro-
social activities as warranting explanation and evaluation. In
keeping with the widely popular notion that we have a deep-
seated intuitive sensitivity regarding harm (e.g., Haidt 2001;
Hoffman 2000; Turiel 2006), perhaps we exhibit what a theory-
theorist might consider a core knowledge bias when reasoning
about others. Specifically, we view good intentions and behavior
as the norm and are consequently hypersensitive to deviations
from it. When asked about people who act badly, we assume
the deviation is what we should attend to and explain (in a
Gricean fashion), and respond accordingly.
On this view, when asked whether the chairman of the board
has intentionally harmed the environment by instituting a new
program that he knows would create harm in addition to increas-
ing profits, people respond affirmatively. Such a response, we
think, reflects vigilant attention to someone knowingly acting in
a way that causes harm. The same interpretation applies to the
findings reflecting variations on the terms (“deciding,” “desire,”
“advocating,” etc.). In these cases, the unacceptable, yet fully
cognizant, behavior is simply assumed to be the topic of conver-
sation. But when asked whether the chairman intentionally
helped, rather than harmed, the environment, people respond
differently – because helping is not a weird and worrying thing
that commands vigilant attention. A question about whether
helping was intended is interpreted as a query about whether
the chairman had that outcome as a goal. In a world where pro-
social aims are assumed to be the norm, we are not inclined to
give the chairman moral credit for the outcome because the orig-
inal goal, according to the narrative, was to increase profit. These
asymmetrical responses do not reflect irrational reasoning; they
reflect different assessments of what is the focal issue, or curios-
ity, to be addressed and explained. It may be that such asymme-
tries are universal because there is a core knowledge
presupposition about the prosocial nature of people, possibly
from very early in development (see Hamlin et al. 2007). This
assumption, in itself, does not mean the reasoning is illogical or
unscientific, but it does influence the topic presumed to
warrant explanation and discussion.
How does this interpretation account for people’s judgments
of causation? When both an administrative assistant and a
faculty member are said to have removed pens from the recep-
tionist’s desk, the former with permission and the latter illicitly,
people indicate that the professor caused the problem. This
response may also reflect vigilant attention to the anomalous
bad behavior, the event that requires explanation, and a corre-
sponding shift in conversational focus. Knobe astutely notes
that it is not just that the behavior is strange or unusual (see,
e.g., Roxborough & Cumby 2009) but specifically that the behav-
ior is morally bereft. So it seems it is moral culpability in general
that is regarded as anomalous, not the specific actions of a certain
person or even a group of people. Moreover, it does not matter
whether in fact the final outcome is actually good (Hitchcock &
Knobe 2009, cited in the target article); the focus continues to
be on the “bad” behavior. So – and here we think we agree
with Knobe – it is not accurate to characterize what we bring
to these reasoning tasks as purely a base-rate assumption regard-
ing any specific action; rather, we simply assume that people will
usually have benign intentions and act in a prosocial fashion.
In one respect, our interpretation resembles Knobe’s. We
agree that moral considerations are being taken into account in
the reasoning reported in the literature. And it may be objected
that our interpretation is simply another version of the motiva-
tional and conversational pragmatics hypotheses refuted by
Knobe. But we think it is different to view people as bringing to
their reasoning core content assumptions about human nature,
assumptions that influence the presumed focus of conversations.
The fact that people have expectations about others’ prosocial and
antisocial proclivities does not in itself mean that reasoning about
causality in the social realm is irrational, impervious to experi-
ence, or otherwise at odds with scientific theorizing.
“Stupid people deserve what they get”: The
effects of personality assessment on
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Abstract: Knobe argues that people’s judgments of the moral status of a
side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect
is intentional. I tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe’s but
involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative
side-effects. My results show that it is people’s sense of what agents
deserve, and not the moral status of side-effects, that drives intuition.
In line with his empirically grounded theory that interpretations
of other people’s minds do not follow scientific principles, Knobe
hypothesizes that our judgments of the intentional nature of side-
effects depend on the side-effect’s assumed moral status.
I conducted a study involving 150 participants which challenges
this hypothesis (Brogaard 2010b). The participants were divided
into four groups of 25, and the subjects in each group were ran-
domly assigned a vignette featuring either an economically or
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eudaimonistically negative side-effect or a positive side-effect1;
plus I had two of these groups of 25 test the last vignette of the
target article (hence totaling 150 subjects). Each of the first four
groups received one of the following different vignettes:
(1A) The famous stand-up comedian Rob’s personal assistant went to
Rob and said, “We are thinking of changing your medication. It will
help your popularity immensely by completely treating your stage
fright, but it will also hurt you by causing morning headaches.” Rob
answered, “I don’t care at all about having morning headaches. I just
want to be as popular as possible. Let’s switch to the new medication.”
Sure enough, Rob suffered from morning headaches.
(1B) [. . .] “It will help your popularity immensely by completely treat-
ing your stage fright, and it will also help you by curing your morning
headaches.” Rob was cured of his morning headaches.
(2A) The famous stand-up comedian Rob’s personal assistant went to
Rob and said, “We are thinking of hiring a new PR assistant. It will
help your popularity immensely, but it will also harm your financial
situation.” Rob answered, “I don’t care at all about my financial situ-
ation. I just want to be as popular as possible. Let’s hire the new PR
assistant.” Sure enough, Rob’s financial situation was harmed.
(2B) [. . .] “It will help your popularity immensely, and it will also help
your financial situation.” Rob’s financial situation was helped.
Of the participants in the group that received vignette (1A),
84% judged that Rob intentionally harmed himself; 76% in the
group receiving (1B) judged that Rob didn’t intentionally help
himself; 88% of the group that got (2A) judged that Rob intention-
ally hurt his financial situation; and 76% of the group that got (2B)
judged that Rob didn’t intentionally help his financial situation.
In these vignettes, the side-effects have no direct bearing on
morality. But the vignettes are akin to Knobe’s in describing an
agent with undesirable personality traits. The agent is either
greedy and self-centered (the chairman), or superficial (Rob).
I found that these personality traits figured in participants’
answers to follow-up questions. When asked to “describe Rob’s
personality traits,” 88% replied with one of the following
words: “shallow,” “superficial,” “stupid,” “flaky,” “irresponsible,”
or “careless.”
Participants given the vignettes (1A) and (1B) were also asked
whether Rob deserved to suffer from headaches or economically,
given the decision he made. Here, 98% checked the options “yes”
or “leaning towards ‘yes’.” When asked to justify their answers
(“Rob deserves/does not deserve to suffer from headaches/econ-
omically because:”), 72% of the participants who replied “yes/
leaning towards ‘yes’ ” used descriptive terms such as “super-
ficial,” “stupid,” and “irresponsible.”
The results indicate that the driving force behind rendering
the negative side-effects in (1A) and (2A) as intentional is a
feeling that Rob deserves to suffer because of his undesirable
personality traits.
I hypothesize that whether a (moral or non-moral) negative
outcome is considered intentional depends on whether the
agent is believed to deserve the outcome or (moral or non-
moral) blame associated with it. If the agent is greedy, selfish,
or superficial, he is thought to deserve the bad outcome or the
blame. Consequently, the outcome is considered intentional.
This hypothesis explains why the chairman in Knobe’s original
cases is judged to have intentionally harmed the environment but
not to have intentionally helped it. Because the chairman is con-
sidered greedy and selfish, he is thought to deserve potential
blame associated with harming the environment. Accordingly,
the outcome is considered intentional.
To further test this hypothesis, I arbitrarily assigned one of two
other vignettes, similar to Knobe’s in the target article, to 50
participants:
(3A) The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the
board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will
help the environment, and it will also hurt our profits.” The chairman
of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about profits. I just want us to
help the environment. Let’s start the new program.” They started the
new program. Sure enough, the company’s profits decreased.
(3B) [. . .] “It will help the environment, and it will help us increase
profits.” . . . Sure enough, the company’s profits increased.
Here, 92% said the chairman in (3A) did not intentionally hurt
the company, and 72% said the chairman in (3B) did not inten-
tionally help the company.
The first result confirms our hypothesis. The chairman in (3A)
has desirable personality traits: He cares about the environment,
not profits. So, the subjects infer that he does not deserve the
potential blame associated with having intentionally brought
about a decrease in profits, and hence, that he did not intention-
ally bring about the side-effect.
The results in (3B) indicate that for an agent to intentionally
bring about a positive side-effect, he or she must not only
deserve the outcome or the potential praise associated with it,
he or she must also aim at bringing it about.
In conclusion: The results of my study are in agreement with
Knobe’s suggestion that people’s judgments of side-effects do
not rely on scientific methods, but the results disagree with
Knobe concerning the underlying principles driving these judg-
ments. Knobe (2006) proposes a model for how moral assess-
ments affect judgments of intentional action. In his original
cases, we are confronted with the side-effect, harmed environ-
ment. We determine that the side-effect is morally bad and
that the chairman showed foresight. We then employ the prin-
ciple “If the side-effect is morally bad, and the agent showed
either trying or foresight, then the side-effect is intentional”
and infer that the chairman intentionally harmed the environ-
ment and is to blame for his behavior (see my Fig. 1).
My study suggests a different model for the attribution of
intentionality. When we are confronted with a side-effect (e.g.,
harmed environment, harmed self, or harmed financial situation),
we determine whether the side-effect is negative. We then assess
the agent’s personality in order to determine whether he or she
deserves the bad outcome or the potential blame associated
with it. Finally, we employ the principle “If the side-effect is
negative, and the agent showed trying or foresight, and he or
she deserves the side-effect or the potential blame associated
with it, then the side-effect is intentional” and infer that the
agent intentionally harmed the environment, him/herself, or
his/her financial situation and therefore is to blame for his or
her behavior (see my Fig. 2).
In a second IRB-approved2 project involving 1,500 participants,
currently in progress (Brogaard 2010a), we seek to determine the
correlation among positive side-effects, undesirable personality
traits/good fortune, and intentionality. Initial results indicate that
an agent’s bad personality traits, a history of undeserved success,
or good fortune leads us to judge that the agent did not intentionally
bring about the positive side-effect and hence does not deserve
praise. In a pilot study preceding this larger project, participants
were presented with vignettes featuring positive side-effects but
differing in terms of whether the agent had good or bad personality
traits or had a history of undeserved success or failure. Agents with
bad personality traits or a history of undeserved success were
judged not to have intentionally brought about the positive side-
effect, whereas the opposite was true for agents with good person-
ality traits or a history of undeserved failure.
Figure 1 (Brogaard). Knobe’s model of the mechanisms of the
side-effect asymmetry. The identification of a morally bad side-
effect triggers a selective search for features that are sufficient
to judge the side-effect as being brought about intentionally.
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NOTES
1. Overlapping material has been omitted.
2. This project was approved by the University of Missouri–St. Louis
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in
Research on May 21, 2010.
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Abstract: Knobe’s laudable conclusion that we make sense of our social
world based on moral considerations requires a development account of
human thought and a theoretical framework. We outline a view that such
a moral framework must be rooted in social interaction.
According to Knobe, moral considerations are an integral part of
the way we make sense of and reason about our social world. The
problem is that Knobe requires an account of the nature of
human thought explaining its moral nature, which, we argue,
must be developmental (Carpendale & Lewis 2004). We take
over where Knobe stops short of such a proposal, and sketch in
an account of the development of thinking, showing how this is
rooted in social interaction, which is moral in nature.
We propose a socially based view of the evolution and develop-
ment of thinking. From this perspective, human cognition
involves “moral considerations” because it originates as a social
process that is gradually mastered by individuals. This social
process has moral preconditions. We make sense of our social
world in moral terms because this is a fundamental aspect of
our human form of life, involving coordinating our actions and
interests with others.
Knobe’s comparison of the person as scientist versus moralist
constructs a straw man (Gellatly 1997), which does not explain
how moral thinking is possible, let alone how “scientific” thinking
and moral thinking fit together. For us, the problem is how the
person as moralist could come into being. We draw on Mead’s
(1934) account of the social origin of thinking and mind, accord-
ing to which meaning arises interpersonally as persons come to
realize the significance of their actions for others. Thus,
meaning is necessarily social because it requires experiencing
others’ attitudes to one’s actions.
The view that reflective thought originates as a social process
has many implications for the role of morality in thought. At the
most basic level, social interaction involves moral preconditions
of responsiveness, of give-and-take, and of turn-taking (Turnbull
2003). Although we often think of morality at a grand scale, in
terms of life-and-death issues, morality is also embedded in
various aspects of everyday interaction with others and the way
we treat one another. There is a level of morality even at the
level of interpersonal interaction; it is built into the foundations
of what makes our interaction possible. This social process is
based on responding to one another and it is therefore moral in
its roots, because we treat each other as persons, not things. We
respond to one another; not to do so is to be morally accountable.
At another level, human forms of communication function
through assuming cooperation because we infer meaning from
what others say based on the assumption that they are cooperating
with us and they want us to understand them (Grice 1975a).
Another aspect of the moral preconditions of social interaction
is Winch’s (1972) point that, “the social conditions of language
and rationality must also carry with them certain fundamental
moral conceptions,” and “a norm of truth-telling is a moral con-
dition of language” (Winch 1972, pp. 60–63, emphasis in orig-
inal). Holiday (1988) also argued that the fabric of human
communication is built on the assumption that we tell the
truth. Of course, lying is possible, but it is only possible
because truth-telling is the default expected pattern. We
develop communication in parent-child interaction in relation-
ships of trust. It is within such relationships that communication
arises and this is mastered as a form of thought.
Piaget’s seminal work focused on the origins of morality in chil-
dren’s practical interaction with each other, and how young chil-
dren instantiate reciprocity in their play (Piaget 1932/1965).
Children then gradually become aware of this level of morality
on which their interaction is based, and this becomes available
for reflective thought; but, for Piaget, this moral understanding
is rooted in earlier, practical understanding developed with
social interaction.
We have outlined how the social process, which is the cradle
for human forms of reflective thought, has moral foundations.
Moral considerations are part of the way we make sense of our
social world because thinking is rooted in, and built on, the
social process, which has moral preconditions. Knobe disregards
a whole tradition according to which thinking is rooted in a
system of socially embedded processes of which morality is an
integral part. Drawing on this tradition would enable Knobe
to dispense with the view of the person as a scientist and
instead consider thinking as embedded in and emerging from
social interaction, which has moral preconditions at a number
of levels.
Moral evaluation shapes linguistic reports of
others’ psychological states, not theory-of-
mind judgments
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Figure 2 (Brogaard). New model of the mechanisms of the
side-effect asymmetry. The identification of a morally bad side-
effect triggers an assessment of personality traits, and the
identification of undesirable personality traits triggers a search
for features that are sufficient to judge the side-effect as being
brought about intentionally.
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Abstract: We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire)
when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of
describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence
reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our
mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far
shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the
way we think about, others’ psychological states.
Knobe has shown that people are far more likely to judge that an
agent intentionally caused (or had the desire to cause) a negative
side-effect than a positive one (e.g., harming vs. helping the
environment). In his target article, he argues that such asymme-
tries are good evidence for a “moralist” (as opposed to a “scienti-
fic”) picture, according to which the naı¨ve human capacity to
ascribe psychological states to others for the purpose of describ-
ing, explaining, and predicting their actions presupposes the
moral cognitive capacity to evaluate and judge others. He also
offers an interesting semantics of psychological predicates such
as intention, deciding, desiring. We think that neither Knobe’s
evidence nor his semantic analysis supports the moralist picture.
Knobe’s semantics for psychological predicates can be seen as
an extension of the semantics of gradable predicates such as cold.
Following Pettit and Knobe (2009), suppose a beer and a coffee
are both at the temperature of 208C. Application of “cold” might
plausibly yield a true statement in the coffee case and a false
statement in the beer case. People rate each liquid relative to a
default value that specifies what it is supposed to be like for it
to be cold. In other words, the concepts respectively expressed
by the words “coffee” and “beer” generate different standards
of comparison for the application of the predicate “cold.” Simi-
larly, the concepts expressed, respectively, by “harm” and
“help” generate different comparison classes for the application
of psychological predicates (e.g., “desire,” “intention”). The
threshold generated by the concept harm is significantly lower
than the threshold generated by the concept help. As a result,
people are more likely to judge, for example, that the chairman
had the desire to harm than the desire to help the environment.
Now, the fact that the semantics of gradable predicates can be
extended to psychological predicates is not convincing evidence
for the moralist picture of naı¨ve psychology. Does the fact that
the concepts harm and help generate different moral standards
for the application of psychological predicates show that our
understanding of psychological states itself is driven by moral
evaluations? Consider the standards involved in the application
of the quantifier many. Suppose that five children died in a fire
and five children survived. The concepts expressed by “die”
and “survive” generate different standards for the application of
one and the same quantifier “many.” When asked, most people
were inclined to accept that many children died, but to deny
that many survived. But it would be odd to conclude, on this
basis, that our mastery of numerical concepts expressed, for
example, by the quantifier “many” (our numerical cognition) is
shaped by moral evaluation.
In fact, Knobe’s own semantics for psychological predicates is
not consistent with the assumption that normative standards and
moral evaluation directly shape our mastery of the relevant con-
cepts of psychological states. On his account, a speaker’s assump-
tion about an agent’s “pro-attitude” towards either a negative or a
positive outcome will change the speaker’s willingness to apply a
psychological predicate (e.g., "intentional") to the agent’s action.
But if so, then the psychological concept of an agent’s pro-atti-
tude must be retrieved and used by the speaker before moral
considerations can come into play.
We have started to address the empirical question whether
moral evaluation shapes, not just our application of psychological
predicates, but our very understanding of mental states them-
selves. Instead of testing the distinct conditions in which partici-
pants are willing to apply the verb “desire” for evaluating the
chairman’s action, we asked them to use their psychological
concept in order to predict the chairman’s decision. We designed
such an experiment and ran the following study on 40
participants. After receiving either the HARM or HELP scen-
ario, participants were then given the following text:
Imagine that, before the program is started, the VP comes back to
the chairman and tells him: “It appears that we have to choose
between three programs. All three will generate the same amount
of benefits: hundreds of millions of dollars. The difference is that
program A will have no impact on the environment, while
program B will harm the environment and program C will help
the environment. Anyway, it will be impossible to prove our respon-
sibility in anything that would happen to the environment. So, if we
harm the environment, no one will know of our responsibility. But,
if we help the environment, that won’t benefit our image. Starting
program B or C will cost 10 dollars more than starting program A.”
If the chairman had to make this choice, what program would he
choose? A, B, or C?
In this case, if participants think that the chairman has the
desire to harm the environment, then they should select
answer B. If they think that he has the desire to help the environ-
ment, then they should select C. If they take the chairman to be
indifferent to the environment, then they should select A. Now, if
we assume that their inclination to apply the verb “desire” is a
reliable guide to their prediction of the chairman’s choice, then
we should make the following prediction: Reading the HARM
scenario should cause participants to select B more than
reading the HELP case should cause them to select C.
Among the participants who received the HARM case, 90%
answered A, 0% answered B, and 10% answered C. Among
those who received the HELP case, 80% answered A, 10%
answered B, and 10% answered C. Clearly, the participants’ pre-
dictions show that they do not think that the chairman’s desire to
harm the environment, in the HARM case, is stronger than the
chairman’s desire to help the environment, in the HELP case.
Arguably, the moral standards triggered, respectively, by the con-
cepts expressed by “harm” and “help” generate different com-
parison classes for the application of the verb “desire,” which
might enable people to convey to others their moral opinion of
the chairman. But even so, these moral standards did not affect
participants’ use of the psychological concept desire in the pre-
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Abstract:Moral considerations and our normative expectations influence
not only our judgments about intentional action or causation but also our
judgments about exact probabilities and quantities. Whereas those cases
support the competence theory proposed by Knobe in his paper, they
remain compatible with a modular conception of the interaction
between moral and nonmoral cognitive faculties in each of those domains.
Joshua Knobe makes three main claims in his paper. The first is
that the influence of moral considerations on our judgments does
not appear to be limited to the concept intentionally, nor even to
closely related concepts such as intention and intending (sect.
3.2). Thus, it appears to affect our judgments about causation,
knowledge, desire, and a number of other attitudes or processes.
Knobe’s second main claim is that the asymmetry found by
Knobe and colleagues in people’s judgments for such cases
depends essentially on our normative evaluation with regard to
counterfactual actions or situations; namely, on what should or
could have been the case. Knobe’s third claim and fairly radical
conclusion, finally, is that we cannot make “a clear division
Commentary/Knobe: Person as scientist, person as moralist
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2010) 33:4 335
whereby certain psychological processes are devoted to moral
questions and others are devoted to purely scientific questions”
(sect. 6, last para.).
In this commentary I would like to add further evidence in
support of Knobe’s first two claims, but express why I think we
should be skeptical of the main conclusion he draws from them.
In agreement with Knobe’s first claim, it may be pointed out
that moral considerations influence at least two other general
competences that would appear prima facie to be non-moral
and that are not mentioned in Knobe’s paper; namely, our quali-
tative evaluation of precise numerical probabilities and our quali-
tative evaluation of precise quantities (Egre´ 2010). The
evaluation of identical numerical probabilities is known to be
subjectively influenced by how detrimental the outcome is per-
ceived. The effect has been called the severity bias in the psycho-
logical literature (see Bonnefon & Villejoubert 2006; Pighin et al.
2009; Weber & Hilton 1990).
For example, Pighin et al. (2009) ran an experiment comparing
the evaluations made by four groups of pregnant women of a
scenario in which a gynecologist tells Elisa, a 30-year-old preg-
nant woman, that “there is a risk of [1 in 28; 1 in 307] that your
child will be affected by [Down’s syndrome; insomnia].” Subjects
in each group were asked to rank the probability communicated
for each disease on a 7-point scale ranging from “extremely low”
to “extremely high.”
What Pighin et al.’s study found was that when the numerical
risk for the two conditions was made the same, the women still
ranked the probability of the child getting Down’s syndrome as
significantly higher than for insomnia. Even the probability of
1/307 for the child getting Down’s syndrome was ranked
higher than the probability of 1/28 for insomnia. Moreover, sub-
jects were asked to rank each disease according to how severe
they judged it to be. Their assessments of probabilities were
found to correlate with those severity judgments.
Cova and Egre´ (2010) looked for the same effect regarding
people’s qualitative evaluation of identical quantities in terms
of the word many. Subjects were given a scenario reporting
that a fire had broken out in a school in which there were 10 chil-
dren, 5 of whom died in the fire and 5 managed to escape. Each
subject had to judge true or false the two sentences: “Many chil-
dren perished in the fire. Many children survived from the fire.”
Irrespective of the order in which the sentences were presented,
the vast majority of subjects agreed that many children had per-
ished; but they did not agree that many children had survived,
despite the identical quantities and ratios involved.
Such cases comport with Knobe’s model and main explanatory
hypothesis in his paper (see also Pettit & Knobe 2009); namely,
they suggest that our subjective evaluation of probabilities or
quantities, just like our evaluation of causation or intentional
action, is sensitive not only to extensive magnitudes or processes,
but also to normative expectations that are highly context-depen-
dent and that vary with the kind of outcome under consideration.
For example, it is known from the semantics literature that our
judgments concerning whether many As are Bs are not purely
extensional (see Fara 2000; Lappin 2000; Sapir 1944). That is,
as the data with Cova confirm, those judgments do not merely
depend on the cardinality of As and Bs and on the ratio of As
to Bs; they intensionally depend on the kind of entities referred
to by A and B, and on what is taken to be either normal or more
desirable relative to context.
In agreement with Knobe’s remark about the importance of
counterfactual evaluations, presumably we judge that many chil-
dren died because we reason that in a better and alternative
course of events, fewer children would have died (and as a
result, that more would have survived). Similarly, how high a
probability value is considered for an outcome may depend on
how much more probable or less probable we consider that
outcome could be or should have been.
It would be quite doubtful, however, to infer from those con-
siderations that we cannot distinguish between the moral
processes that influence our qualitative evaluation of quantities
or probabilities and the non-moral processes that underlie our
scientific judgments based on numerical quantities or probabil-
ities. Indeed, when it comes to having a scientific attitude
towards relative or absolute quantities, our evaluation can
safely rely on our nonmoral capacity to compare extensional mag-
nitudes. (Contrast “Did many children die?,” which calls on our
subjective and moral evaluation, with “How many children
died?,” which can be given an exact and objective answer.)
More generally, I wish to make the qualification that whereas
sensitivity to normative expectations is most likely directly
encoded in the lexical semantics of most of our qualitative voca-
bulary (see Egre´ 2010; Kennedy 2007), including for vague con-
cepts such as knowing, desiring, causing, and so on, this remains
compatible with the hypothesis Knobe appears to reject in his
article. That is, it is compatible with the view that our cognitive
competence in each of those domains works in a modular way,
based on the interaction of non-moral evaluative faculties and
moral evaluative faculties.
From Knobe’s interesting data and examples, it would be safer
to conclude that our folk concepts of causation, knowledge, and
desire are irreducibly norm-sensitive, without that impugning
the division between moral and non-moral cognition.
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Abstract:Moral judgments often affect scientific judgments in real-world
contexts, but Knobe’s examples in the target article do not capture this
phenomenon.
Moral considerations often affect reasoning about facts in the real
world, clouding the judgments of both scientists and non-scien-
tists. The elementary psychological processes that underlie this
phenomenon are important to uncover. The experimental evi-
dence presented in Knobe’s target article, however, does not illu-
minate these underlying judgments.
Consider first the scenario in which a profit-maximizing indi-
vidual A chooses an action that harms versus helps the environ-
ment, and a majority of subjects say the harm was intentional
but the help was unintentional. Is there a disagreement concern-
ing the facts among decision-makers? Almost certainly not. For
instance, all subjects might agree with the assertion that A
foresaw the effect of his decision on the environment and did
not factor in this effect in deciding upon his action. All subjects
must agree with this, in fact, because the description of the situ-
ation says precisely this. It follows that attributing intentionality
in one case and not the other is not a judgment of fact, but
rather a moral judgment. The experiment then shows that
moral judgments affect other moral judgments, which is not a
contested assertion.
One might object that attribution of intentionality is a factual
statement concerning an individual’s mental state, and some-
times indeed this is the case. For instance, we might conclude
that after copulation, an insect may “intentionally” feed himself
to his mate, or that the prey may “intentionally” reveal his
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awareness of the predator to the predator. In such cases, we are
saying that it is a normal part of the behavioral repertoire of the
organism to engage in this act even when the organism has the
capacity and the information to behave otherwise. But intention-
ality has a distinct second meaning that lies clearly in the moral
realm. We say a undesirable result of an individual decision is
“intentional” if the individual foresaw the result and could have
prevented the result and achieved all other effects of the
decision, except that doing so would have incurred additional
personal cost.
Intentionality has yet a distinct third meaning, also in the
moral realm. We say a welcome result of an individual decision
is “intentional” if the individual foresaw the result and acted to
bring about the result at personal cost.
When a subject says that the harm was “intentional,” it is most
plausibly the second meaning that is being invoked. When a
subject says that the help was “unintentional,” it is most plausibly
the third meaning that is being invoked. We rule out the first
meaning of “intentional” in these cases – because this meaning
is strictly factual, whereas the context of the situation calls for a
moral evaluation.
The interpretation of this evidence is complicated by the fact
that there are several other commonly used meanings of inten-
tionally, one being “foresaw the result and acted in order to
achieve this result.” In this sense, profit-maximizer A did not
intentionally harm in the first scenario and did not intentionally
help in the second. Very likely, many subjects chose to use this
definition, despite the fact that it renders the choice completely
trivial, as the statement of the problem includes non-intentional-
ity overtly in the description of the situation.
The Gricean analysis of meaningful communication is relevant
here. According to Grice (1975b), in normal conversation, a lis-
tener assumes that when a speaker solicits information, the
speaker expects the information to be useful to the speaker.
Thus, if someone asks, “Is there a washroom on this floor?”
acceptable answers include “Yes, down the hall on the right,”
or “Yes, but it is out of order; there is a working washroom the
next flight up,” or “You’ll have to go across the street.” A
simple yes or no would be considered a somewhat bizarre
answer. In the current case, some of the common usages of the
word “intentionally” are explicitly assumed in the statement of
the situation, so a Gricean subject can supply useful information
only by referring to those usages of the terms that require some
sort of substantive inference. These usages are the second and
third ones defined above.
Related problems of the multiple meaning of words beset
Knobe’s causation analysis. Consider the scenario of the philos-
ophy department receptionist and the taking of pens. The question
as to whether the professor, the administrator, or both caused the
problem is not a matter of fact. The facts are laid out quite clearly
in the statement of the scenario, and would be agreed upon by all.
The notion of “cause” in question is not that of Newtonian mech-
anics, but rather systems theory or product design. To see this, let
us change the scenario a bit, to a machine that needs a certain level
of motor oil to prevent seizure:
Half the oil is devoted to a mechanism that burns 10% of its oil allot-
ment each day, the lost oil being replenished at the start of each day.
The other half of the oil is devoted to a mechanism designed to burn
no oil at all. At the end of one day, the machine seizes up and it is
determined that the first mechanism consumed its allotted 10% of
oil, but the second mechanism consumed an additional 10%
through a malfunction.
If asked whether the first mechanism, the second mechanism, or
both “caused” the failure, the correct answer is the second.
There is here, of course, no factual dispute and the inspectors
are making no moral judgments in placing blame on the second
mechanism. In general, when a complex mechanism fails, blame
is placed on elements that failed their designed tasks, even if in
some sense their behavior according to Newton’s laws was
exactly the same as other elements that performed as designed.
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Abstract: We have found that moral considerations interact with belief
ascription in determining intentionality judgment. We attribute this
finding to a differential availability of plausible counterfactual alternatives
that undo the negative side-effect of an action. We conclude that
Knobe’s thesis does not account for processes by which counterfactuals
are generated and how these processes affect moral evaluations.
Ever since Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, there has been debate
over the extent to which there is separation between morality and
cognition. We applaud Knobe’s modern effort to integrate the
investigation of these areas. There are three main reasons,
however, to doubt his thesis according to which moral evaluations
affect the ordinary understanding of social and psychological
phenomena “from the very beginning” (target article, sect. 5.3,
para. 3).
First, moral and non-moral evaluations of the social world do
not always work together. In particular, in support of the position
that Theory of Mind reasoning is not theory-like and does not
proceed in terms of a process that can be characterized in
terms of “child-as-scientist” (Leslie et al. 2004), preverbal
infants appear to possess basic mind-reading skills (e.g., Surian
et al. 2007). No evidence suggests that such acquisition
depends on input from moral competencies. Moreover, children
with selective impairments of mind-reading skills appear to have
an intact ability to make some basic moral judgments (Blair 1996;
Leslie et al. 2006b).
Second, even when moral evaluations appear to shape ordinary
intuitions about the social world, non-moral considerations are a
necessary input to the shaping of these intuitions. We have found
that both adults (Pellizzoni et al. 2010) and preschoolers (Pelliz-
zoni et al. 2009) attribute intentionality to a negative side-effect
produced by an agent who was not aware of it. By contrast, par-
ticipants did not do this when the agent was described as having a
false belief about the negative side-effect. When the side-effect
was positive, participants judged that it had been produced unin-
tentionally, regardless of whether the agent believed that it could
occur or not. Thus, evaluative considerations interact with belief
ascription in determining intentionality judgment.
Third, counterfactual thinking affects moral evaluations, rather
than vice versa. We have attributed the above-described results
to a differential availability of plausible counterfactual alterna-
tives that undo the negative side-effect. When individuals read
about an agent who did not know that his action could produce
a negative side-effect, they could easily think, “Had he made an
inquiry, he would have discovered the side-effect and made a
different choice.” Indeed, when readers undo the negative
outcome of a story, they alter the protagonist’s choices (Girotto
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et al. 1991). But when a misinformed agent had no reason to
anticipate a negative side-effect, individuals could not easily
imagine a plausible alternative (e.g., ”Had he imagined that he
was misinformed, he would have made a different choice”).
Counterfactual thinking seems to play an important role in
Knobe’s thesis, too: Individuals attribute intentionality to a nega-
tive but not to a positive side-effect because they tend to con-
struct alternatives that are morally right (“If the agent had
chosen differently, he might have produced a positive side-
effect”) rather than morally wrong (“If the agent had chosen dif-
ferently, he might have produced a negative side-effect”). The
problem with Knobe’s interpretation that moral evaluations
determine the selection of counterfactuals is that it does not
explain how counterfactuals are generated or how counterfac-
tuals affect other mental activities, including moral judgment.
His interpretation neglects the finding that individuals do con-
struct morally dubious alternatives. For example, they imagine
breaking the constitutive rules of a game in order to undo a
failure (e.g., Girotto et al. 2007). When applied to intentionality
attribution, Knobe’s interpretation appears to confuse morality
with normality. According to Knobe, individuals who read the
positive side-effect story do not imagine the chairman damaging
the environment because this possibility is morally wrong. We
would say that they don’t do so simply because this possibility
alters normal events, that is, the normal tendency of chairmen
to seek to make profits (Kahneman & Miller 1986; Uttich & Lom-
brozo 2010). With regard to the effects of counterfactual think-
ing, Knobe’s interpretation neglects the finding that moral
evaluations often depend on the availability of counterfactual
alternatives. For example, individuals attribute more compen-
sation to the victim of an accident (and more responsibility to
the perpetrator) when it is preceded by exceptional rather than
by normal circumstances (Macrae 1992). Finally, Knobe’s
interpretation cannot easily explain our results: The possible
alternatives evoked by the non-informed agent version (e.g.,
”Had he made an inquiry. . .”) were not morally different from
those evoked by the misinformed agent version (e.g., ”Had he
imagined that he was misinformed. . .”). Yet, only in the first
case did individuals attribute intentionality to the negative side-
effect (Pellizzoni et al. 2010).
To investigate the relations between the moral and non-moral
facets of naı¨ve psychology remains a high priority for future
research. However, in this connection, it is not necessary to pos-
tulate that moral evaluations play a pervasive role in the ordinary
understanding of intentional actions.
Questioning the influence of moral judgment
doi:10.1017/S0140525X10001755
Steve Guglielmo
Department of Psychology, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.
steve_guglielmo@brown.edu
http://research.clps.brown.edu/mbq/guglielmo/
Abstract: Moral judgment – even the type discussed by Knobe –
necessarily relies on substantial information about an agent’s mental
states, especially regarding beliefs and attitudes. Moreover, the effects
described by Knobe can be attributed to norm violations in general,
rather than moral concerns in particular. Consequently, Knobe’s
account overstates the influence of moral judgment on assessments of
mental states and causality.
Knobe’s “person as moralist” account provides a novel contri-
bution to the study of human morality. Whereas most research
in this domain has examined the features of behavior that
guide moral judgment (Cushman 2008; Guglielmo et al. 2009;
Shaver 1985) or the processes that underlie moral judgment
(Greene 2008; Haidt 2001), Knobe’s target article extends the
literature by probing the influence of morality on other psycho-
logical judgments.
Despite its promise, however, Knobe’s account has several
limitations. Knobe neither measures nor defines moral judgment,
leaving it unclear precisely what the account posits and how it
may be falsified. Nonetheless, any conceptualization of moral
judgment consistent with Knobe’s account necessarily relies on
substantial information about an agent’s mental states. Moreover,
the results described by Knobe are likewise obtained by instances
of entirely non-moral norm violations. Finally, Knobe should
clarify why it would be the case that people’s moral judgments
of badness and blame share no direct relationship.
The crux of Knobe’s argument is that moral judgments of
badness (hereafter “MJ1”) impact judgments about an agent’s
mental states and causal role, which thereby impact moral judg-
ments of blame (hereafter “MJ2”). Although MJ2 are often
measured, studies of Knobe’s account rarely (if ever) measure
MJ1. It is therefore critical to know the conditions under which
such judgments arise. To this end, Knobe claims to examine
“judgment[s] that the agent’s action itself is bad.” But this defi-
nition does not provide much clarity – if MJ1 are not simply
judgments about bad outcomes (sect. 4.1.3, para. 4), are they
judgments that an agent caused /knew about/ intended some-
thing bad? Absent either a measurement or definition of MJ1,
it is unclear precisely what is alleged to influence mental state
and causality assessments, and how one could attempt to falsify
the account.
In any case, Knobe’s account would be most compelling if MJ1
arise in the absence of any considerations of the agent’s mental
states (which, after all, are proposed to be influenced by MJ1).
However, this is clearly not the case. First, the agent’s knowledge
is relevant to these moral judgments. For example, the harming
chairman’s action is bad in part because he knew that harm
would occur. When agents lack knowledge of the harmful conse-
quences of their action, people no longer view the consequences
as intentional (Nadelhoffer 2006b; Pellizzoni et al. 2010). Accord-
ing to Knobe’s account, therefore, such actions must not be bad.
But if this is true, then MJ1 require consideration of an agent’s
knowledge.
An agent’s attitude is likewise relevant to moral judgment. The
harming chairman’s action is bad in part because he displayed
absolutely no concern for the environment. When an agent
regrets or feels bad about a negative outcome, people are markedly
less likely to say the action was intentional (Cushman & Mele
2008; Guglielmo & Malle, in press; Phelan & Sarkissian 2008).
On Knobe’s account, therefore, such actions also must not be
bad, suggesting that MJ1 require consideration of an agent’s atti-
tude. Accordingly, MJ1 substantially depend on mental state infor-
mation, particularly regarding beliefs (that the agent know about a
negative outcome) and attitudes (that the agent not care about the
outcome). These two elements are widely recognized as essential
inputs to moral judgment (Cushman 2008; Darley & Shultz
1990; Guglielmo et al. 2009; Young & Saxe 2009).
Even if one grants that morality impacts mental state judg-
ments, this effect appears to be a special case of norm violation
more generally. In fact, the same empirical patterns on which
Knobe’s account is based are also found for cases of norm viola-
tions that have nothing whatsoever to do with morality (Machery
2008). For example, people judged an agent’s making of black
toys to be more intentional when doing so violated, rather than
conformed to, the conventional color designation (Uttich & Lom-
brozo 2010). People also judged it more intentional to violate a
dress code than to conform to one (Guglielmo & Malle, in
press). This is because norm violations – whether moral or not
– provide diagnostic information about a person’s disposition,
motives, intentions, and so on (Reeder & Brewer 1979; Skow-
ronski & Carlston 1989). Interestingly, Knobe’s recent work
adopts precisely this explanation, highlighting the impact of
non-moral norms on causality judgments (Hitchcock & Knobe
2009). But this perspective suggests that people are not
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“moralists” at all; rather, their judgments are sensitive to norms,
just as those of a “scientist” would be.
Setting aside the criticisms raised here, Knobe should clarify a
puzzling aspect of his proposed account. Knobe distinguishes
between early MJ1 (badness judgments) and later MJ2 (e.g.,
blame judgments). One might expect these judgments to be
tightly linked, as they both assess the morality of a given action.
However, the connection between them is argued to be fully
mediated by non-moral assessments (e.g., regarding mental
states and causality, see Figure 5 of the target article). Knobe’s
account would benefit from a psychological explanation for the
existence of such a circuitous path between the conceptually
similar MJ1 and MJ2. Why might it be that two moral judgments
have no direct relationship to each other?
One possible answer to the puzzle is that MJ1 are not actually
moral judgments, but simply judgments about whether an action
violated an expectation. Such expectations are sometimes a func-
tion of valence – people expect others to bring about positive
events and avoid negative ones (Pizarro et al. 2003). Perceivers
may adopt different thresholds for what constitutes a relevant
mental state or causal role, depending on the extent to which
the action violates expectations. This possibility is largely consist-
ent with Knobe’s discussion of default attitude positions (Figs. 8
and 9 of the target article), except that Knobe maintains the
threshold is set by moral judgments in particular. Given the dis-
cussion here, it is not clear how this can be true. Although expec-
tations (including, but not limited to, those concerning valence)
may impact the evidential threshold set by perceivers, moral
judgments depend on assessments of an agent’s mental states.
Accordingly, the claim that such assessments are “suffused with
moral considerations” (sect. 5.3, para. 3) is greatly overstated.
Person as lawyer: How having a guilty mind
explains attributions of intentional agency
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Abstract: In criminal law, foresight betrays a guilty mind as much as
intent does: both reveal that the agent is not properly motivated to
avoid an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our
judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even when
unintended. In contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea that acting
intentionally is acting with a certain frame of mind.
The experimental findings Knobe discusses suggest that norma-
tive considerations influence our judgments about non-norma-
tive issues. The core finding is this: When an individual brings
about a harmful side-effect, foresees that he does so, but does
not care about it, people nevertheless tend to judge that he
does so intentionally. The key question is whether these judg-
ments are correct, calling for a revision of prevailing analyses
of intentional action, or whether no such revision is needed
since the judgments are simply incorrect. The controversy sur-
rounding this finding is marked by a conspicuous absence of
the legal perspective (Malle & Nelson 2003 and Nadelhoffer
2006a are exceptions). In particular, it has gone unnoticed that
the way intent and foresight are interpreted in law provides
support for taking the attributions of intentional agency at face
value.
Intention and foresight in criminal law. In criminal law, it is
common practice to classify cases of foresight as intent, even
though the agent did not strictly intend to bring about the
relevant effect. Courts are “entitled to infer” intent from foresight
(Ashworth 2006, p. 178). The underlying idea is that foresight
betrays a guilty mind (mens rea) as much as intent does. This
insight is often expressed by saying that the agent “obliquely”
intends the effect. An agent obliquely intends an effect when
she anticipates it as a consequence of her action, even though
it does not contribute to the successful performance of that
action (Duff 1996, p. 17). In practice, this notion of an oblique
intention is used only in relation to harmful consequences. So
an agent who is said to obliquely intend a consequence will be
someone who lacks the proper motivation to avoid a harmful or
illegal consequence of her action. My hypothesis is that this mis-
alignment between what actually motivated her and what (she
realized) should have motivated her warrants our judgment
that she brought about the effect intentionally (see Hindriks
2008).
Many foreseen consequences do not really concern us. I
might realize that I increase the humidity in my bathroom
when I take a shower, but normally I do not really care about
this and I have no reason to do so. It would be odd to say that
I increase the humidity “intentionally.” When a consequence
of my action is harmful, however, I should be concerned
about it. When a foreseen consequence should concern us, it
makes much more sense to attribute intentional agency. Inten-
tional action would then be broader than intent, but narrower
than foresight. Duff argues that “the wider legal definitions of
‘intention’ try to capture this broader notion” (1990, p. 37).
This suggests that legal practice supports the folk attributions
of intentional agency.
The mens rea explanation. On my hypothesis, intentional
action is of special interest to lawyers or prosecutors. A misalign-
ment between what actually motivated a defendant and what (he
realized) should have motivated him bears directly on whether he
acted intentionally, and thereby on whether he satisfies the mens
rea requirement of the relevant criminal offense. In light of this, I
call my account of the attributions of intentional agency that
Knobe has investigated “the mens rea explanation.” This expla-
nation shares with Knobe’s account the idea that moral consider-
ations figure in the competences of people who attribute
intentional agency. The way in which Kobe’s account differs
from mine can be illuminated in terms of the distinction
between conduct and fault, between actus reus and mens rea
(interpreted broadly to cover both illegal and immoral acts).
Knobe argues that the moral character or badness of the side-
effect influences judgments of intentional action. This is a
matter of actus reus rather than mens rea.
Knobe’s actus reus explanation has an important drawback.
The moral character of a consequence that constitutes the
actus reus is not something mental and does not concern the
motivation of the agent. Thus, the actus reus explanation severs
or significantly weakens the tie between intentional action and
motivation. In particular, Knobe has to abandon the idea that
acting intentionally is a matter of acting with a certain frame of
mind. This is a core commitment in our understanding of inten-
tional action (Bratman 1987; Setiya 2003; Velleman 1989). The
mens rea explanation places the agent’s failure to be motivated
appropriately at the center of the relevant attributions of inten-
tional agency; it focuses on the agent’s ignoring of a normative
reason that counts against his intended action. It thereby pre-
serves the idea that acting intentionally is a matter of acting in
a certain frame of mind.
The mens rea explanation has at least two other virtues. Its
second virtue is that it reveals why the notion of intentional
action is so useful as input for judgments about criminal and
moral responsibility: Culpability and blame require both (illegal
or immoral) conduct and fault (mens rea), and the notion of
intentional action serves to provide (defeasible) evidence for
fault (there is no use for a notion broader than intent for ben-
eficial consequences, because, in contrast to blame, praise
requires intent; Stocker 1973, p. 60). Many have argued that
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Knobe’s core finding undermines this traditional conception of
intentional action and responsibility. The mens rea explanation
shows that it actually supports it.
The third virtue concerns the shifting standard that Knobe
postulates with respect to which issues such as acting intention-
ally, deciding, and favoring are judged. By changing the focus
from what is good or bad to what the agent has reason to do,
the mens rea account makes better sense of why the default
does not apply when legal or moral issues are concerned:
People are held to a different standard with respect to what
motivates them because (and in particular when they realize
that) they have reason to behave differently. Standards shift
when legal prosecution or moral criticism becomes pertinent.
Person as moral scientist
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Abstract: Scientists are generally more moral, and moralists more
scientific, than Knobe suggests. His own experiments show that people,
rather than making unscientific judgements about the moral intentions
of others, are behaving as good Bayesians who take account of prior
knowledge.
Knobe’s home university must be a remarkable place if, as he
suggests, scientists there “typically leave [moral] questions to
one side” (sect. 6, para. 2). In the wider world, science is
nothing if not a moral enterprise. At the very least, scientists
make a public commitment to tell the truth, to respect the
rules of argument, to make their arguments open to refutation,
not to cheat, and so on. Think of a scientist who is engaged in
peerreviewing a colleague’s work: He or she is probably using
the “ethical circuits” in his or her brain in similar ways to a
judge at a criminal trial. Contrary to the picture Knobe paints,
I would say science is an approach to the world that could only
have been developed by humans who were already constantly
aware of right and wrong.
Persons as scientists ought to be moral. But persons as moral-
ists ought to be scientific, too. Knobe claims that his experimental
studies show that when people are morally engaged, they begin to
think “unscientifically.” Yet it can be argued, on the evidence of
his own experiments, that the opposite is true.
Let’s consider the chairman study. Subjects are asked to
judge what the chairman’s intentions were. But, it is important
to note that, since subjects have only limited access to the facts,
the best they can do is to make an informed guess. What Knobe
then finds is that they guess, on one hand, the chairman
intended to harm the environment, but on the other, he did
not intend to help it. So, either way, they guess the chairman’s
intentions were reprehensible. But isn’t this exactly what we
might expect if the subjects are rational guessers who have, as
it happens, been given prior reason to believe that the chairman
is a bad man?
Knobe himself comes close to saying as much in the last para-
graph of section 5.2 when he says that “before people even begin
considering what actually happened [. . .] they make a judgement
about what sort of attitude an agent could be expected to hold.”
However, what he does not seem to realise is that this is a
thoroughly scientific approach. Philosophers of science widely
agree that the best procedure under conditions of uncertainty
is to adopt a Bayesian algorithm and calculate the probabilities
of a particular outcome based on prior knowledge (see the discus-
sion in Pugliucci 2010).
True enough, ordinary people as scientists are not equally
attentive to all kinds of prior information. And when it comes
to predicting the behaviour of others, there is no question that
morally relevant information takes pride of place. In particular,
as Cosmides and Tooby have shown, people tend to be on the
alert for any evidence that another person has deliberately
broken a social contract. Moreover, if and when people suspect
this, they begin to think all the more rationally (see, e.g., Cos-
mides et al. 2010). Now, the evolved “cheater-detection mechan-
ism,” which Cosmides and Tooby have identified, would certainly
be activated by news about the chairman who does not pull his
weight in protecting the environment. We might, therefore,
expect subjects in the experiment to be thinking particularly
clearly about intentionality, causation, and so on.
No doubt the cheater-detection module plays a key role too
when scientists review each other’s scientific work – which is
why we all do it so well. (What’s that motto at Yale, where
Knobe comes from? Lux et Veritas – “Light and Truth.”)
The cultural capital of the moralist and the
scientist
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Abstract: In this commentary we explore Knobe’s ideas of moral
judgments leading to moral intuitions in the context of the moral
thought and moral action debate. We suggest that Knobe’s primary
moral judgment and the setting of a continuum with a default point is
in essence a form of cultural capital, different from moral action, which
is more akin to social capital.
The idea that there is a difference between moral thought and
moral action has bedeviled the study of moral development
and decision making for years (Blasi 1980). At the core of the
debate is the idea that individuals make very different decisions,
and oftentimes show very different sensibilities, when they are
judging others who have engaged in some type of transgression
versus when they themselves are actively involved in an ambigu-
ous social problem. Are these observed differences representa-
tive of some qualitative difference between moral thought and
moral action, or is the difference the result of the same basic
decision-making process adjusting to two very different situations
and perspectives? (For example, it is a common theme in ethno-
graphy that actually being in the situation changes your perspec-
tive of the situation; Malinowski 1922.)
In his target article, Knobe never really addresses a possible
division between moral thought and moral action in any overt
way, relying primarily on judgment/decision-making scenarios
describing the actions of a social agent to make his case that gen-
eralized judgments precede and serve as context for moral intui-
tions. What Knobe adds to the equation in his complex analysis of
moral competencies is the idea that our intuitions concerning the
intentions of an agent (and therefore the possible moral culpabil-
ity of the agent) are deeply affected by primary, dynamic judg-
ments of the generalized situation/dilemma faced by the agent
– what Knobe refers to as “moral considerations.”
We feel Knobe’s thesis makes sense but leaves open two criti-
cal questions related to the moral thought/moral action dilemma.
The first is: Where do these initial moral judgments that serve as
context for intuition and further decision-making come from?
Establishing an initial, complex moral judgment as the originat-
ing point of moral intuitions and decision-making in a sense
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begs the question of what is driving moral decision processes.
The second question we are left with is: What, if any, role
would this continuum play in the moral actions of the individual?
Do we use the same type of default system when we are making
socially ambiguous decisions that might directly affect us and/or
those around us? (For example, are there pre-judged lines that
we will not cross?)
We have made the argument (Kang & Glassman 2010) that
moral thought, including the type of moral judgments Knobe
describes, is actually a form of what Bourdieu (1986) refers to as
cultural capital, while moral action is a form of social capital
(Portes 1998). The motivation and goal (Glassman 1996) of cul-
tural capital is to signal to those around you that you are a
member in good standing of the social group. It is a short-hand
for the types of social interactions that allow individuals to estab-
lish affiliation through community standards. Moral judgments are
one of the easiest forms of cultural capital to use to establish group
membership, whether it is gossip around a community pool or the
establishment of a common enemy, villain, and/or scapegoat.
We suggest that the primary moral judgment that Knobe
describes is made in the service of cultural capital, and that it
is more about signaling and establishing membership in a given
community than “about controllability, about recency, about stat-
istical frequency” (sect. 5.1, para. 5). The default position of what
is acceptable for the businessman in Knobe’s scenario example
would change dramatically based on whether you were trying
to signal membership and affiliation in the Chamber of Com-
merce or in the Sierra Club.
The setting of a continuum and establishing of a default is a
form of cultural capital, and if we are on target in our thesis
(Kang & Glassman 2010), it would all but disappear when individ-
uals are engaged in collective moral action. In moral action, indi-
viduals are less concerned with establishing a signal/symbol
system for long-term group maintenance and belonging than in
coming together as a group to solve a critical problem. In moral
action, the focus is almost completely on the problem at hand,
rather than on who should be included (and excluded) from the
working group. The action is integrated with the specifics of the
problem to be solved, and as the common problem dissipates,
so, too, does the motivation behind the group (Putnam 2001).
We see two reasons why there is little to be gained by using the
primary moral judgments of generalized situations in moral
action. The first is that group membership is malleable in
problem solving, and placement in the group is dependent on
abilities. The second reason is that problems are dynamic and
shifting, and individuals who are taking action might have to con-
tinuously abandon or change their default point based on circum-
stances. To take a crude example, a person with a specific default
position on sharing of community resources might take a very
different view if he or she is placed in charge of such resources.
(For example, how would the individuals in Knobe’s academic
example change if they found themselves being denied access
to pens when they needed them? Or if their salary were depen-
dent on maintaining a supply of pens?)
We take the real-world example of the recent British Pet-
roleum (BP) oil spill to illustrate our point, similar to
Knobe’s businessman who does not care about risks to the
environment. Suppose, before the spill occurred, people
were asked about the intentions of the president of BP if he
said the company could engage in deep water drilling
without harming the environment: There would be a wide
array of responses, directly based on the primary judgments
Knobe discussed, but judgments used to signal community
belonging. If you asked an officer in an environmental group,
he or she might have set the default point for acceptable
action so that the greater part of the continuum led to intui-
tions of morally bad intentions (e.g., being willing to drill at
all, or not actively investing in sustainable energy). If you
asked a politician from the Gulf Region, he or she might
have set a default position with far more of the continuum
devoted to a neutral position (e.g., drilling could occur as
long as there were minimal safety precautions) in order to
signal kinship with the oil-dependent community.
After the spill, many members of the two groups have acted
together in attempting to stop the spill and reclaim the Gulf.
Intuitions about good or bad intentions and the moral judgments
that led to them have become secondary or even irrelevant for
many working in this group, and it is considered bad form to
bring them up. Ties have been established based on the need
to solve the immediate problem. Once the problem has dimin-
ished, or retreats into the background, the social group will dis-
sipate and moral judgments as cultural capital will move to the
fore again. It represents a cycle of moral thought as cultural
capital and moral action as social capital.
Are mental states assessed relative to what
most people “should” or “would” think?
Prescriptive and descriptive components of
expected attitudes
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Abstract: For Knobe, observers evaluate mental states by comparing
agents’ statements with “defaults,” the attitudes they are expected to
hold. In our analysis, Knobe’s model relies primarily on what agents
should think, and little on expectancies of what they would think. We
show the importance and complexity of including descriptive and
prescriptive norms if one is to take expectancies seriously.
If you claimed at a dinner party to have no opinion about child
abuse, you would get funny looks. In Knobe’s analysis, because
you should strongly oppose abuse, neutrality is tantamount to
support. Similarly, expressing neutrality about women’s suffrage,
which our society supports, would appear sexist. Thus, observers
do not take agents’ claims at face value, but instead assess them
relative to what Knobe calls a “default.” Observers essentially
convert an agent’s claim to their own metric, much like convert-
ing Celsius to Fahrenheit, based on the object of judgment (e.g.,
helping vs. hurting the environment) and the associated “default”
attitude (see our Fig. 1, Panel A).
This “default,” defined in the target article as “what sort of atti-
tude an agent could be expected to hold toward” an object (sect.
5.2, last para.), and elsewhere (Pettit & Knobe 2009) as what any
reasonable person “would” (p. 597) or “should” (p. 598) think, is
thus a central part of Knobe’s model. In this commentary, we aim
to analyze and clarify this concept, which we believe is more
complex than Knobe lets on. There is much to be gained from
such analysis, especially from distinguishing the should and
would aspects of default expectations.
What influences people’s expectations about how others
behave and think? Certainly, one factor, as Knobe points out, is
personal moral judgment: we expect people to behave in (what
we ourselves believe is) a moral fashion. However, two other
social factors seem at least as important as personal moral judg-
ment in determining defaults: prescriptive norms (how we
think the group believes people should act) and descriptive
norms (how we think group members actually act, regardless
of how they should). Personal moral judgments do not always
correspond to group prescriptive norms, and the default expec-
tation often depends on the latter, as when an agnostic, hearing
an American presidential candidate publicly espousing agnosti-
cism, sees this as a forceful anti-religion stance given American
norms, even if it accords with his own views. Similarly, a
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default based on descriptive norms explains why, even if I know
that I (personal moral judgment) and my colleagues (prescriptive
norm) believe it is better to take public transportation than to
drive to work, my assessment of a colleague who drives (and
whether that means she “supports” public transportation) still
depends on whether I know my colleagues generally drive or not.
These examples illustrate that we evaluate other people’s
choices not just relative to the default of our own personal
values (how they should act), but also relative to what we can
reasonably expect from others given our knowledge of the
world (how they would act). Knobe privileges the should
aspect: For example, one version of the pen/professor study
(sect. 3.4) pits moral judgment against descriptive norms, and
the relative importance of moral judgment is taken to support
the model. Although Knobe’s issues (the environment; reason-
able rules about pens) are fairly prescriptively consensual, per-
ceived prescriptive norms could be divorced from personal
moral judgment, in which case Knobe would still favor the
latter. Imagine I feel strongly that eating meat is immoral,
while realizing my view is the minority one. Knobe would say
that I think others who express indifference are really in favor,
because my should default is strong opposition, even though I
would not reasonably expect a random stranger to share my
view (would default).
While Knobe may be right that should factors matter in many
circumstances, other evidence suggests the importance of would
factors in evaluating attitudes. For example, people use prescrip-
tive norms to infer situational pressure and correct expectations
accordingly. Observers assuming strong pressures against expres-
sing support for harming the environment can sensibly infer a
suppressed pro-harm attitude behind an expression of indiffer-
ence (Fig. 1, panel B). Similarly, a speaker advocating immediate
action by a corporation to reduce pollution is perceived as more
anti-environment when speaking to a pro-environment audience,
where such a message is expected, than to a pro-business audi-
ence (Eagly et al. 1978). Here, assumed audience pressure
changes the default, although participants’ personal moral judg-
ment presumably remains constant. Ironically, this is exactly the
“augmentation” process described in Kelley’s (1971) attribution
theory, which Knobe dismisses as a wrongheaded “person-as-
scientist” theory.
Another example where would matters is the impact of inter-
group perceptions. A devout Catholic claiming no particular
opinion on Roe v. Wade might seem more in favor than a
staunch feminist making the same claim. Biernat (2005) showed
that expectations associated with different groups lead to such
contrast effects. (Intriguingly, Biernat’s research also suggests
an assimilation effect with more objective measures – the
Figure 1 (Kreps & Monin). Converting expressed attitudes into inferred attitudes by reference to a default (Panel A) or to known
pressure (Panel B).
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Catholic would still seem less likely to get an abortion –
suggesting that Knobe’s might have found a different pattern
using objective outcome measures.) Thus, group-specific descrip-
tive norms evoked by agents’ identities influence the default.
The value of distinguishing should and would influences on
defaults is further suggested by research indicating possible
interactions between them. For example, personal moral judg-
ments affect perceived norms: Research on naı¨ve realism and
social projection (e.g., Ross & Ward 1996) shows that individuals
generally believe their own judgments are rational, objective, and
ethically appropriate, and therefore overestimate the similarity of
others’ attitudes. Also, norms can influence personal judgment:
People’s desire to fit in can lead them to change their own judg-
ment to conform to perceived norms (e.g., Asch 1956). Further,
descriptive norms are sometimes inferred from prescriptive
norms, and vice versa (Prentice & Miller 1996).
In summary, we believe Knobe’s model makes a valuable
addition to our understanding of defaults and social judgments,
but it seems to be unreasonably limited to factors based on
“should”; for a fuller understanding of what determines people’s
default expectations, the model could be enriched by including
other factors based on “would,” such as group descriptive and pre-
scriptive norms. Including these factors – which often have little
to do with morality – might dilute the model’s focus on how
moral considerations suffuse social judgment, but such a change
seems warranted given the important role of non-moral factors
in determining default expectations. We hope future research
will extend Knobe’s model to include such factors.
Understanding the adult moralist requires first
understanding the child scientist
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Abstract: Children learn from people and about people simultaneously;
that is, children consider evidentiary qualities of human actions which
cross traditional domain boundaries. We propose that Knobe’s moral
asymmetries are a natural consequence of this learning process: the
way “child scientists” gather evidence for causation, intention, and
morality through early social experiences.
Knobe’s “person as moralist” view contests two related claims
about human cognition: that it is clustered by discipline, much
as university departments are, and that cognition in two “scienti-
fic” disciplines – folk psychology and causal inference – is analo-
gous to scientific inquiry. Knobe then presents evidence that the
psychology of intention and causation are “suffused with moral
considerations” (sect. 5.3, para. 3), by which he means to show
that there is neither a separation between disciplines, nor can
reasoning about scientific topics be considered “scientific.”
We suggest another perspective on these moral asymmetries:
that they are, at least in part, the consequences of early links
between causal learning and social learning. Specifically, they
are the result of how, as children, we gather evidence for such
learning by observing and interacting with people. The adult
moralist recruits knowledge gained from years of social evidence
gathering – years spent learning from people and about people
simultaneously. Therefore, to understand the adult moralist we
must first understand her predecessor – the child scientist.
For a long time, developmental psychologists studied chil-
dren’s knowledge separately, according to domain. Some
research examined early causal reasoning – intuitions about
spatio-temporal relations (Leslie & Keeble 1987; Oakes &
Cohen 1990), causal mechanisms (Bullock et al. 1982; Schulz
1982), and the use of statistical cues in causal judgments
(Gopnik et al. 2001; Sobel & Kirkham 2006). Other research
focused on children’s “mind-reading” abilities – what they
knew about the intentions, desires, beliefs, and knowledge
states underlying human actions (e.g., Lutz & Keil 2002; Repa-
choli & Gopnik 1997; Wellman 1990; Woodward 1998). Others
sought to understand children’s knowledge of social categories
(Bigler & Liben 2007; Heyman & Gelman 2000), and still
others focused on developing moral and conventional knowledge
(e.g., Turiel 1983). The picture that emerged from these separate
subfields is a lot like the mental university described by Knobe –
separate departments for separate knowledge structures.
The domain-specific approach has lead to important discov-
eries about the content of early physical, biological, psychologi-
cal, and social and moral knowledge. However, trying to apply
this approach wholesale to learning processes has been less fruit-
ful. Take causal learning: spatio-temporal cues and mechanism
knowledge are useful, but are often unavailable. Statistical cues
are also useful, but cannot help distinguish between causes and
spurious correlations. Most often, ordinary causal learning
depends on social interaction; evidence comes from doing
things and watching others do things. Human actions are a
child scientist’s natural causal experiments (Gopnik et al. 2004;
Schulz et al. 2007).
Importantly, along with physical evidence (e.g., toys making
noise, milk spilling, sticks breaking), causal actions contain valu-
able social evidence (a knowing glance at the right button, a cry of
“oops!”, a desire for two short sticks). To evaluate the quality of
causal evidence, children take knowledge, ability, and intention
into account. For example, infants and preschoolers distinguish
intentional actions from accidental ones, and this leads them to
make different causal inferences (Carpenter et al. 1998; Meltzoff
1995). Preschoolers prefer to learn new causal relations from
knowledgeable rather than ignorant causal agents (Kushnir
et al. 2007). Children also treat causal evidence differently
when a demonstrator is explicitly teaching them (Bonawitz
et al. 2009; Rhodes et al., in press). This evidentiary link is not
limited to passive observations – it influences and interacts
with the evidence children generate themselves through play.
Thus, when children get ambiguous evidence from another
person, they privilege evidence from their own past actions
(Kushnir et al. 2009), or are motivated to explore further to gen-
erate new evidence (Schulz & Bonawitz 2007).
Other research suggests that children break traditional domain
boundaries when learning about people, as well. For example,
infants use contingency detection (Shimizu & Johnson 2004) or
violations of contiguity (Saxe et al. 2007; Spelke et al. 1995) to
infer the presence of a psychological agent when other cues to
agency are absent. Toddlers and preschoolers infer other
people’s preferences based on violations of random sampling,
not merely positive regard and enthusiasm (Kushnir et al.
2010). Children may use statistical cues to track other individual
regularities, such as personality traits (Siever et al, under review).
They also readily track social regularities, such as norms and
group characteristics (Kalish 2002; Rhodes & Gelman 2008).
From her earliest social experiences, the child scientist is
engaged in a dynamic process of hypotheses formation, evi-
dence-gathering, and theory change. The adult moralist, on the
other hand, is asked to reason about a single instance of human
behavior. The adult must therefore rely on her existing knowl-
edge – knowledge acquired through this early learning process.
We now have a better sense of where this knowledge begins;
recent studies show early understandings of empathy, fairness,
help, harm, and a host of moral precursors (e.g., Hamlin et al.
2007). Knobe’s analysis encourages us not to stop with domain-
specific characterizations of knowledge. Instead, we should
broaden how we view evidence from human actions to include
their moral and normative dimensions, and investigate how
these early evidential links give rise to later moral asymmetries
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in reasoning. This approach leads to interesting questions for
research with adults, so long as we carefully distinguish
between reasoning based on existing knowledge and the process
of learning something new. When adults learn, for example,
how do moral asymmetries change in response to further evi-
dence? Is the evidence itself evaluated asymmetrically?
To conclude, while it may be wise at times to abandon the sep-
aration of disciplines, it seems premature to draw conclusions
from Knobe’s experimental data about the process by which
they are integrated. To better understand this process, we need
to look at learning at all ages, and continue research connecting
moral development to both causal learning and social cognition.
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Abstract: If Knobe is right that ordinary judgments are normatively
suffused, how do scientists free themselves from these influences? I
suggest that because science is distributed and externalized, its claims
can be manipulated in ways that allow normative influences to be hived
off. This allows scientists to deploy concepts which are not normatively
suffused. I suggest that there are good reasons to identify these
normatively neutral concepts with the folk concepts.
Joshua Knobe has added considerably to our knowledge of the
ways in which ordinary people attribute intentions and make
judgments regarding causation. In this commentary, I do not
want to criticize his claim that the competencies agents deploy
in making these judgments are deeply suffused with normative
influences. However, I will suggest that there are nevertheless
grounds for regarding these competencies as distorting influ-
ences on our concepts. Our perfectly ordinary concept of causa-
tion (for instance), I suggest, is not normatively suffused. This is
best brought out by thinking about science; I therefore begin
with Knobe’s claim that we ought not to understand folk judg-
ments on the analogy of scientific hypothesis testing.
Knobe’s claim that folk judgments are made in ways very
unlike scientific hypothesis testing leaves us with a puzzle:
Given that scientists are ordinary people too, how do they
manage to engage in scientific research? If the relevant compe-
tencies are suffused with normative influences, how do scientists
manage to free themselves of these influences (sufficiently well
that they can identify them in the first place)? This question is
important for several reasons, including, that if we can identify
the means whereby scientists succeed in separating normative
influences from the relevant judgments, we might all be in a pos-
ition to make better normative judgments. At least on standard
normative theories, our normative claims ought to follow from,
rather than themselves cause, judgments of causation and inten-
tion; hence, separating out the normative from the non-norma-
tive might be a precondition of justified normative judgment.
So how do scientists manage to transcend the normative influ-
ences Knobe identifies? The answer is multifaceted, but an
important part of it refers to the structure of the scientific enter-
prise. Science is an essentially distributed enterprise. The struc-
ture of a scientific community enables its members to
compensate for the limitations and biases of individuals
(Kitcher 1993). Individual biases can thereby be cancelled out;
one scientist’s bias toward a hypothesis will be cancelled out by
another’s against it. Of course, this cancellation process is power-
less against the kind of normative influences Knobe identifies, as
they are universal.
But the structure of science has a second property: it externa-
lizes scientific knowledge. Since science, by virtue of its essen-
tially distributed nature, requires that data and theories be
available to a multiplicity of researchers, they must be presented
in a format that makes this possible, and that requires externali-
zation. Once theories and data are externalized in this way, they
become available for manipulation using formal techniques, and
these techniques are designed to be impervious to the normative
influences Knobe identifies. They can also be manipulated
through the use of methods such as double blinding, which can
also serve to filter out normative influences.
One implication of the forgoing is that the finding that ordinary
people are not best understood on the model of scientists is
unsurprising: no one is a scientist alone. An agent can be a scien-
tist only as part of a community of researchers engaged in sys-
tematic inquiry. The contrast between scientific judgments and
folk judgments is therefore misplaced: The contrast is not
between different modes of thinking so much as between differ-
ent ways of manipulating mental representations; one individua-
listic and the other deeply social.
An important implication is that there are grounds for seeing
the competencies that agents utilize in making judgments as dis-
tortions of their concepts. We do not wish to say that scientists
are mistaken in making causal judgments that are not normatively
suffused. We therefore should not see the concept of causation as
constituted by the structure of the competencies Knobe has ele-
gantly uncovered. Scientists are members of the folk, and their
onboard competencies are identical to everyone else’s, yet they
understand their causal judgments, qua scientists, as deploying
the ordinary concept of causation, not a theoretical innovation.
I suspect that given the choice between the concept of causation
used in science and one that is explicitly normative, ordinary
people would also choose the former, providing further evidence
that scientists use the ordinary concept.
In saying this, I take issue neither with Knobe’s arguments in
favor of the view that our competencies are themselves norma-
tively suffused, nor with his correlative claim that the rival view
(according to which moral judgments bias our application of
our concepts) is false. I am accepting that normative influences
figure into the relevant competencies, but I am claiming that
nevertheless we need to distinguish between these competences
and the relevant concepts, even though we probably derive the
concept from the competency (via some process of idealization).
The concept of causation is normatively neutral, even though
ordinary people deploy the concept using competencies that
are normatively suffused.
It may be that we can dissociate the normatively neutral
concept from the normatively suffused competencies only by
externalizing and distributing our application of our concepts.
We can hope to deploy our concepts better by becoming more
like scientists. Doing so does not involve changing our onboard
competencies – that may be a task that is beyond us – but
instead requires that we alter the context in which we deploy
them. By dividing and distributing cognitive labor, and by design-
ing institutions that filter out the normative influences, we may
become better reasoners, both in the normative and the non-
normativerealms.
Putting normativity in its proper place
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Abstract: Knobe considers two explanations for the influence of moral
considerations on “non-moral” cognitive systems: the “person as
moralist” position, and the “person as [biased] scientist” position. We
suggest that this dichotomy conflates questions at computational and
algorithmic levels, and suggest that distinguishing the issues at these
levels reveals a third, viable option, which we call the “rational
scientist” position.
In this elegant and provocative article, Knobe summarizes a
growing body of work suggesting that moral considerations influ-
ence a range of “non-moral” judgments, from mental state ascrip-
tions to causal ratings. Knobe offers two interpretations for these
data: (1) his preferred view of people as “moralists,” and (2) the
traditional position of people as intuitive “scientists,” albeit poor
ones subject to moral biases. We unpack these options using
Marr’s levels of analysis, and suggest at least one viable alterna-
tive, which we call the “rational scientist” position.
In Knobe’s “person as moralist” position, “moral consider-
ations actually figure in the competencies people use to make
sense of human beings and their actions” (sect. 1, para. 7, empha-
sis added). In contrast, the “person as scientist” position claims
that the “fundamental” capacities underlying these judgments
are analogous to processes in scientific inquiry (sect. 2.2, para.
2). Both positions, as laid out by Knobe, involve a distinction
between the “fundamental” or “primary” aspects of a cognitive
system and those that are “secondary.” Knobe suggests that to
account for the data, the scientist approach must claim that
moral considerations play a secondary role, biasing judgments
that are fundamentally scientific.
Examining these positions in terms of Marr’s levels of analysis
(Marr 1982) reveals two different questions at play: one at the
computational level, about the function of the cognitive system
in question, and one at the algorithmic level, about the represen-
tations and processes that carry out that computation. For an
advocate of the moralist position, the computational-level
description of a cognitive system appeals to a “moralizing” func-
tion (perhaps evaluating people and their actions), and the algo-
rithmic level is merely doing its job. For an advocate of the
“biased” scientist position that Knobe considers, the compu-
tational-level description appeals to a scientific function
(perhaps predicting and explaining people’s actions), but the
algorithmic level is buggy, with moral considerations biasing
judgments.
This leaves two additional options (see Table 1). First is the
“biased moralist” position, with a “moralizing” function at the
computational level, but a buggy algorithm. Without a fuller com-
putational-level analysis that provides a normative account of the
judgments the algorithmic level should generate, this position is
hard to distinguish from the “non-biased” moralist.
Second is the “rational scientist” position, which we advocate
for some cognitive systems (Uttich & Lombrozo 2010). Accord-
ing to this position, a given cognitive system has a scientific func-
tion at the computational level, and the algorithm is just doing its
job. To account for the slew of data Knobe cites, an advocate for
this position must explain how moral considerations can influ-
ence judgments without threatening claims about the system’s
function (at the computational level) or the efficacy of the pro-
cesses that carry out that function (at the algorithmic level).
In a recent paper (Uttich & Lombrozo 2010), we attempt pre-
cisely this for ascriptions of intentional action. The cognitive
system in question, broadly speaking, is theory of mind: the
capacity to ascribe mental states to others. Traditionally, this
capacity has been conceptualized as analogous to a scientific
theory, with the function of predicting, explaining, and control-
ling behavior. At the computational level, this puts the traditional
picture in the “scientific” camp. But what are the implications for
the role of moral considerations in carrying out this function?
Knobe seems to assume that moral considerations have no legit-
imate role in this picture. But we argue the reverse: that accu-
rately inferring mental states can in fact require sensitivity to
moral considerations, particularly whether a behavior conforms
to or violates moral norms.
Here, in brief, is our argument. Norms – moral or convention-
al – provide reasons to act in accordance with those norms. For
example, a norm to tip cab drivers provides a reason to do so.
Observing someone conform to this norm is relatively uninforma-
tive: We can typically infer knowledge of the norm, but not
necessarily a personal desire to provide additional payment. In
contrast, norm-violating behavior can be quite informative, par-
ticularly when other mental-state information is lacking. If we
believe a person knows the norm, then observing that person
fail to tip a driver suggests an underlying preference, desire, or
constraint that is strong enough to outweigh the reason to
conform. This same logic applies to Knobe’s chairman vignettes
(sect. 3.1). When the side effect of the chairman’s actions helps
the environment, he is conforming to a norm, and the action is
relatively uninformative about his underlying mental states.
When he proceeds with a plan that causes environmental
harm, the action is norm violating, and allows us to infer under-
lying mental states that support an ascription of intentional
action.
Our aim here is not to elaborate and marshal evidence for this
position; we direct interested readers to Uttich and Lombrozo
(2010). Rather, we hope to populate the space of possible pos-
itions and call attention to what seem to be distinct compu-
tational- and algorithmic-level assumptions lurking in the
background of Knobe’s target article. Knobe argues against
various versions of the “biased scientist” position, but does not
consider the “rational scientist” position. Like the two “moralist”
positions, the biased and the rational scientist positions can be
difficult to distinguish, and require a more fully specified compu-
tational-level description with a corresponding normative theory
to identify which judgments stem from buggy versus non-buggy
algorithms.
Knobe infuses normativity into folk considerations, painting a
picture of people as moralists. But distinguishing the four pos-
itions we identify (Table 1) may actually require appeals to nor-
mativity in the generation and evaluation of empirically testable
theoretical claims. In other words, we must appeal to normativity
as theorists, regardless of whether or how we do so as folk. We
suspect that Knobe avoids this framing as a side effect of other
commitments and a preference for process-level theorizing.
Whether or not it was intentional, we think it is a mistake to col-
lapse computational and algorithmic questions. We hope future
debate can restore normative questions to their proper place in
scientific theorizing, whether the folk are ultimately judged
scientists or moralists.
Table 1 (Lombrozo & Uttich). Four possible positions to account
for the data Knobe cites demonstrating an influence of moral
considerations on non-moral judgments, such as mental state
ascriptions and causal ratings. The positions are expressed in
terms of Marr’s levels of analysis, with one of two computational
level functions, and algorithms that generate the judgments they
do either as a result of their computational level functions (non-
buggy) or because they are biased by other (e.g., moral)
considerations (buggy).
Four positions to account for
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Abstract: We propose Knobe’s explanation of his cases encounters a
dilemma: Either his explanation works and, counterintuitively, morality is
not at the heart of these effects; or morality is at the heart of the effects
and Knobe’s explanation does not succeed. This dilemma is then used to
temper the use of the Knobe paradigm for discovering moral norms.
Knobe presents two kinds of theories that compete with his own:
motivational bias theories and conversational pragmatic theories.
He presents his own theory as a competence account. While we
agree with his criticisms of the other accounts, we think his tax-
onomy is incomplete. We would like to suggest a different form
of competence account, one that does not take morality as such
to play a crucial role in these effects. (In this regard, we agree
with Phelan and Sarkissian [2008], Machery [2008], and indeed
even Knobe and Mendlow [2004].) On our account, the effects
of morality are a piece of a larger puzzle: Morality affects judg-
ments of intentionality and related concepts only in virtue of its
effects on expectations. Consequently, we think that anything
affecting expectations will produce effects similar to those pro-
duced by moral norms. In fact, Knobe’s own account points to
a similar conclusion, although he doesn’t acknowledge this.
According to Knobe’s competence theory, people’s moral norms
influence their default expectations of others’ intentions, beliefs,
values, causal roles, and so on, and these default expectations in
turn affect participants’ judgments. Thus, he concludes, morality
plays a deep role in explaining judgments in these various
domains. But in this explanation, expectations are doing all the
work; moral expectations have their effects only because they are
expectations, not because they are moral. Thus, if Knobe’s
theory is right, we should find effects similar to the effects cited
here in cases that have nothing to do with morality, but instead
involve participants’ non-moral expectations in parallel ways.
And if this is right, it suggests that there is nothing specifically
moral going on in the cases Knobe cites. These effects are,
rather, effects of expectation, and expectations can be affected
by both moral and non-moral factors (e.g., we expect people to
have con-attitudes towards losing a game, although losing a
game is not, normally at least, moral in any way).
Consequently, we think Knobe encounters a dilemma: Either
his explanation of the effects he cites is correct, and then there is
nothing especially moral at play here, but only an effect of expec-
tations in general; or else his explanation of the effects is incorrect
(in which case there may still be room for morality to play a dis-
tinctive role). Either way, Knobe finds himself in an awkward
position; it doesn’t seem that his explanation of morality’s
effects is compatible with the conclusion that moral consider-
ations as such figure in our folk-psychological competence.
But we do not merely mean to present the dilemma. We take
sides. We think Knobe’s explanation is substantially correct, and
that the effects Knobe finds would follow from any expectations
participants hold firmly enough, whether or not those expec-
tations have a moral character. To see whether this is indeed
the case, it is not enough to look at cases that involve moral
factors. Similar cases involving non-moral norms must be con-
structed and tested.
As a step in this direction, we have conducted some prelimi-
nary studies involving variations on the CEO cases that involve
non-moral norms. These studies were conducted using partici-
pants on Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk website. We ran
multiple studies attempting to measure possible non-moral
effects on judgments of intention. In one such study, we used
the following vignettes1:
Normal case:
Two people are playing chess.
One of them considers moving her queen to square A6. She thinks, “If I
move my queen to square A6, I will capture my opponent’s rook. But I
don’t care at all if I capture my opponent’s rook; I think moving my
queen to square A6 will allow me to checkmate in three moves.”
She moves her queen to square A6. Sure enough, she captures her
opponent’s rook.
Did she “intentionally” capture her opponent’s rook?
Abnormal case:
The abnormal case was identical, except that the player
allowed her own rook to be captured, instead of capturing her
opponent’s rook. We expected that participants reading the
abnormal case would be more likely to judge that the side-
effect of the player’s move was intentional, when compared to
participants reading the normal case. After all, it is normal to
want to capture an opponent’s rook, and normal to want one’s
own rook to remain uncaptured.
Although our results almost invariably trend in the expected
direction, none actually reaches significance. (The closest result
to significance arose from the vignettes given above; here, x2(1,
N ¼ 124) ¼ 3.03, p ¼ .08.) For comparison, we also reproduced
the original CEO cases using Mechanical Turk participants.
Here, the results were highly significant: x2(1,
N ¼ 33) ¼ 14.73, p , .001. One possibility is that moral norms
have a stronger effect on participants’ expectations than do
non-moral norms (or at least the non-moral norms we tested).
Another possibility is that Knobe’s explanation, which depends
entirely on expectations, needs revision. Of course, either way,
more systematic research is needed.
Our main point: One cannot only examine moral norms when
judging whether Knobe’s data show an effect of morality. We
must look at non-moral norms as well, to find just how broad
the phenomenon is. In fact, Knobe has, in the past, thought
similar things. In Knobe and Mendlow (2004), the authors
propose that the kind of badness that affects intentional action
judgments extends beyond just moral badness. They propose
this in light of studies that seem to show similar effects involving
clearly non-moral factors.
These theoretical possibilities matter for further work involving
this effect. If indeed the effects Knobe finds are not specific to
moral norms, then we must be careful not to interpret the effects
as telling us about participants’ moral norms. For example, Inbar
et al. (2009) use participants’ judgments of intentionality as a way
to measure implicit moral norms. This is risky; although judgments
of intentionality might tell us something about participants’ expec-
tations in general, they cannot tell us which of those expectations
are particularly moral and which are not. Use of intentionality judg-
ments to measure implicit moral norms thus runs the risk of seeing
moral norms where there are none.
NOTE
1. We thank Jesse Prinz, whose suggestion inspired these cases.
Norms, causes, and alternative possibilities
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Abstract: I agree with Knobe’s claim in his “Person as Scientist, Person as
Moralist” article that moral considerations are integral to the workings of
people’s competence in making causal judgments. However, I disagree
with the particular explanation he gives of the way in which moral
considerations influence causal judgments. I critically scrutinize his
explanation and outline a better one.
Knobe’s general explanation of the way in which moral consider-
ations influence intuitive judgments goes like this: In judging
causation, doing/allowing, intentional action, and so on, people
select alternative possibilities to compare with what actually
happens and their selection of these possibilities is influenced
by their moral judgments. How does this idea explain the data
about people’s causal judgments? Unfortunately, Knobe offers
only the briefest hint in his Note 5, which suggests that moral
considerations affect people’s causal judgments by influencing
which counterfactuals of the form “If event c had not occurred,
event e would not have occurred” they regard as true. This
suggested explanation doesn’t work, however, for his own
example in which Professor Smith’s action rather than the admin-
istrative assistant’s is regarded as the cause of a problem. This
difference is not reflected in any difference in the counterfactuals
people regard as true, since it is true that there wouldn’t have
been a problem if either Professor Smith or the administrative
assistant hadn’t taken a pen.
Luckily, Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) provide the missing
elements of the explanation. Hitchcock and Knobe appeal to
the finding in the literature on counterfactual availability that
people are very inclined to entertain counterfactual hypotheses
about what would have happened if a normal event had occurred
instead of an abnormal one; and, by contrast, they are much less
inclined to entertain counterfactual hypotheses in which normal
events are replaced by abnormal ones. So people are willing to
entertain the counterfactual about what would have happened
if Professor Smith hadn’t taken a pen because it “mutates” an
abnormal event into a normal event. By contrast, people are
less willing to entertain the corresponding counterfactual about
the administrative assistant’s action because it does not involve
the privileged kind of “mutation.” Finally, by positing that
people’s willingness to make a causal judgment “c caused e”
goes hand-in-hand with their willingness to entertain the coun-
terfactual “If c had not occurred, e would not have occurred,”
they explain why people are more inclined to regard Professor
Smith as the cause of the problem.
I suspect this explanation cannot be right for two reasons. The
first is that the explanation involves an uneconomical hypothesis
about the capacities involved in causal cognition. The explanation
implies that people have an underlying competence for under-
standing counterfactuals that is linked to their understanding
the objective core of the causal concept (the “causal structure”
in Hitchcock & Knobe 2009). This competence is exercised
when people understand counterfactuals of all kinds, including
the counterfactuals about Professor Smith and the administrative
assistant. Sitting alongside this competence, the explanation
implies, is a psychological tendency to entertain some counter-
factuals as “available,” a tendency aligned to people’s propensity
to select certain events as salient causes. This hypothesis strikes
me as implausible because of its doubling up of capacities
involved in causal cognition.
My second reason for suspecting that this explanation can’t be
correct is that empirical evidence casts doubt on the assumption
that people’s causal judgments depend on their counterfactual
judgments. Mandel and Lehman (1996), Mandel (2003), and
Byrne (2005) cite experimental data that show that people’s
causal judgments “c caused e” are dissociated from their counterfac-
tual judgments “If c had not occurred, e would not have occurred”:
the former go with judgments about sufficient conditions and pro-
ductive mechanisms, whereas the latter go with judgments about
enabling conditions and preventative mechanisms.
There is another way of developing Knobe’s general idea that
moral considerations influence people’s causal judgments by way
of their selection of alternative possibilities. In their classic work,
Hart and Honore´ (1985) argue that the concept of actual causa-
tion originates in the situation in which a human action inter-
venes in the normal course of events and makes a difference in
the way these develop. “The notion, that a cause is essentially
something which interferes with or intervenes in the course of
events which would normally take place, is central to the
common-sense concept of a cause” (Hart & Honore´ 1985,
p. 29). They argue that our judgments about what constitutes
the normal course of events are guided context-sensitively –
sometimes by what usually happens, and sometimes by social,
moral, and legal norms. Their account readily explains why we
regard Professor Smith’s action rather than the administrative
assistant’s as the cause of the problem: for his action makes a
difference to what happens normally – that is, in conformity
with the prevailing norms – in a way that the administrative assist-
ant’s does not.
Hart and Honore´’s account of the way our causal judgments
are shaped by moral considerations is better than Hitchcock
and Knobe’s for several reasons: (1) Hart and Honore´’s
account captures in a seamless fashion the idea that causes are
difference-makers for their effects. In contrast, it isn’t clear
how Hitchcock and Knobe’s account captures this idea. Is it
through the link with counterfactuals or through the rules
about counterfactual availability? (2) Hart and Honore´’s
account doesn’t tie people’s causal judgments so closely with
their counterfactual judgments, which is a virtue given the
empirical evidence dissociating them. If it makes a link with
counterfactuals, it is with counterfactuals that are based not on
the actual world but on “normalised” worlds that abstract from
the abnormal features of the actual world (Menzies 2007). (3)
Hart and Honore´’s account provides a more uniform account
of the contrastive structure of actual causation. Many philoso-
phers have observed that causal judgments have an implicit con-
trastive structure: the causal judgment “c caused e” has the
implicit contrastive structure “c rather than c caused e rather
than e.” People typically select as the contrast elements c and
e events that would normally have occurred if the abnormal
actual events c and e had not occurred (Menzies 2009). This
follows straightforwardly from Hart and Honore´’s account,
which incorporates the contrastive structure into the semantic
content of causal judgments. If Hitchcock and Knobe’s account
is to explain the contrastive character of causal judgments, it
must do so through appealing to pragmatic or non-semantic
rules about counterfactual availability.
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Abstract: We are neither scientists nor moralists. Our mental capacities
(such as attributing intentionality) are neither akin to the scientist’s exact
reasoning, nor are they “suffused through and through with moral
considerations” (Knobe’s target article, sect. 2.2, last para.). They are
more similar to all those simple capacities that humans and animals are
equally capable of, but with enhanced sensitivity to counterfactual
situations: of what could have been.
Knobe presents us with a false dilemma on the level of the meta-
phors he uses: maybe we are neither scientists nor moralists. But
he also presents us with a false dilemma when it comes to the
two explanatory schemes he considers: The first one is that the
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competences that underlie our mental capacities (to attribute inten-
tionality or to spot causal relevance) are influenced by moral con-
siderations. The second is that these competences are themselves
non-moral, but there is some additional factor that makes it the
case that our attribution of intentionality is influenced by moral
considerations. I will focus on the attribution of intentionality that
Knobe considers to be the strongest case in favor of his claims.
The two options Knobe offers are not exhaustive. In fact, they
share a premise that we have good reasons to doubt: that is, the
premise that the attribution of intentionality is influenced by
moral considerations. Knobe’s reason for holding this claim is
that in two very similar scenarios, the “harm” and the “help” scen-
arios (Knobe 2003a; see also sect. 3.1 of the target article) that
differ only in their moral overtones, our attribution of intention-
ality also differs. As he says, “the only major difference between
the two vignettes lies in the moral status of the chairman’s behav-
ior” (sect. 3.1, para. 2).
But that is definitely not the only major difference (see Nanay
[2010] for an overview). One striking feature of the experiments
Knobe and his collaborators conducted on this topic is that they
all share the same structure. To put it very simply, in one scen-
ario, the agent has two reasons for performing a certain action
and ignores one of these; in the other, the agent has a reason
for and a reason against performing an action and ignores the
reason against. Thus, in Knobe’s most famous helping/harming
experiment (Knobe 2003a; see also target article, sect. 3.1), we
have the following two scenarios:
(a) In the harm case, the chairman has a reason (R1) for introducing
the plan (i.e., to increase profit) and a reason (R2) against (i.e., to
avoid harming the environment).
(b) In the help case, in contrast, the chairman has two different
reasons to introduce the plan: he had a reason to increase the
company’s profit (R1) and he also had a reason to help the environ-
ment (R3).
In short, the difference between scenario (a) and scenario (b)
is that in (a) the chairman has R1 for and R2 against introducing
the plan, whereas in (b) he has R1 and R3 both in favor of per-
forming this action. Importantly, the chairman chooses to
ignore the environmental considerations: R2 and R3, respectively.
This leaves R1 in both scenarios, which is a reason for introducing
the plan. There is no difference between (a) and (b) in the actual
reason the chairman is acting on.
But there is a modal difference between (a) and (b): a differ-
ence in what would happen if the chairman did not ignore R2
and R3, respectively. Contrast the original scenarios (a) and (b)
with another pair of cases where the chairman chooses not to
ignore the environmental considerations:
(a) The chairman chooses not to ignore R2 (i.e., a reason against intro-
ducing the plan). Then his action would, or at least it could, be differ-
ent, as now he has a reason for (R1) and a reason against (R2)
introducing the plan.
(b) The chairman chooses not to ignore R3 (i.e., a reason for introducing
the plan). His actionwould still be the same, as now he has two reasons (R1
and R3) in favor of introducing the plan.
So an important difference between case (a) and case (b) is a
modal one: The outcome would be different if the chairman
didn’t ignore the environmental considerations. In (b), ignoring
that the plan helps the environment would make no difference,
as there are two independent reasons in favor of introducing the
plan: The chairman’s actions in (b) and in (b) will be the same.
In (a), on the other hand, ignoring that the plan harms the environ-
ment would make (or at least it could make) a difference: The chair-
man’s actions in (a) and in (a) will be (or at least can be) different.
Thus, what this experiment shows is that in (b), introducing
the new scheme does not depend counterfactually on ignoring
the environmental considerations, whereas in (a), there is
counterfactual dependence between ignoring the environ-
mental considerations and introducing the new scheme. This
counterfactual dependence in (a) is not very strong, as not
ignoring will not guarantee that the chairman’s action will be
different, but it is an instance of counterfactual dependence
nonetheless. In (b), we have no counterfactual dependence,
weak or strong.
What I have said so far shows that the experimental data
Knobe uses can be explained with the help of an alternative
hypothesis, where the attribution of intentionality does not
depend on our moral judgments. In other words, we have two
ways of explaining Knobe’s original experiments: one appeals to
moral judgments, the other one does not. The fact that my expla-
natory scheme is consistent with Knobe’s findings in itself casts
doubt on his conclusion.
But we can say something even stronger. My explanatory
scheme is in fact preferable to Knobe’s for two reasons. First,
my explanatory scheme is more robust than Knobe’s: it can
explain cases of the attribution of intentionality that Knobe’s
cannot. There are several scenarios where we get differences in
the attribution of intentionality without any moral difference
(Machery 2008; Mallon 2008; Nanay 2010; Nichols & Ulatowski
2007; maybe even Knobe 2007). As these cases all follow the
modal asymmetry I identified, I can account for them (Nanay
2010). Knobe cannot.
Second, those of us with naturalist leanings prefer to explain
our complex mental capacities in simple terms. When explaining
the mental capacity of attributing intentionality to others, the
(broadly) naturalistic way to proceed would be to account for
this mental capacity with reference to simple mental processes.
This is exactly my strategy: If we can explain the attribution of
intentionality with reference to mental capacities that nonhuman
animals also possess, plus some further ability to be sensitive to
counterfactual situations (which at least some nonhuman pri-
mates may also possess; see Suddendorf & Whiten 2001), we
should not rely on any further, uniquely human higher-order
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Abstract: Knobe reports that subjects’ judgments of whether an agent
did something intentionally vary depending on whether the outcome in
question was seen by them as good or as bad. He concludes that
subjects’ moral views affect their judgments about intentional action.
This conclusion appears to follow only if different meanings of
“intention” are overlooked.
Knobe describes a number of studies in which, he claims, sub-
jects’ moral judgments influence their views about whether the
actions of others were intentional, about whether an agent did
something or merely allowed it to happen, and about whether
an agent caused an undesirable consequence. He concludes
that the exercise of competencies that humans use in making
what might seem to be purely factual judgments about the
world – such as judgments about causes and judgments about
other agents’ mental states – is “suffused with moral consider-
ations from the very beginning” (sect. 5.3, para. 3).
Knobe suggests, very plausibly, that people’s judgments about
“the cause” of an event depend on a selection of relevant alterna-
tives. His experimental evidence supports the conclusion that in
some cases moral considerations partly determine this selection,
although it remains an open question how wide this range of
cases is. The same may well be true of judgments distinguishing
between “doing” and “allowing.”
In this comment, however, I will focus on Knobe’s claims
regarding judgments about intentional action. Here his
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conclusions seem to me not to be supported by the evidence he
describes, because there is an alternative interpretation of his
experimental results that is more plausible than the one he
proposes.
The use of intentional and its cognates involves a well-known
ambiguity (see Anscombe 1958, p. 9; Scanlon 2008, p. 10). One
sense of “intentional” is the one opposed to “unintentional.” An
agent does something “intentionally” in this sense if he or she rea-
lizes that this is what he or she is doing – call an action that is
intentional in this sense belief-intentional. An agent’s intention
in the other sense is what he or she aims at in so acting. What
an agent does “intentionally” in this other sense is opposed to
what he or she sees as a mere side-effect of so acting – call
what is intentional in this sense aim-intentional.
The effects on the environment of the policies adopted by the
chairmen in the two experiments Knobe describes are belief-
intentional: the description of the cases makes clear that they
are aware that the policies they choose will have these effects.
But these effects are not aim-intentional: the descriptions make
clear that the chairmen are indifferent to these effects, and are
concerned only with profits. Given that these facts are made
clear in the presentation of the scenarios, it is reasonable to
believe that the subjects in each case have the same beliefs
about the chairman’s mental state: that the bringing about of
these effects is belief-intentional but not aim-intentional. The dif-
fering answers that the subjects give to the question of whether
the chairmen harmed or helped the environment “intentionally”
is indeed due to moral considerations, but not in the way that
Knobe suggests.
The important moral fact here is that agents are commonly open
to moral criticism for bringing about bad effects when they know
that these effects will occur even if they do not aim at these
effects – that is to say, when they do so belief-intentionally, even
if not aim-intentionally. But agents are generally held to merit
moral praise or credit for bringing about good consequences only
if they do so aim-intentionally. Given that the subjects see harm
to the environment as a bad thing, when they are asked whether
the chairman in the first scenario harmed the environment inten-
tionally, what they are likely to ask themselves is whether the chair-
man’s action was intentional in the sense relevant to moral criticism
for bringing about such an effect (that is to say, whether it was
belief-intentional). In the other case, since the subjects are likely
to view helping the environment as a good thing, when they are
asked whether the chairman helped the environment intentionally,
what they are likely to ask themselves is whether what the chairman
did was intentional in the sense relevant to moral praise or credit
(that is to say, whether it was aim-intentional). What the shift
from harming to helping does is not to change the subjects’
interpretation of the chairman’s mental states in the respective
scenarios, but rather, to change the question about those mental
states to one that seems to the subjects to be relevant.
This interpretation of the subjects’ responses seems to me
extremely plausible. It is also supported by some of the further
details that Knobe mentions. For example, he reports that
when subjects are asked whether “the chairman intended
to harm the environment,” answers are moved strongly in a
negative direction (sect. 3.2, para. 4). This is to be expected
on the interpretation I propose, because the verb intend
suggests (aim) intention more strongly than does the adverb
intentionally.
My interpretation also explains why subjects disagree with the
claim that an agent was “in favor of” a morally good outcome but
are neutral on the question of whether the agent was “in favor of”
a morally bad outcome (sect. 3.2, para. 5). This is because the
agent fails to favor the morally good outcome in the way relevant
to moral praise or credit; but, even if he or she does not actively
favor the morally bad outcome, an agent who is perfectly willing
to bring about that outcome for some other reason is more favor-
ably disposed toward it than he or she should be, and therefore
open to some criticism on this score.
Alternatives and defaults: Knobe’s two
explanations of how moral judgments









Abstract: Knobe cites both relevant alternatives and defaults on a
continuum to explain how moral judgments influence intuitions about
certain apparently non-moral notions. I ask (1) how these two accounts
are related, (2) whether they exclude or supplement supposedly
competing theories, and (3) how to get positive evidence that people
consider relevant alternatives when applying such notions.
Joshua Knobe’s novel theory of how moral judgments influence
people’s intuitions about certain apparently non-moral notions,
including intentionality and causation, is a version of contrasti-
vism (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). As with many other topics
(including knowledge, free will, explanation, and morality), it is
illuminating to consider the range of possible contrasts or
alternatives and ask when and why people limit their attention
to a smaller contrast class. So I am very sympathetic. I would,
however, like to press Knobe to develop three aspects of his
theory.
First, Knobe formulates his “general approach” in his section
5.1 in terms of relevant alternatives. Moral judgments are said
to affect which counterfactual alternatives are seen or treated
as relevant. Next, Knobe discusses his “case study” in his
section 5.2 in terms of defaults on a continuum. Moral judgments
are said to affect the position of the default. These views are not
equivalent, because alternatives need not always fall on a conti-
nuum, and relevant alternatives might fall on either side of a
default. Knobe describes the default as “a particular sort of
alternative possibility,” but it does not seem to be the only rel-
evant alternative, so comparing a default and comparing a
range of alternative possibilities seem quite different. My ques-
tion for Knobe is then: What exactly is the relation between
these two theories?
Second, it is also not clear what the relation is between either
of Knobe’s suggestions and the views against which he has argued
in the earlier parts of his article. Motivation, blame, emotion, and
pragmatic context would seem to be promising candidates for
explaining why we treat certain alternatives rather than others
as relevant, or why we place the default at one point instead of
another on a continuum. If Knobe agrees, then his own theory,
though a crucial part of the story, would need to be sup-
plemented by central aspects of the views he criticizes. His
theory then works together with his supposed opponents,
rather than supplanting them. But if Knobe denies that these fea-
tures explain why we adopt certain relevant alternatives and
defaults, then we need an alternative explanation of relevance
and default. It is not enough to refer to alternatives and defaults
without explaining how the alternatives and defaults get set.
Addressing this issue, Knobe says, “all sorts of different factors
can play a role here” (sect. 5.1, para. 5). This is surely right, and
he cites supporting literature. However, it leaves open the possi-
bility that motivation, blame, emotions, and pragmatic context do
sometimes play roles in determining which alternatives we see as
relevant and where we place the default. No theory that focuses
on one single factor can or should be expected to cover all
examples, even if each factor does explain some variance in
some areas. Hence, I also want to ask Knobe whether his argu-
ments are supposed to show that motivation, blame, emotions,
Commentary/Knobe: Person as scientist, person as moralist
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2010) 33:4 349
and pragmatic context do not always play a role or do not ever
play a role in determining relevant alternatives and defaults.
Third, after he criticizes his opponents for failing “to produce
any positive evidence in favor of the hypothesis” (sect. 4.1.4, para.
1), I would like to see Knobe’s positive evidence in favor of his
own hypotheses. Consider first his claim about relevant alterna-
tives, and focus on his example of what caused the dent in the
car. He suggests that, when we ask whether a certain person,
object, or event caused a certain effect, we “think about,” “con-
sider,” “compare,” and “pick out just certain specific alternatives”
(sect. 5.1, para. 4). As Knobe says, we do not “consider the possi-
bility that the car could have been levitating in the air.” But what
is the positive evidence that we do consider other alternatives?
I do not deny that we treat a range of alternatives as relevant.
However, it is not clear whether we actually represent these
alternatives, even unconsciously. Another possibility is that we
have a disposition to dismiss certain alternatives as irrelevant, if
raised, and to accept other alternatives as relevant, if raised; but
we never explicitly “think about” or “consider” the relevant alterna-
tives any more than the irrelevant alternatives unless prompted.
How can we decide between these views? Perhaps we could get
evidence that subjects consider or think about certain alternatives
by asking the subjects, but self-report would not be reliable.
Another method would be to measure subjects’ memory errors,
word completion patterns, or reaction times when asked whether
certain words were in the scenarios. If subjects really do consider
an alternative that would naturally be formulated in certain terms
that were not actually in the scenario, then we would expect
them to be more likely to misremember those terms as being in
the scenario, to complete letter strings so as to form those terms,
and to unscramble the letters from those terms more quickly
than if they never considered that alternative.
However, before we can apply these techniques, we would
need to formulate specific hypotheses about which alternatives
are and are not thought about or considered in which scenarios.
It is not enough simply to say that moral judgments affect the
range of alternatives that are taken to be relevant. We need to
know which alternatives are supposed to be seen as relevant.
Only then can we test whether those alternatives are actually con-
sidered or thought about, as Knobe claims.
The same basic issue arises for Knobe’s theory that moral judg-
ments affect which point on a continuum is seen as the default.
Certain hypotheses might seem plausible and might have explana-
tory power, but it is not easy to figure out how to gather positive
evidence for the hypothesis that people actually set different
defaults depending on their moral judgments. So my last question
for Knobe is: How will you get positive evidence for your claims
that moral judgments affect relevant alternatives and defaults?
“Very like a whale”: Analogies about the mind
need salient similarity to convey information
doi:10.1017/S0140525X10001871
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Abstract: Knobe relies on unhelpful analogies in stating his main thesis
about the mind. It isn’t clear what saying the mind works, or doesn’t
work, “like a modern university” or “a scientific investigation” means.
We suggest he should say that some think that human cognition
respects a ban on fallacies of relevance, where considerations actually
irrelevant to truth are taken as evidence. His research shows that no
such ban is respected.
We have no dispute with Knobe’s description of the ways in
which various accounts – including motivational bias and con-
versational pragmatics – of the experimental results he describes
don’t succeed, and how the competency approach he favours cur-
rently does better.
This said, it remains unclear precisely what Knobe’s position is,
because his exposition depends on analogies that are both under-
developed and problematic. Consequently, the answers to two
questions are not sufficiently clear. The first question is: What
specific commitment regarding human cognition is being
rejected? The second question is: What specific claim about
human cognition is being defended?
Analogical reasoning transfers information from one object to
another, non-identical one. For this to work well, the two objects
need to have enough salient features or relationships in common.
Disanalogies between paradigmatic features of the two objects
impede the transfer. Niels Bohr, for example, explained his rejec-
tion of previous models of the atom partly by drawing an analogy
with the solar system. Despite important differences between
atoms and planetary systems, this was a good way of getting at
a few key and, at the time, radical ideas: Atoms are mostly
empty; very small parts of them are in approximately orbital
activity around other central ones.
Knobe offers two analogies for the view he is ostensibly reject-
ing. According to the first, the human mind works “something
like a modern university” (sect. 1, para. 2). According to the
second, which is an analogy within the first, some mental pro-
cesses use the “same sorts of methods we find in university
science departments” (sect. 1, para. 2). Except for relatively
cryptic remarks on the ways disciplines are supposedly separated
in universities, and some (also brief) remarks on science, Knobe
develops neither analogy in significant detail.
What might it mean for the mind to be like a university? Knobe
suggests that the organisation of a university corresponds to a set
of distinctions between types of questions, so that the mind has
something analogous to theology, art, philosophy, and some
scientific departments. He goes on to argue that the mind is
not like this. But the administrative organisation of universities
into departments exists along with a patchwork of overlapping
techniques, theories, problems, and collaborative research pro-
grammes cutting across departmental divisions. The analogy
also doesn’t do the work Knobe requires because some depart-
ments, such as those of history and politics, consider both
factual and moral questions, just as art departments consider
factual and aesthetic ones (not merely “is this painting good?”
but also “is it genuine?”). Philosophy departments notoriously
consider almost anything – these days they even do experiments.
The fact that the overall organisation of universities is not con-
sistently or strictly modular need not be a big problem, since
most of the heavy lifting is done by the second analogy,
suggesting a view (the one to be rejected) where some mental
processes use the same methods as scientists do. Unfortunately,
though, there are no agreed upon set of criteria that separate
science from non-science, partly because there is no clear div-
ision between the methods of “science” and those of other enter-
prises. Philosophers of science have argued for generations
without converging on consensus about what, if anything, demar-
cates science from pseudo-science and non-science. That this is
so is reason to recognise that “like science” is not a promising
explanatory analogy.
We suggest that neither analogy need be repaired, or even
replaced. Instead, the claim at issue can be stated directly.
Knobe gives us a clue when he says that “Genuinely scientific
inquiry seems to be sensitive to a quite specific range of consider-
ations and seems to take those considerations into account in a
highly distinctive manner” (sect. 2.1, para. 5). We think it
makes most sense to read this as saying that the “specific range
of considerations” are epistemic considerations, which is to say
ones strictly relevant to whether or not some claim is true. It is
a good normative rule for truth seekers to avoid fallacies of
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relevance. One example of such a fallacy is an appeal to conse-
quences. Saying that evolution by natural selection should be
rejected because believing it (supposedly) leads to selfishness,
appeals to considerations which have no evidential value. Like-
wise, that an experimenter is very nice, or nasty, or eccentric,
has no epistemic value as far as the empirical test of a hypothesis
itself is concerned.
The phenomena to which Knobe draws our attention, and
which his own empirical work has done a great deal to document,
are all examples of fallacies of relevance, mostly in the attribution
of credit for intention and causation. Whether someone caused
something, intended it, or is responsible for it, depends on
what they did and how that influenced the world. It does not
depend on whether what happened is the sort of thing we
would regard as morally objectionable. The fact that consider-
ations relating to the moral value of the outcomes appear to
affect judgements regarding what was intended, or caused,
suggests that some of our mental processes are routinely prone
to what, by responsible epistemic lights, are fallacies of relevance.
The general claim about human cognition that Knobe is reject-
ing, we therefore suggest, is one to the effect that the organisation
of (human) cognition respects this normative standard, and that it
does so by not allowing strictly irrelevant considerations to inter-
act during processing. We already have ample evidence that the
general claim is false, from, among other things, a long history
of social psychology and behavioural economic experiments.
Thorndike (1920), for example, showed that in assessments of
other people, perceptions of some traits were more correlated
with perceptions of other traits than should be the case if traits
(such as attractiveness and competence) varied independently.
What is exciting and surprising about the work Knobe reviews
(and has been conducting himself) is that, from this point of
view, it shows the persistent influence of moral reactions in judge-
ments about matters where those reactions are irrelevant to truth.
It would be interesting, not to mention extremely important, to
see whether the effects are reduced when people deliberate
about causation and responsibility in organised groups charged
with an epistemic task – for example, juries.
Are we really moralizing creatures through
and through?
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Abstract: Knobe contends that in making judgments about a wide range
of matters, moral considerations and scientific considerations are
“jumbled together” and thus that “we are moralizing creatures through
and through.” We argue that his own account of the mechanism
underlying these judgments does not support this radical conclusion.
In his conclusion, Knobe reminds us that the target article began
with a metaphor (well, a simile, actually) comparing the organiz-
ation of the mind to the organization of a modern university: “Just
as a university would have specific departments devoted
especially to the sciences, our minds might include certain
specific psychological processes devoted especially to construct-
ing a roughly ‘scientific’ kind of understanding” (sect. 6, para.
1) This suggests a view on which moral judgments play a quite
limited role in cognition.
In a university, there might be faculty members in the philosophy
department who were hired specifically to work on moral questions,
but researchers in the sciences typically leave such questions to one
side. So maybe the mind works in much the same way. We might
have certain psychological processes devoted to making moral judg-
ments, but there would be other processes that focus on developing
a purely ‘scientific’ understanding of what is going on in a situation
and remain neutral on all questions of morality (sect. 6, para. 2).
Knobe maintains that this picture is “deeply mistaken”:
[There is no] clear division whereby certain psychological processes
are devoted to moral questions and others are devoted to purely scien-
tific questions. Instead, it appears that everything is jumbled together.
Even the processes that look most “scientific” actually take moral con-
siderations into account. It seems that we are moralizing creatures
through and through. (sect. 6, para. 3, emphasis added)
This is a bold and radical view. And while we share Knobe’s
fondness for views that fly in the face of conventional wisdom,
we are not persuaded that he has made a convincing case.
Indeed, we think that Knobe’s own explanation for the sorts of
phenomena he so clearly and carefully documents flies in the
face of these audacious and dramatic claims.
To explain our skepticism, we will focus on the target article’s
Figures 6–8. These are aimed at explaining how people make judg-
ments about whether an agent is in favor of an outcome. Knobe
begins his explanation with the “fundamental assumption” that
people’s representation of the agent’s attitude is best understood not in
terms of a simple dichotomy between “in favor” and “not in favor,” but
rather, in terms of a whole continuum of different attitudes an agent
might hold. . .. For simplicity, we can depict this continuum in terms
of a scale running from con to pro. (Fig. 6) (sect. 5.2, para. 2)
An agent whose attitude falls way over on the con side, Knobe
tells us, will be classified as “not in favor” and an agent whose atti-
tude falls way over on the pro side will be classified as “in favor.”
But that does not tell us “how . . . people determine the threshold
at which an agent’s attitude passes over from the category ‘not in
favor’ to the category ‘in favor’” (sect. 5.2, para. 2). To explain
this, Knobe posits “an additional element” that includes a vari-
able default position whose location along the continuum is
determined, in part, by people’s moral judgments. Knobe pro-
ceeds to tell us, in some detail, how this default-setting system
works, and how it plays a role in determining whether we
judge that an agent is in favor of the outcome in question.
There is, however, one central and important part of the
system about which Knobe tells us nothing at all. The lacunae
emerges very clearly when we compare Figure 7 to Figure 8.
One difference between these two figures, the one that Knobe
focuses on, is that the Default position, and thus the part of
the continuum that supports a judgment that the agent is “IN
FAVOR,” has been shifted to the right. But there is another
difference. In Figure 8, the position of the Agent on the conti-
nuum has been marked. And that position is, of course, crucial
to the account. In Figure 8, the Agent is located to the left of
the Default, leading to a judgment that the Agent is not in
favor of the outcome in question. Had the Agent been located
significantly further to the right, the system would produce the
judgment that the Agent is in favor of the outcome.
But how does the psychological mechanism that Knobe posits
succeed in locating the Agent along the continuum? As far as we
can see, Knobe tells us nothing about this, and there is certainly
no hint that the psychological processes responsible for locating
the Agent along the continuum are sensitive to any moral or
evaluative judgment made elsewhere in the system. Rather, it
seems, this crucial determination is made in a value-free way. To
revert to Knobe’s recurrent metaphor, it is made by one of the
mind’s “science departments” that focuses on “developing a
purely ‘scientific’ understanding of what is going on in a situation
and remain[s] neutral on all questions of morality” (sect. 6, para. 2).
The point is underscored by Knobe’s analogy with the process
that a teacher might use in assigning grades. The teacher starts
out with a “continuum of different percentage scores on a test”
(sect. 5.2, para. 4) and must then decide on a threshold beyond
which a score will count as an A. Her process for setting the
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threshold involves a variable default determined by the teacher’s
assessment of the difficulty of the test. This is analogous to the
variable, morally influenced default depicted in Figures 7 and
8. However, presumably the test scores themselves are not influ-
enced by the teacher’s assessment of the difficulty of the test.
They, like the position of the Agent in Figure 8, are determined
by a “purely scientific” component in the assessment process.
The bottom line is that on Knobe’s own account of how we
decide whether an agent is in favor of an outcome, there is a
clear division between psychological processes that involve
moral considerations and those that do not. It is not the case
that “everything is jumbled together,” nor is it the case that
“we are moralizing creatures through and through.”
Depression affecting moral judgment
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Abstract: Depressive mood can be involved in the moral judgments
made by people with depression. Here, we focus on the negative
judgments depressed patients have of themselves and the world.
Possibly, the alterations in moral judgment in subjects with depression
can be understood by taking into account the neural basis of depression.
In his article, Knobe discusses the role of moral judgments in
people’s understanding. The author focuses his study on the
moral influence present in the process of cognition. In discussing
the motivational bias hypothesis (sect. 4.1), Knobe mentions
studies in patients who had a lesion in the ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex. These studies tried to demonstrate the non-involve-
ment of affective reaction in the process of moral judgment.
In this commentary, we consider moral judgment in depressed
subjects. We feel that depressive mood is particularly relevant to
the negative moral judgments often made by patients with
depression. In the psychopathology of depression, patients’
actions and thoughts can be affected by the depressive mood,
which in turn tends to affect their moral judgments. This psycho-
pathological process is characterized by ruminations of negative
thoughts. Patients with major depression understand the world
and themselves in the same way, that is, in a negative way.
Here, these disturbed thoughts can be understood as a distortion
of moral judgments influenced by the presence of depressive
mood. In the moral judgments, patients often evaluate them-
selves or their acts as something “bad” or “wrong.” This process
supposes that patients are evaluating themselves axiologically.
During this process, depressed patients consider themselves to
“blame.” Such depressed patients with these negative moral
judgments and thoughts can be an example for the line of
study developed by Knobe. Patients’ negative moral judgment
and other psychopathological alterations return to normal with
the remission of depression (Benedetti et al. 2007). This
process of continuous and rigid negative moral judgments may
have a biological explanation.
What kind of process can be underlying this alteration on nega-
tive moral judgment in depression? In normal human subjects,
studies with functional brain imaging have found increased
activity in brain areas in a resting state and reduced activity
when there is a proposed goal for brain function . This organized
mode of brain function identified in specific brain regions consti-
tutes the default system (Drevets et al. 2008). A disturbance in
this network can explain depression symptomatology. Studies
developed by Sheline et al. (2009) found that depressed subjects
showed less decrease in activity than control subjects in areas of
the default system, or default mode network (DMN), during per-
formance of emotional tasks. These findings have supported the
view that alterations in areas of the DMN may constitute a basis
for the disordered self-referential thoughts of depression.
In Knobe’s article, there is a mention about a study investi-
gating cognition in people who don’t have immediate affective
reactions as a result of lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex. He uses this study to show that the results of his analyses
about moral judgment in normal subjects are not due to an affec-
tive reaction. However, in people with distortion of judgment
caused by depressive mood, the neural dysfunction in specific
brain areas found in depression investigations can explain the
moral judgment disturbance, and supports the interference of
the depressive mood on moral judgments.
This construction supports our view that the neural basis of
depression may explain depressive mood and, consequently,
moral judgment; albeit it does not exclude Knobe’s point that
moral judgment may occur independently of affective reaction.
Fixing the default position in Knobe’s
competence model
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Abstract: Although we agree with the spirit of Knobe’s competence
model, our aim in this commentary is to argue that the default position
should be made more precise. Our quibble with Knobe’s model is that
we find it hard to ascribe a coherent view to some experimental
subjects if the default position is not clearly defined.
In the target article “Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist,”
Joshua Knobe has devised an innovative model where moral
appraisals play a fundamental role in how people make sense
of agents and their actions. According to Knobe, people’s intui-
tions depend on a comparison between the action under con-
sideration and an alternative possibility, which he calls the
“default position.” The default position falls somewhere along a
continuum, but experimenters fail to designate its exact location.
In this commentary, we contend that the default position must be
fixed and clearly articulated. Otherwise, some of the subjects’
intuitions seem incoherent. We agree with Knobe that there
seems to be a default position against which people judge
whether or not some action under consideration is favored. But
we believe that his approach may be made more precise than it
is by specifying clearly what the default position is.
According to Knobe’s competence model, moral consider-
ations figure into how subjects make a comparison between the
action under consideration and certain alternative possibilities.
It seems people who view an action as morally bad uphold an atti-
tude at least slightly toward the con side, and people who view an
action as morally good tend to have an attitude at least slightly
toward the pro side. An action is favored when “the agent’s atti-
tude falls sufficiently far beyond the default” (sect. 5.2, para. 5).
The core of Knobe’s explanation has it that “moral judgments
affect [people’s] intuitions by shifting the position of the
default” (sect. 5.2, para. 6, emphasis Knobe’s).
Knobe’s competence model has done a nice job of explaining
why a majority of subjects answered the harm and help scenarios
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as they did (sect. 3.1). When a majority of subjects (82% accord-
ing to Knobe 2003a) compare the chairman’s attitude to the
default position that harming the environment is morally bad,
they favor the response that the chairman intentionally harmed
the environment. Likewise, when a majority of subjects (77%
according to Knobe 2003a) compare the chairman’s attitude to
the default position that helping the environment is morally
good, they do not favor the response that the chairman intention-
ally helped the environment. Although Knobe’s competence
model has succeeded in explaining the majority’s intuitions, his
model may not succeed in explaining the intuitions of subjects
who gave the minority view.
Some subjects responded that the chairman did not intention-
ally harm the environment (18%) or that the chairman did inten-
tionally help the environment (23%) (Knobe 2003a). These
represent a minority response in the harm case and help case,
respectively. If Knobe’s competence model is correct, then the
minority’s default position for the harm scenario is that
harming the environment is a morally good thing. The data also
suggest that the minority’s default position in the help case is
that helping the environment is a morally bad thing. These
views are unusual and the result of applying Knobe’s competence
model.
Knobe may object to this assessment. Subjects receiving the
harm scenario may hold that harming the environment is
morally bad but the chairman’s indifference does not constitute
that he intentionally harmed the environment. These subjects
may refrain from saying that the chairman intentionally harmed
the environment because the chairman did not want to harm
the environment. Subjects who responded that the chairman
intentionally helped the environment may uphold the default
position that helping the environment is morally good. Since
the chairman knew that the program would help the environ-
ment, subjects chose the response that he intentionally helped
the environment. If this is correct, Knobe is able to show why
the competence model explains the minority’s intuitions.
The problem with this response is that one of us (Ulatowski)
collected data where two-thirds of subjects given both the
harm and the help case chose minority responses (Nichols & Ula-
towski 2007). Of the two-thirds, half responded that:
(1) The chairman intentionally helped the environment and the
chairman intentionally harmed the environment.
or that:
(2) The chairman did not intentionally harm the environment and
the chairman did not intentionally help the environment.
On response (1), if the competence model is correct, then
respondents judged that not only is harming the environment
morally bad but helping the environment is morally bad, too.
On response (2), if the competence model is correct, the
default position for subjects is not only that helping the environ-
ment is morally good but that harming the environment is
morally good, too. Subjects’ default positions seem to be incon-
sistent and, therefore, incoherent.
We suggest that the default position be clearly defined to avoid
incoherence of subjects’ intuitions. In a series of experiments
testing whether the distinction between doing and allowing
depends on moral appraisals, we specified an alternative possi-
bility against which subjects should compare the agent’s action
(Ulatowski & Johnson 2010):
Five people are in imminent danger of death, and you are a part of a
team that is taking a special train to rescue the five people. Every
second counts. You have just taken over from the driver, who has
gone to the back of the train to check on something. Since the train
is on automatic control, you don’t need to do anything to keep it
going. But you can stop it by putting on the brakes. You suddenly
see someone trapped ahead on the track. If you don’t do anything,
he will be killed (though the train will be able to continue on its
way). But if you do stop, and then free the man, the rescue mission
will be aborted. So you let the train continue.
We asked subjects, “Since you could have stopped the train,
did you kill the man on the track?” We stipulated the default pos-
ition: to stop the train. We believe that by specifying the default
position, it may prevent an incoherent interpretation of people’s
intuitions.
Our aim in this commentary has been to expose the incoher-
ence in subjects’ responses when an experiment fails to stipulate
the default position. Ultimately, we cannot assume that we know
what the subjects’ default position is.
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Abstract: The commentators offer helpful suggestions at three
levels: (1) explanations for the particular effects discussed in
the target article; (2) implications of those effects for our
understanding of the role of moral judgment in human
cognition; and (3) more theoretical questions about the overall
relationship between ordinary cognition and systematic science.
The present response takes up these three issues in turn.
The commentators have offered helpful suggestions and
criticisms at all levels, from the nitty-gritty of the individ-
ual experiments to the broadest sorts of theoretical and
philosophical issues. Clearly, the questions at these differ-
ent levels are intimately connected, but since one has to
begin somewhere, perhaps it is best to start by focusing
in on the trees and then move gradually toward thinking
about the overall shape of the forest. In other words, we
can start with specific questions about the explanations
for particular effects and then move to implications for
broader theoretical and philosophical issues.
R1. Alternative hypotheses
Recent studies indicate that people’s moral judgments can
impact their application of a surprising range of different
concepts. Moral judgments appear to be impacting
people’s application of the concepts of intentional action,
causation, freedom, knowledge, doing and allowing,
desire, and many other concepts besides. The primary
aim of the target article was to provide an explanation
for this pervasive impact of moral judgment.
To explain these phenomena, I offered a specific
hypothesis. The suggestion was that people come to an
understanding of the actual world by comparing it with
certain alternative possibilities (counterfactuals). People’s
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moral judgments impact their selection of alternatives and
thereby influence their application of a wide range of
different concepts.
A number of commentators responded by developing
competing hypotheses. These hypotheses explain the
impact of moral considerations in terms of quite different
sorts of cognitive processes.
R1.1. A case study
One worry about many of these hypotheses is that they
proceed by picking out just one concept whose application
is affected by moral judgment and examining this one
concept in isolation from all the others. Hence, these
hypotheses offer explanations for one of the effects of
moral judgment but say nothing about other effects that
seem, at least initially, to be closely related.
Of course, the fact that a hypothesis is framed entirely in
terms of one of these effects does not mean that this
hypothesis has to be incorrect. Future research might
show that the hypothesis can be extended in fairly
natural ways to handle other related phenomena, or
perhaps it will be shown that the phenomena that initially
seem so closely related are, in fact, fundamentally differ-
ent. The problem, then, is not that these hypotheses are
necessarily wrong but just that they have not yet been
developed to the point where they can be properly
evaluated.
Thus, to take one example, Scanlon suggests that we
might be able to explain the apparent asymmetries in
people’s intuitions about intentional action by looking
more closely at the meaning of the word intentionally.
Specifically, suppose we assume that an expression like
“John brought about the outcome intentionally” actually
has two distinct meanings:
(a) John knew that he was bringing about the outcome.
(b) John aimed at bringing about the outcome.
People’s moral judgments might then impact their intui-
tions simply by affecting their sense of which of these two
meanings is the relevant one in the context at hand.
This hypothesis does seem to do a nice job of accounting
for the asymmetries observed in people’s intuitions about
intentional action, but the first thing to notice here is that
the very same effect can be observed for numerous other
concepts. When people determine that a foreseen side-
effect is morally bad, they are not only more inclined to
say that the agent brought it about intentionally; they are
also more willing to say that she was in favor of it, that
she decided to bring it about, even that she advocated it.
Presumably, it is not merely a coincidence that we find
this exact same effect arising in the application of so
many different concepts. So what we really need here is
an explanation for the pattern as a whole.
One option would be to extend Scanlon’s hypothesis by
claiming that the ambiguity posited for the word intention-
ally can also be found in numerous other expressions. For
example, one might say that an expression of the form
“John advocated the outcome” also has two distinct mean-
ings. Roughly:
(a) John called on people to adopt a policy with the aim of
bringing about the outcome.
(b) John called on people to adopt a policy that he knew would
bring about the outcome.
But we would then be offering a hypothesis of a very
different type. We would no longer just be pointing to
some idiosyncratic feature of the word intentionally.
Instead, we would be positing a general feature of
language that led to a systematic ambiguity within a
whole class of expressions. And, of course, the methods
used for testing the hypothesis would then have to be cor-
respondingly different. We couldn’t proceed just by
looking at patterns in people’s intuitions about intentional
action. We would have to introduce a more general claim
about word meanings and then evaluate this claim both by
gathering data involving people’s use of numerous differ-
ent expressions and by thinking about the ways in which
it fit into larger theories about lexical semantics, polysemy,
and so forth.
R1.2. Application to further examples
This very same worry also arises, albeit in somewhat differ-
ent forms, for a number of the other alternative hypoth-
eses. For example:
Nanay points out that people’s judgments about the two
intentional action cases differ not only from a moral per-
spective, but also from a modal perspective. Specifically,
he claims that people who are given the harm case make
the judgment:
If the chairman had not ignored the environmental consider-
ations, he would not have harmed the environment.
but that people who are given the help case do not make
the judgment:
If the chairman had not ignored the environmental consider-
ations, he would not have helped the environment.
Nanay then suggests that this difference in people’s
modal judgments can lead to a difference in people’s intui-
tions about intentional action. Hence, it might be possible
to explain the effect without introducing moral consider-
ations in any way.
Menzies argues that the asymmetries observed for
people’s causal judgments can be explained if we adopt a
theory of causal cognition that emphasizes the role of nor-
mality. Suppose we assume that people only regard an
event as a cause to the extent that this event “intervenes
in the normal course of events and makes a difference in
the way these develop” (para. 5). Now suppose we
further assume that people’s ordinary notion of normality
is not simply a matter of statistical frequency but also takes
into account social, legal, and moral norms. Starting from
these two assumptions, we arrive at an interesting and sur-
prising conclusion: If both the behavior of the administra-
tive assistant (a perfectly normal behavior) and the
behavior of the professor (a violation of social and moral
norms) were necessary for the problem to arise, people
will tend to pick out the behavior of the professor and
regard it, in particular, as the cause of the problem.
Hindriks suggests that we can come to a better under-
standing of the intentional action effect by applying the
legal distinction between actus reus (guilty act) and mens
rea (guilty mind). He then notes that most research in
this domain has focused on the impact of people’s judg-
ments of the moral status of the agent’s action, with the
assumption being that these judgments are somehow
influencing people’s intuitions about intentional action.
By contrast, he suggests that people’s intuitions might
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actually be affected by a judgment of mens rea, that is, a
judgment about the status of the agent’s mental states.
In earlier work, Hindriks has spelled out this claim in
terms of the hypothesis that people tend to think that an
agent S intentionally performed an action A to the extent
that “An agent S fs intentionally if S intends to c, fs by
cing, expects to f by cing, and cs in spite of the fact
that he believes his expected fing constitutes a normative
reason against cing” (Hindriks 2008, p. 635).
Humphrey argues that the intentional action effects
can be given a straightforward Bayesian interpretation.
All one needs to consider is the conditional probabilities
people assign in the relevant cases. Thus, suppose we
compare (a) the conditional probability that the agent
harmed the environment intentionally, given that he
implemented the program, and (b) the conditional prob-
ability that the agent helped the environment intention-
ally, given that he implemented the program. If one
assigns priors in such a way that (a) is greater than (b), it
will follow straightforwardly that people should be more
inclined to guess that the agent harmed intentionally
than they are to say that the agent helped intentionally.
Brogaard agrees that people’s intuitions about inten-
tional action are not purely scientific in nature, but she
argues that it would also be a mistake to understand
them in terms of the judgments people make about
whether actions are morally right or wrong. Instead, she
claims, we should understand these intuitions in terms of
judgments of desert. People make judgments about
whether the agent deserves a side-effect, or the blame
for it, and these judgments of desert end up influencing
their intuitions about whether or not the behavior was per-
formed intentionally.
Lombrozo & Uttich note that people ascribe different
attitudes in cases of norm violation from the attitudes they
ascribe in cases of more ordinary behavior. If we see that a
person has chosen to implement a program that has some
entirely innocuous effect, we might assume that this
person did not actually care very much about the
program either way – maybe he just decided to adopt it
without much thought. But now suppose, instead, that
we saw a person choosing to implement a program that
he knew would harm the environment. Since harming
the environment is a norm violation, we might immedi-
ately conclude that he must have had some strong interest
in adopting this program, and we would therefore be more
inclined to attribute to him the kind of pro-attitude that
would lead us to say that he acted intentionally.
Each of these proposals offers interesting suggestions
about a particular concept – and many of these proposals
will no doubt lead to important new insights – but all of
them seem to leave us with a mystery as to why the
impact of moral judgment is so pervasive.
For a particularly promising example, consider the
hypothesis that Menzies offers about people’s causal
intuitions. Menzies suggests that causal intuitions can be
affected in a complex way by judgments of what might
be called “normality.” Now, it is an interesting question
whether this hypothesis is right or wrong. (As it happens,
I think that it is completely correct; Hitchcock & Knobe
2009.) However, the key point is that this hypothesis
does not explain why the effect we find for the concept
of causation can also be found for so many other concepts.
Indeed, there is an important sense in which it does not
really explain the effect for causal intuitions at all. It
simply describes a certain pattern in people’s application
of this concept, without telling us why the concept works
like this and not some other way. So this sort of hypothesis
gives us a tantalizing glimpse into the phenomenon at work
here, but it seems that we will not really have an adequate
account until we can offer a more general theory.
If I may be permitted to speculate, it seems to me that
contemporary work on these problems is suffering from
the legacy of a certain tradition of conceptual analysis. In
early work in that tradition, it was thought that we
should proceed by developing for each concept a list of
necessary and sufficient conditions. The aim was to
provide a separate list of conditions for each concept –
one list for the concept of intentional action, one for the
concept of causation, and so forth. This tradition has
now been widely repudiated. None of the commentators
on the present target article attempted to provide lists of
necessary and sufficient conditions, and I am sure that
most of them would agree that such an approach is unli-
kely to prove fruitful. Yet, though researchers today are
anxious to distance themselves from this program of list-
making, I suspect that a certain remnant of that earlier tra-
dition still remains. There are still attempts to go through
people’s various concepts and provide something like an
“analysis” for each of them; it’s just that these analyses
no longer take the form of necessary and sufficient
conditions.
In my view, we should make an even more radical break
with the tradition. There is simply no use in developing
something like an “analysis of the concept of intentional
action” and then, separately, an “analysis of the concept
of causation.” Instead, we should recognize that people’s
intuitions about each of these concepts are shaped by a
number of distinct psychological processes, and that
each of these processes in turn influences intuitions
about a number of different concepts. So what we really
need is not a separate theory for each of the separate con-
cepts but rather unifying theories of the underlying pro-
cesses. Such theories might not offer us a comprehensive
picture of any one concept, but they will allow us to gen-
erate specific testable predictions regarding a whole
range of different concepts.
R1.3. Motivation to blame
The contribution from Alicke & Rose pursues precisely
this strategy. They suggest that the phenomena might be
explained in terms of a single underlying psychological
process that can affect people’s intuitions across a wide
variety of different domains. Specifically, they suggest
that people sometimes experience a motivation to justify
attributions of blame and that this motivation can affect
their views about intention, causation, and numerous
other issues.
In the target article, I had argued that this sort of
process could not explain the effects under discussion
here. Alicke & Rose reply by reviewing some very
impressive data from Alicke’s earlier work (Alicke 1992),
which they take to provide conclusive evidence that
people’s judgments actually can be distorted by a motiv-
ation to blame.
This commentary definitely raises a number of impor-
tant issues, but I worry that I was not sufficiently clear in
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articulating the nature of the disagreement in the target
article itself. The thing to keep in mind is that no one is
actually trying to refute the key claim made in Alicke’s
earlier work. In that earlier work, Alicke provides excellent
evidence for the claim that people’s intuitions can be dis-
torted by a motivation to blame, and none of the people
writing on these issues more recently have been trying to
call that claim into question. Rather, the issue is just
about whether the theory developed in Alicke’s earlier
work provides the best explanation for a specific class of
effects that have been uncovered in more recent work.
Some researchers have argued that it can (Alicke 2008;
Nadelhoffer 2006a); others have argued that it cannot
(Nichols & Ulatowski 2007; Wright & Bengson 2009;
Young et al. 2006).
At this point, I think that Alicke’s basic theoretical
claims about the importance of a motivation to blame
have been established beyond reasonable doubt, and
there is no need to provide any further evidence for
them. The thing to focus on now is just the detailed struc-
ture of these particular effects and whether a motivational
explanation can account for them. In the target article, I
reviewed some of the experimental evidence for the view
that it cannot.
R1.4. Sources of evidence
Sinnott-Armstrong raises more or less this same issue
about my own preferred account. The account suggests
that people’s moral judgments affect their counterfactual
reasoning, which in turn plays a role in their application
of numerous different concepts. But, Sinnott-Armstrong
asks, how is such an account to be assessed? Given that
we can’t actually see directly which counterfactuals
people regard as relevant, how can we know whether the
account is true or false?
This is exactly the right question to be asking, and I am
sure that future research will offer us certain new tech-
niques for answering it. At present, though, we have two
major methods at our disposal.
First, the account predicts a particular pattern of intui-
tions across a broad range of different concepts. At the
very heart of the approach is the idea that we should, as
far as possible, avoid introducing ad hoc hypotheses just
to explain the impact of moral judgment on one or
another particular concept. Instead, we start out with per-
fectly general principles about the impact of moral judg-
ment on counterfactual thinking. Then we introduce
independently testable claims about the role of counter-
factual thinking in the application of certain individual
concepts. Together, these two types of claims generate
specific testable predictions.
The thing to notice about this strategy is that it allows us
to make predictions about the impact of moral consider-
ations on the application of numerous concepts that have
not yet been empirically investigated. Thus, to take one
example, Jonathan Phillips (personal communication)
points out that counterfactual reasoning seems to play a
role in people’s ordinary notion of choosing. (An agent
cannot be said to have “chosen” one specific option
unless other options were also available.) Hence, we
should immediately predict an impact of moral judgment
on people’s intuitions about whether or not an agent can
truly be said to have “chosen” a particular option. Or, to
take a different case, it seems that counterfactual reason-
ing plays a role in people’s intuitions about whether a
given trait is innate. Accordingly, one might predict an
impact of moral judgments on intuitions about innateness,
and Richard Samuels and I are testing that prediction in a
series of studies under development now. In essence,
then, the first answer to Sinnott-Armstrong’s question
is that we can test the theory by using it to generate new
predictions about the application of various concepts and
checking to see whether those predictions are borne out.
But there is also a second way in which the theory can
be put to the test. We can use various methods to look
more directly at people’s judgments about the relevance
of counterfactuals. For example, numerous studies have
proceeded by presenting participants with questions of
the form: “If only ___, this outcome would not have
arisen.” Participants can fill in the blank with whichever
possibility they prefer, and researchers then infer that
the possibilities chosen most often are regarded as most
relevant. Studies using this methodology consistently
show that moral judgments do have an impact on intui-
tions about counterfactual relevance (McCloy & Byrne
2000; N’gbala & Branscombe 1995).
In conclusion, then, our research can proceed by
looking at the relationships among a complex constellation
of different kinds of data. We start out with certain prin-
ciples about the role of moral judgment in counterfactual
thinking and certain hypotheses about the role of counter-
factual thinking in the application of particular concepts.
Then we check the theory against evidence regarding
both counterfactual thinking and the application of con-
cepts, testing to see whether all of these data conform to
the theoretical predictions.1 Presumably, they will not,
and the theory will have to be revised in important
respects. However, my hope is that we will at least be
looking in roughly the right neighborhood and thereby
moving toward a better understanding of these
phenomena.
R2. The role of moral judgment
Suppose now that we focus, if only for the sake of argu-
ment, on the particular account advanced in the target
article. The most important and controversial aspect of
this account is the role it assigns to moral judgment. Yet,
it can prove surprisingly difficult even to say what that
role is and why it should be controversial, much less to
determine whether the account is right or wrong.
R2.1. Investigating the judgments themselves
To begin with, there is the question as to what we even
mean by the phrase “moral judgment.” When one first
hears this phrase, one is naturally drawn to think of a
specific sort of conscious event. One thinks, for example,
of cases in which we focus in on a particular behavior,
bring to bear a variety of different considerations, and
then determine that an agent deserves moral blame or
praise.
Now, conscious episodes like this certainly do take
place, but it sounds a bit implausible to suppose that
such episodes could somehow be exerting a pervasive
impact on people’s whole way of understanding the
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world. We quite often wonder whether, for example, a
person has a particular intention, and it seems absurd to
suppose that whenever we want to answer such a question,
we have to start out by making a full-blown moral
judgment.
There is, however, a way of interpreting the hypothesis
on which this sense of absurdity dissolves. To get a feeling
for the issue, consider the way we might proceed if
someone suggested that people’s whole way of under-
standing the world was shaped by statistical reasoning.
Clearly, when one first turns to the topic of statistical
reasoning, one imagines a particular sort of conscious
episode. (One thinks, perhaps, of a person moving step-
by-step through the computations involved in a formal
analysis of variance.) But surely the claim is not that this
sort of cognition is shaping our whole understanding of
the world! Rather, the idea is that people go through a
kind of immediate, automatic, non-conscious process and
that this process is analogous in certain important respects
to what people do when they are consciously conducting
statistical analyses.
The claim under discussion here should be understood
in more or less this same way. We are certainly not
suggesting that people’s conscious moral beliefs can
somehow shape their whole understanding of the world
(see Knobe 2007). Rather, the claim is that people make
certain immediate, automatic, non-conscious moral
appraisals and that these automatic appraisals then exert
a surprising influence on the rest of their cognition.
With this basic framework in mind, we can now turn to a
series of interesting suggestions from the commentators.
R2.1.1. Theory-of-mind and counterfactuals. The com-
mentaries from Guglielmo and Girotto, Surian, &
Siegal (Girotto et al.) point to two important character-
istics of people’s moral judgments:
1. Guglielmo notes that conscious moral judgments are
based in part on reasoning about the agent’s mental states.
2. Girotto et al. note that conscious moral judgments
are based in part on counterfactual reasoning.
These two points appear to spell trouble for the theory
presented in the target article. After all, the claim was that
people make a moral judgment which then influences
their reasoning about mental states and counterfactuals.
But if people have to think about mental states and coun-
terfactuals before they can even make this moral judg-
ment, how could the process ever get off the ground?
My answer is that the initial judgment that influences
people’s subsequent reasoning is deeply different from
the conscious judgment that this reasoning can ultimately
inform. People’s conscious moral judgments can take into
account information about numerous different consider-
ations, including mental states, counterfactuals, and a
great deal else besides. But their initial, purely non-con-
scious judgments do not work like that. These initial judg-
ments are instead the product of an extremely rapid and
far less complex process.
To see the basic idea here, imagine what might go
through your mind if you were actually in the room as
the vignette about the professor and the pens unfolded.
There you are, watching as the professor moves toward
the desk and starts reaching for one of the pens. Ulti-
mately, you might end up making a conscious moral judg-
ment about this behavior. You might decide that the
professor deserves blame for the problem that results, or
that his act was morally wrong, or something of the kind.
But before you can even begin any of this sophisticated
reasoning, you might go through a more automatic,
entirely non-conscious process of moral appraisal. As you
see the professor reaching for the pens, you recognize
that he is suppose to refrain from taking them, and you
therefore conceptualize his action by comparing it to the
behavior he was supposed to perform, namely, refraining
from taking pens. The key claims now are that (a) your ten-
dency to focus on this specific comparison involves a kind
of very simple moral cognition and (b) this simple form of
moral cognition does not itself depend on your subsequent
reasoning about mental states or counterfactuals.
R2.1.2. Origins of moral judgment. A question now arises
about how exactly people make these rapid and automatic
moral judgments. Here a number of commentators have
provided helpful suggestions.
Kang & Glassman propose that moral judgments are
shaped by the aim of acquiring cultural capital. People
seek to signal their membership in particular communities
and end up arriving at moral judgments accordingly. (Just
as one might wear skinny jeans to signal one’s membership
in the community of Brooklyn hipsters, one might
condemn abortion to signal one’s membership in the com-
munity of Southern evangelicals.)
Terroni & Fraguas suggest that people’s moral judg-
ments can be impacted by their emotional states. They
then hypothesize that people might make substantially
different moral judgments when their emotional states
were altered by clinical depression. So a person might
arrive at different judgments about the very same case
depending on whether that person happened to be
depressed or not.
Carpendale, Hammond, & Lewis (Carpendale
et al.) argue that people’s capacity for moral judgment
develops in the context of social interaction. Children
learn to treat others as human beings (as opposed to
mere physical objects), and they thereby acquire an under-
standing of moral norms.
Each of these hypotheses seems plausible and promising,
but it would be especially exciting if we could use these
approaches to drive a wedge between people’s conscious
moral judgments and their more automatic moral apprai-
sals. Thus, suppose that an individual is trying to gain cul-
tural capital by signaling membership in the community
of liberal intellectuals. She might thereby end up arriving
at the obvious sorts of conscious moral judgments: opposi-
tion to sexism and homophobia, support for disadvantaged
groups, and so forth. But would her non-conscious apprai-
sals go in this same way? Perhaps not. It might be that her
conscious moral judgments would be shaped by the aim of
gaining cultural capital, whereas her intuitions about inten-
tional action, causation, and the like would continue to
reveal a very different system of values at work (see, e.g.,
Inbar et al. 2009). Or consider the case of depression.
Even when a person is clinically depressed, she may be
able to exert enough cognitive control to continue making
exactly the same sorts of conscious judgments that she
would have otherwise. But perhaps her depression would
nonetheless impact her non-conscious appraisals, and we
might be able to pick up this impact just by asking questions
about intention or causation.
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R2.2. Impact of non-moral considerations
The commentaries from Girotto et al. and Guglielmo
point out that people’s intuitions about intentional action
can be influenced, not only by moral considerations, but
also by information about the agent’s mental states.
Thus, people are reluctant to say that an agent brought
about an outcome intentionally when the agent shows
regret (Guglielmo & Malle, in press; Phelan & Sarkissian
2008; Sverdlik 2004) or when the agent falsely believed
that she would not be bringing the outcome about (Pelliz-
zoni et al. 2010).
These are good points, and any correct theory of inten-
tional action ascription will have to accommodate them.
The theory presented in the target article does so by
suggesting that moral considerations are used to set a
kind of threshold, while information about the agent’s
mental states is used to determine whether the agent
falls above or below that threshold. Hence, the position
of the agent relative to the threshold ends up depending
on a complex combination of moral considerations and
mental state information.
R2.3. Moral concepts
What we have here, then, is a concept whose application
can be influenced both by moral considerations and by
mental state information. How should such a concept be
understood? Gintis suggests that the best interpretation
might be that people are simply using the concept of inten-
tional action as a moral concept. The whole effect would
then be rather unsurprising and unimportant. All it
would show is that moral considerations can impact the
application of moral concepts.
At least initially, this does seem like an appealing strat-
egy. One starts out with a distinction between “moral” con-
cepts and “non-moral” concepts, such that any concept
whose application is impacted by moral considerations is
supposed to fall in the former category. If one then finds
an impact of moral considerations on a concept that had
previously been classified as non-moral, one should not
conclude that the whole framework is thereby called into
question. All one needs to do is just reclassify that one
concept.
Still, it does seem that there is a certain point at which
this sort of strategy begins to look unworkable. If we find
an impact of moral considerations on just one concept,
we can always proceed by reclassifying it. But that is not
the situation in which we actually find ourselves. These
effects are arising not only for the concept of intentional
action, but also for the concepts of causation and knowl-
edge, even for the concept of advocating. At some point,
I think, one has to conclude that it is becoming unhelpful
to divide off a special sphere of “moral concepts” and claim
that the impact of moral considerations arises only for
them.
R2.4. Morality and normality
Kreps & Monin and Mandelbaum & Ripley take things
even further in this direction. They suggest that the rep-
resentation that is influencing people’s intuitions in these
cases is not actually specific to morality in particular.
Rather, it is a representation of something like “normality”
or “expectation.” Such a representation would then unite
moral considerations with considerations of a more
purely statistical variety.
Continuing with this general approach, Ulatowski &
Johnson propose that one can impact the relevant rep-
resentation simply by creating stimulus materials that
present a given outcome as a “default.” Even if this
outcome is not described as in any way morally good or
right, the claim is that it will nonetheless be seen as
having a particular sort of status that will prove relevant
in people’s subsequent cognition.
I think that the commentators are exactly right on this
score, and I look forward to further research expanding
on this theme. My only disagreement, if it can be con-
sidered a disagreement at all, is on the level of rhetoric.
The commentators see themselves as deflating the
claims made in the target article, showing that moral con-
siderations are actually less central than I had originally
suggested. By contrast, I would describe them as radica-
lizing the target article’s original thesis. What they are
showing is that it is not even possible to isolate a parti-
cular point in the process where the moral judgments
come in. Instead, moral and statistical considerations
appear to be welded seamlessly together from the very
beginning.
R2.5. Morality and language
However, a number of commentators actually suggested
moving in the opposite direction. They proposed theories
according to which moral considerations are confined to a
single, highly delimited role, while the remainder of the
process has nothing to do with morality and proceeds
more or less like a scientific investigation.
In particular, Egre´ and Cova, Dupoux, & Jacob
(Cova et al.) suggest that the role of moral considerations
might be confined entirely to language. The basic idea
here is a simple and powerful one. Suppose that people’s
actual capacity for theory-of-mind works by classifying
attitudes along a continuous scale. Still, it might be that
our language cannot describe attitudes in these purely
continuous terms. If we want to capture an agent’s attitude
in language, we need to impose some kind of threshold
and then say that a particular term or phrase applies when-
ever the attitude goes beyond this threshold. So perhaps it
is there that morality enters into the picture. In other
words, it might be that the underlying scale is entirely
non-moral, but that morality plays a role in the process
we use to determine the position of the threshold for par-
ticular linguistic expressions.
One way of spelling out this sort of account would be to
represent the underlying scale using numbers. We could
say that the number 0 stands for absolute indifference,
the positive numbers stand for pro-attitudes, and the
negative numbers for con-attitudes. A particular agent’s
attitude could be represented using the diagram shown
in Figure R1:
Yet, although people would have some representation of
the agent’s attitude along this scale, the actual expressions
of natural language would not correspond to points on the
scale in any absolute sense. So there would not be any
expressions in English that could describe an agent as
having an attitude of, say, “þ2 or higher.” Instead, all of
the expressions of natural language would stand in a
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more complex relationship to the scale. They would
characterize the agent’s attitude relative to a (partially
moral) default. Thus, if it turned out in the case at hand
that the default was to an attitude of -1, the expressions
of our language would describe the agent’s attitude only
relative to this default position, characterizing it as “3
points past the default.”
There is, however, another possible way in which this
system could work. It could be that human beings do
not make use of any purely absolute representations at
any stage of processing. Instead, the attitude would be rep-
resented from the very beginning in terms of its position
relative to the default. We would start by labeling the 0
point as default and then represent the agent’s attitude
like this (Fig. R2):
On this latter view, the comparison with the default is
already available in people’s underlying, nonlinguistic
representation of the attitude. The expressions of natural
language can then correspond in a straightforward way
to these nonlinguistic representations.
The primary difference between these two hypotheses is
that the first posits an entirely non-moral representation,
which is then obscured in certain ways by complex linguis-
tic rules, whereas the second does not posit any purely
non-moral representation at any level. The key to adjudi-
cating between these hypotheses, then, is to come up
with a richer account of what the non-moral represen-
tation is supposed to be doing. Given that it is not necess-
ary as an explanation for the way people use expressions in
natural language, what exactly is it used for? If we had a
better account of what the non-moral representation was
supposed to be doing, we would be better able to decide
whether it is actually there.
R2.6. Characterizing the effect
The target article claims that moral considerations play a
surprisingly important role in people’s cognition. In
trying to characterize this role, I adopted a number of
different formulations. Sometimes I said that moral con-
siderations figure in people’s competence, sometimes that
moral considerations suffuse the process through and
through. The commentators suggest that both of those for-
mulations are misleading and unhelpful.
Alexander, Mallon, & Weinberg (Alexander et al.)
point out that no clear criteria are ever given for picking
out a “competence” and distinguishing it from the
various other factors that impact people’s intuitions.
They therefore suggest that we dispense with this distinc-
tion between competence and other factors and simply
focus on exploring the various different processes that
impact people’s intuitions.
Stich & Wysocki note that there is a perfectly clear
sense in which my own account does not have moral con-
siderations influencing the process “through and through.”
On the contrary, the account says that moral consider-
ations play a role in one specific part of the process but
do not exert any influence on certain other parts.
These are both excellent points, and I agree that the for-
mulations adopted in the target article may indeed be
unhelpful in certain respects. So instead of defending
what I wrote there, let me simply accept these criticisms
and try now to formulate the point more accurately.
My aim in the target article was to argue against a par-
ticular vision. This vision distinguishes two aspects of the
processes that generate people’s intuitions:
1. A kind of “underlying” or “fundamental” capacity
2. Various additional factors that in some way “bias” or
“distort” people’s intuitions
The claim, then, is that the fundamental capacity is
entirely non-moral and that the impact of moral consider-
ations only arises because of the presence of these distort-
ing factors.
Now, the distinction between these two aspects might
be spelled out in various different ways, and different
researchers would presumably adopt quite different
accounts of the distinction. What unites all of these
various accounts, however, is the claim that we can carve
off a distinct capacity that is entirely non-moral and that
is capable, all by itself, of generating an answer to the
issue in question. Hence, faced with a person’s intuition
about intentional action, we might say: “This person’s fun-
damental capacity for theory-of-mind would normally
have classified this behavior as unintentional. However,
her moral judgments got in the way and led her to
regard it as intentional.”
My aim was to show that this sort of strategy cannot be
made to work. On the view I develop, there simply is no
distinct capacity that is entirely non-moral and that is
capable, all by itself, of determining whether a behavior
is intentional or unintentional. Thus, on the model pro-
vided in the target article, there would be no sense in
asking a question like: “Suppose we got rid of all the
moral considerations and just allowed people’s fundamen-
tal capacity for theory-of-mind to proceed undisturbed.
Which conclusion would they then draw about whether
this behavior was intentional?” The trouble here is that
the model does not involve any kind of distinct non-
moral capacity which could answer the question in the
absence of all moral considerations.
Note that this argument does not require me to say any-
thing positive about the distinction between competence
and performance. Nor does it require me to claim that
there is no stage anywhere in the process that is untouched
by moral considerations. All it requires is a kind of negative
claim. Specifically: that it not be possible to isolate a dis-
tinct capacity that has a particular sort of non-moral
character.
Figure R1. Representation of an agent’s attitude on an absolute
scale.
Figure R2. Representation of an agent’s attitude relative to a
default.
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R3. Ordinary cognition and science
In thinking about people’s ordinary ways of making sense
of the world, it sometimes proves helpful to draw analogies
with more systematic and explicit systems of thought. So
one might say that people’s ordinary understanding is
similar in certain respects to Aristotelian metaphysics, or
to legal theory, or to certain religious doctrines. These ana-
logies can then help to illuminate aspects of this ordinary
understanding that might otherwise have remained
obscure.
One particularly common analogy here has been
between people’s ordinary understanding and systematic
science. This analogy calls up a specific picture of what
the human mind is like. A scientific researcher might
have two different kinds of beliefs in a particular domain –
a system of scientific beliefs and then, quite separately, a
system of moral beliefs. Such a researcher might then find
that her collaborators strongly disagree with her moral
beliefs but that they are nonetheless in complete agreement
with her scientific beliefs.
In the target article, I argued that this analogy was mis-
leading. People’s ordinary cognition does not appear to
involve a clear distinction between purely “scientific”
beliefs and moral beliefs. It might be helpful, therefore,
to reject the analogy with science and to look instead at
analogies between ordinary cognition and forms of sys-
tematic thought in which moral and non-moral consider-
ations are more explicitly mixed.
R3.1. The relevance of moral considerations
Spurrett & Martin argue that there is little to be gained
by discussing the respects in which ordinary cognition
might or might not resemble science. Instead, they
suggest that we simply focus directly on the ways in
which people apply specific considerations to address par-
ticular questions. Adopting this latter approach, they claim
that the effects described in the target article are best
characterized as “fallacies of relevance.” That is, these
effects are best understood as cases in which people
apply moral considerations to questions in which only
non-moral considerations would be relevant.
Spurrett & Martin may turn out in the end to be right
on this score, but it is important to emphasize that the
claim they are making is precisely the claim that is up
for debate here. The central thesis of the target article
was that people’s ordinary cognition is radically different
from scientific inquiry and that, in particular, ordinary
questions like “Who caused the problem?” are not best
understood on the model of scientific questions about
causal relations. So, on the view defended in the target
article, moral considerations actually are relevant to the
ordinary questions people ask about whether one thing
caused another, and there is no fallacy involved in applying
such considerations to questions like these.
R3.2. Science and development
Kushnir & Chernyak suggest that the analogy to science
might apply not so much to the beliefs people have at any
given time but rather to the development of these beliefs in
the first place. Hence, the beliefs people hold as adults
might be radically different in various respects from the
beliefs held by trained scientists, but the process people
go through as children to acquire those beliefs might
turn out to show many of the stages characteristic of scien-
tific inquiry: looking for evidence, checking its fit to exist-
ing views, modifying these views when they do not fit the
evidence, and so forth.
Kushnir & Chernyak’s reference to the developmen-
tal literature here is a very helpful one, and future research
could examine these developmental issues more directly.
But it seems important at the outset to emphasize the
very distinctive claim one makes when one says that ordin-
ary human cognition resembles science. Such a claim
presumably is not merely saying that ordinary human cog-
nition involves taking in evidence and using it to assess
prior views (a claim which is obviously true and needs
no further defense). Instead, the claim seems to be an
interesting and controversial one, which says something
in particular about the precise way in which human
beings use evidence to update their beliefs.
To see why, consider the way we might apply a similar
approach in another domain. Suppose that someone says,
“Human visual cognition uses Fourier transforms.” The
claim here is presumably not just that human visual cognition
uses some kind of computation. Rather, what is being
claimed is that visual cognition makes use of one specific
kind of computation – a kind of computation that was first
formalized by modern mathematicians and is now known
as a Fourier transform. This is an interesting hypothesis,
which can be put to the test in further experimental studies.
Now suppose that someone says: “Human cognitive
development uses the methods of science.” In just the
same way, this claim cannot simply mean that cognitive
development involves taking in evidence and using it to
adjust our beliefs. (After all, that basic approach long pre-
dates the development of systematic science and can be
found in an enormous variety of quite different modes of
thought.) Rather, the claim has to be understood as
saying that cognitive development makes use of the sorts
of methods, first made explicit in the “scientific revolution”
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that are now
regarded as the distinctive methods of science. This is cer-
tainly an interesting hypothesis, which we can set about
testing in experimental studies.
The thesis of the target article, however, was that exist-
ing experiments do not suggest that this hypothesis is
correct. If we look to the distinctive characteristics of
science – the characteristics that distinguish science
from other systematic modes of thought – we find that
people’s ordinary non-conscious cognition does not tend
to show these characteristics. For that reason, it might
be helpful to understand ordinary cognition, not by
looking to an analogy with contemporary science, but by
looking to an analogy with the earlier modes of thought
that the scientific revolution displaced.
R3.3. The function of theory-of-mind
Yet, even if the methods people use in ordinary theory-of-
mind turn out to be radically different from the one we
find at work in science, the function of theory-of-mind
might be exactly the same as the function of scientific psy-
chology. Thus, it might be that people’s ordinary theory-
of-mind makes use of moral considerations, but that
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there is some sense in which its aim is simply to generate
accurate predictions and explanations of behavior.
Exploring this possibility, Bartsch & Young suggest that
the impact of moral considerations might be understood
in terms of information about frequency or probability.
Suppose people generally assume that morally bad beha-
viors are infrequent or improbable. The judgment that a be-
havior was morally bad would then impact their statistical
understanding, which could in turn influence their intui-
tions about intention, causation, and the like.
A number of other commentators take up related
themes. Baldo & Barberousse propose that affective
reactions can themselves serve as information and that
this information may influence people’s intuitions. And
Lombrozo & Uttich point out that, even if moral con-
siderations are entering into people’s judgments at the
algorithmic level, the best description at the compu-
tational level might still be in terms of an attempt to
predict and explain behavior.
Now, it certainly does seem to be the case that people
can sometimes use moral judgments to arrive at statistical
truths, and these proposals therefore merit closer analysis.
We should distinguish, however, between two possible
ways in which the proposals might be interpreted.
One possible claim would be about the actual cognitive
process people go through on-line. It might be claimed, for
example, that people make a moral judgment, then use this
judgment to make an inference about the frequency of the
relevant behaviors, which in turn influences their intuitions
about causation. If the proposal is understood in this way, I
think that it is probably false. The problem is that when
researchers independently vary information about frequency
and moral status, they continue to find that moral status is
playing an independent role (Roxborough & Cumby 2009).
But perhaps there is another, very different way of
understanding the proposal. One might say that facts
about frequencies are playing a role, not at the level of
people’s on-line cognition, but rather at the level of an
“ultimate” or “evolutionary” explanation. Thus, suppose
that theory-of-mind evolved as a mechanism for predicting
and explaining behavior. Then, if violations of moral norms
were generally infrequent, knowing that a behavior
violated a norm might be a good cue for making certain
statistical judgments about it, and our capacity for theory-
of-mind might therefore have evolved to take moral con-
siderations into account. In other words, the actual
sequence of cognitive processes taking place in people’s
minds might involve all sorts of irreducibly moral apprai-
sals, but the best evolutionary explanation of this process
might be that it generally serves to enable accurate predic-
tion. (For an especially clear defense of this approach, see
the commentary by Lombrozo & Uttich.)
What we have here is a quite interesting hypothesis, but
it is hard to know exactly how one might put it to the test
empirically. In essence, we are dealing with a conflict
between two very different visions. One vision focuses
specifically on the nature of people’s capacity for theory-
of-mind. It says that this capacity has a particular
“purpose” or “function” – for example, to accurately
predict and explain behavior – and the patterns of intui-
tion under discussion here can be explained in terms of
their tendency to fulfill that function. By contrast, the
vision I develop in the target article emphasizes certain
general principles governing human cognition as a
whole. The claim, then, is that the patterns we find in
people’s theory-of-mind judgments are not best under-
stood as fulfilling any kind of purpose that is specific to
theory-of-mind. Rather, these patterns simply reflect
certain perfectly general principles about the impact of
moral judgment on human cognition.
Clearly, the debate between these two visions is not the
sort of thing that could be settled by a single critical exper-
iment. Nonetheless, it does seem that further studies can
offer us some illumination here. The key thing to notice is
that the theory advanced in the target article predicts that
the effects found in theory-of-mind should also be found
in other domains that have nothing to do with theory-of-
mind or even with prediction and explanation. So we can
test the theory by looking to these other domains and check-
ing to see whether similar effects are found there. An initial
step in that direction can be found in the commentaries from
Egre´ and fromCova et al., both of which show an impact of
moral judgment on the use of quantifiers like many. If we
continue to find effects of that basic type, we will gradually
acquire stronger and stronger reasons to conclude that the
effects under discussion here are best explained in terms
of very general facts about the structure of human cognition.
R3.4. The cognitive basis of science
Suppose, then, that people’s ordinary way of making sense
of the world really is deeply different from what one finds
in systematic science. A question now arises about how the
emergence of systematic science could even have been
possible. Given that science is itself a human invention,
how could the methods of science have ended up diver-
ging so substantially from the methods characteristic of
ordinary human cognition?
Levy offers a fascinating answer to this question. He
suggests that the solution lies in the social character of
science. In other words, the solution is not that each indi-
vidual scientist can somehow enter a kind of special
psychological state that allows her to transcend the limit-
ations of ordinary human cognition and put all of her
moral views to one side. Rather, the key point is that scien-
tific inquiry is pursued by a whole community of different
individuals, each of whom holds a slightly different set of
moral views, and that this community as a whole is able
to engage in a kind of inquiry that no single person
could follow through on her own.
This suggestion strikes me as a deeply intriguing and
promising one, and it would be wonderful to put it to the
test in further experimental studies. Ideally, one would
want to bring scientists into the lab and look systematically
at the factors that influence their judgments. Assuming that
scientists show many of the same effects found in lay
people (e.g., Mercier & Sperber, forthcoming), there is
good reason to expect that the presence of a broader com-
munity would have a substantial impact on their ability to
call into question their own initial intuitions.
R4. Conclusion
Replies like this one are governed by some peculiar expec-
tations. The author is supposed to fend off all the commen-
tators’ objections and show that his or her original article
was actually completely correct all along. But, of course,
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I don’t actually believe anything like that. A number of the
hypotheses I defended in the past were subsequently
refuted by other researchers, and I am sure that many of
the hypotheses I have defended here will meet with a
similar fate. Accordingly, it might be best to conclude,
not by summarizing the views I hold right now, but
rather by saying a few words about where things might
move in the future.
When I first started investigating the impact of moral
judgments on intuitions about intentional action, I
assumed that most of people’s cognition was entirely
non-moral, and I therefore introduced a series of ad hoc
maneuvers to explain the new experimental results. That
strategy turned out to be completely misguided. As
researchers began uncovering more and more cases in
which morality influenced people’s intuitions, it became
ever more clear that we needed a theory that offered a
more abstract characterization of the impact of morality
on people’s cognition as a whole.
I suspect that we will actually have to move even farther
in that direction. As a number of the commentators noted, it
might be a mistake to look for some special place where
moral considerations enter the picture. Instead, we might
need to develop a view on which the mind makes little dis-
tinction between moral and non-moral factors, so that the
very same theory that explains the impact of moral consider-
ations also explains our ability to make apparently “scienti-
fic” use of purely statistical or descriptive information.
NOTE
1. A quick note about the relevance of these data: The claim
under discussion here is that judgments of counterfactual rel-
evance play a role in intuitions about, e.g., causation. Hence,
this claim yields the prediction that any factor that impacts judg-
ments of counterfactual relevance should also impact intuitions
about causation. In other words, if we uncover five different
factors that influence judgments of counterfactual relevance,
we should predict that all five of these factors influence causal
intuitions, as well.
However, the claim does not also go the other way. We are not
claiming that counterfactual thinking is the only thing that ever
affects causal intuitions, so we are not claiming that every
factor that influences causal intuitions must also influence coun-
terfactual reasoning. On the contrary, as Menzies helpfully
notes, a whole series of excellent studies have shown that
people’s causal intuitions can be influenced by factors that
seem not to play a role in counterfactual thinking.
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